

526 K. 22.

AN
INQUIRY
INTO THE
ORIGINAL of our IDEAS
OF
BEAUTY and VIRTUE;
In Two TREATISES.

IN WHICH

The Principles of the late Earl of SHAFTESBURY
are Explain'd and Defended, against the Author of
the *Fable of the Bees* :

AND THE

Ideas of *Moral Good* and *Evil* are establish'd, accord-
ing to the Sentiments of the Antient *Moralists*.

With an Attempt to introduce a *Mathematical Calcul-*
ation in Subjects of *Morality*.

Itaque eorum ipsorum quæ aspectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud
animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium
sentit : Quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad ani-
mum transferens, multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, con-
stantiam, ordinem in consiliis, factisque conservandum putat :
Quibus ex rebus confiat & efficitur id quod quærimus honest-
um : Quod etiamsi nobilitatum non sit, tamen honestum sit :
quodque etiamsi à nullo laudetur, naturâ est laudabile. Formam
quidem ipsam & faciem honesti vides, quæ si oculis cerneretur,
mirabiles amores excitaret sapientia. *Cic. de Off. lib. I. c. 4.*

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TO
BEAUTY AND VIRTUE



THE PRINCIPLES OF
AND
THE

T H E

P R E F A C E.

THERE is no part of Philosophy of more importance, than a just Knowledge of human Nature, and its various Powers and Dispositions. Our late Inquiries have been very much employ'd about our Understanding, and the several Methods of obtaining Truth. We generally acknowledge, that the Importance of any Truth is nothing else than its Moment, or Efficacy to make Men happy, or to give them the greatest and most lasting Pleasure; and Wisdom denotes only a Capacity of pursuing this End by the best Means. It must surely then be of the greatest importance to have distinct Conceptions of this End it self, as well as of the Means necessary to obtain it; that we may find out which are the greatest and most lasting Pleasures, and not employ our Reason, after all our laborious Improvements of it, in trifling Pursuits. It is to be fear'd indeed, that most of our Studys without this Inquiry will be of very little use to us; for they seem to have scarce

any other tendency than to lead us into speculative Knowledge it self. Nor are we distinctly told how it is that Knowledge or Truth is pleasant to us.

THIS Consideration set the Author of the following Papers about inquiring into the various Pleasures which human Nature is capable of receiving. We shall generally find in our modern philosophic Writings, nothing further on this Head, than some bare Division of them into Sensible, and Rational, and some trite commonplace Arguments to prove the latter to be more valuable than the former. Our sensible Pleasures are slightly pass'd over, and explain'd only by some Instances in Tastes, Smells, Sounds, or such like, which Men of any tolerable Reflection generally look upon as very trifling Satisfactions. Our rational Pleasures have had much the same kind of treatment. We are seldom taught any other Notion of rational Pleasure than that which we have upon reflecting on our Possession, or claim to those Objects, which may be occasions of Pleasure; such Objects we call advantageous; but Advantage, or Interest, cannot be distinctly conceiv'd till we know what these Pleasures are which advantageous Objects are apt to excite; and what Senses or Powers of Perception we have about such Objects. We may perhaps see Reason to imagine such an Inquiry

The PREFACE.

v

ry of more importance in Morals, to prove what we call the reality of Virtue, or that it is the surest Happiness of the Agent, than one would at first imagine.

I N reflecting upon our external Senses, we plainly see, that our Perceptions of Pleasure, or Pain, do not depend directly on our Will. Objects do not please us according as we incline they should: The presence of some Objects necessarily pleases us, and the presence of others as necessarily displeases us; nor can we by our Will, any otherwise procure Pleasure, or avoid Pain, than by procuring the former kind of Objects, and avoiding the latter: by the very Frame of our Nature the one is made the occasion of Delight, and the other of Dissatisfaction.

T H E same Observation will hold in all our other Pleasures and Pains; for there are many other sorts of Objects, which please, or displease us as necessarily, as material Objects do when they operate upon our Organs of Sense. There is scarcely any Object which our Minds are employ'd about, which is not thus constituted the necessary occasion of some Pleasure or Pain: Thus we shall find our selves pleas'd with a regular Form, a piece of Architecture, or Painting, a Composition of Notes, a Theorem, an Action, an Affection, a Character:

THE PREFACE.

and we are conscious that this Pleasure necessarily arises from the Contemplation of the Idea, which is then present to our Minds with all its Circumstances, altho some of these Ideas have nothing of what we call sensible Perception in them; and in those which have, the Pleasure arises from some Uniformity, Order, Arrangement, Imitation; and not from the simple Ideas of Colour, or Sound, or mode of Extension separately consider'd.

THESE Determinations to be pleas'd with any Forms or Ideas which occur to our Observation, the Author chuses to call SENSES; distinguishing them from the Powers which commonly go by that Name, by calling our Power of perceiving the Beauty of Regularity, Order, Harmony, an INTERNAL SENSE; and that Determination to be pleas'd with the Contemplation of those Affections, Actions, or Characters of rational Agents, which we call virtuous, he marks by the name of a MORAL SENSE.

*HIS principal Design is to shew,
 " That human Nature was not left quite
 " indifferent in the affair of Virtue, to
 " form to it self Observations concerning
 " the Advantage or Disadvantage of Ac-
 " tions, and accordingly to regulate its
 " Conduct." The weakness of our Reason,
 and the avocations arising from the Infir-
 mity*

The PREFACE.

vii

mity and Necessitys of our Nature, are so great, that very few of Mankind could have form'd those long Deductions of Reason, which may shew some Actions to be in the whole advantageous to the Agent, and their Contrarys pernicious. The AUTHOR of Nature has much better furnish'd us for a virtuous Conduct, than our Moralists seem to imagine, by almost as quick and powerful Instructions, as we have for the preservation of our Bodys: He has made Virtue a lovely Form, to excite our pursuit of it; and has given us strong Affections to be the Springs of each virtuous Action.

THIS moral Sense of Beauty in Actions and Affections may appear strange at first View: Some of our Moralists themselves are offended at it in my LORD SHAFTESBURY; so much they are accus'd to deduce every Approbation, or Aversion, from rational Views of Interest, (except it be merely in the simple Ideas of the external Senses;) and have such a Horror at innate Ideas, which they imagine this borders upon. But this moral Sense has no relation to innate Ideas, as will appear in the second Treatise. Our Gentlemen of good Taste can tell us of a great many Senses, Tastes, and Relishes for Beauty, Harmony, Imitation in Painting and Poetry; and may not we find too in

The P R E F A C E,

Mankind a Relish for a Beauty in Characters, in Manners? I doubt we have made Philosophy, as well as Religion, by our foolish management of it, so austere and ungainly a Form, that a Gentleman cannot easily bring himself to like it; and those who are Strangers to it, can scarcely bear to hear our Description of it: So much is it changed from what was once the delight of the finest Gentlemen among the Antients, and their Recreation after the Hurry of publick Affairs!

I N the first Treatise, the Author perhaps in some Instances has gone too far, in supposing a greater Agreement of Mankind in their Sense of Beauty, than Experience perhaps will confirm; but all he is solicitous about is, to shew, "That there is some Sense of Beauty natural to Men." And we find to the full as great an Agreement of Men in their Relishes of Forms, as in their external Senses, which all agree to be natural; and that Pleasure, or Pain, Delight, or Aversion are naturally join'd to their Perceptions. If the Reader be convinc'd of such Determinations of the Mind to be pleas'd with Forms, Proportions, Resemblances, Theorems, it will be no difficult matter to apprehend another superior Sense natural to Men, determining them to be pleas'd with Actions, Characters, Affections. This is the moral Sense

which

The P R E F A C E.

ix

which makes the Subject of the second Treatise.

T H E proper Occasions of Perception by the external Senses, occur to us as soon as we come into the World; and thence perhaps we easily look upon these Senses to be natural: but the Objects of the superior Senses of Beauty and Virtue generally do not. It is probably some little time before Children do reflect, or at least let us know that they reflect upon Proportion and Similitude; upon Affections, Characters, Tempers; or come to know the external Actions which are Evidences of them: And hence we imagine that their Sense of Beauty, and their moral Sentiments of Actions, must be entirely owing to Instruction and Education; whereas it is full as easy to conceive, how a Character, a Temper, as soon as they are observ'd, may be constituted by NATURE the necessary occasion of Pleasure, or an Object of Approbation, as a Taste or a Sound; tho it be some time before these Objects present themselves to our Observation.

W E R E not the Author diffident of his own Performance, as too inconsiderable to have any great Names mention'd in it, he would have publickly acknowledg'd his Obligations to a certain LORD (whose Name would have had no small Authority with

The PREFACE.

with the learned World) for admitting him into his Acquaintance, and giving him some Remarks in Conversation, which have very much improv'd these Papers beyond what they were at first. The Author might have found good Materials for a modern Dedication from the active parts of his Life, as well as from his Learning and Reflection; but he knows him to be one of that sort,

Cui male si palpere, recalcitrat undique tutus.*

And therefore, when they come to his Hands again, he only repeats to him the old Dedication with which he first presented them——

——Si quid ego adjuvero, curamve levaffo,

Si quæ te coquat, aut verfet in pectore fixa,

Jam pretium tulerim †.——

THE same Consideration hinders the Author from mentioning a Clergyman, to whom he was much oblig'd for revising these Papers, and for some valuable Remarks. That Gentleman's Character is further known for every Quality becoming

* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 1. v. 20.

† Cicero de Senectute, in initio.

The P R E F A C E.

xi

his Office, than the Author can well presume his Papers ever shall be ; and therefore he thinks he can do him no honour by mentioning him.

W H A T E V E R Faults the Ingenious may find with the Author's Performance, he hopes no body will find any thing in it contrary to Religion or good Manners ; and he shall be well pleas'd if he gives the learned World an occasion of examining more thorowly these Subjects, which are, he presumes, of very considerable Importance. The chief Ground of his Assurance that his Opinions in the main are just, is this, That as he took the first Hints of them from some of the greatest Writers of Antiquity, so the more he has convers'd with them, he finds his Illustrations the more conformable to their Sentiments.

T H E

THE
CONTENTS.

TREATISE I.

- Sect. I. *C*oncerning some Powers of Perception distinct from what is generally understood by Sensation. Page 1
- Sect. II. Of original or absolute Beauty. 14
- Sect. III. Of the Beauty of Theorems. 27
- Sect. IV. Of comparative or relative Beauty. 35
- Sect. V. Concerning our Reasonings about Design and Wildom in the Cause, from the Beauty or Regularity of Effects. 42
- Sect. VI. Concerning the Universality of our Sense of Beauty. 65
- Sect. VII. Concerning the Power of Custom, Education and Example, as to our internal Senses. 79
- Sect. VIII. Of the Importance of the internal Senses in Life, and the final Causes of them. 88

TREA-

THE CONTENTS.

TREATISE II.

INTRODUCTION.

Page 101

Sect. I. *Of the moral Sense by which we perceive Virtue and Vice, and approve, or disapprove them in others.* 107

Sect. II. *Concerning the immediate Motive to virtuous Actions.* 125

Sect. III. *The Sense of Virtue, and the various Opinions about it, reducible to one general Foundation. The manner of computing the Morality of Actions.* 150

Sect. IV. *All Mankind agree in this general Foundation of their Approbation of moral Actions. The Grounds of different Opinions about Morals.* 179

Sect. V. *A further Confirmation that we have practical Dispositions to Virtue implanted in our Nature, with a further Explication of our Instinct to Benevolence in its various Degrees; with the additional Motives of Interest, viz. Honour, Shame, Pity.* 195

Sect. VI. *Concerning the Importance of this moral Sense to the present Happiness of Mankind, and its Influence on human Affairs.* 221

Sect.

The CONTENTS.

Sect. VII. *A Deduction of some complex moral Ideas, viz. of Obligation, and Right, Perfect, Imperfect, and External; Alienable and Unalienable from this moral Sense.*

249

ERRATA.

- P**AGE 1. l. 13. dele Comma after *Perception*.
 P. 14. l. 2. of the Note, dele *as*.
 P. 18. l. 20. instead of a Semicolon, put a full Stop.
 P. 47. l. 8. read *met*.
 P. 69. l. ult. for a Semicolon put a full Stop.
 P. 71. l. penult. for a Semicolon put a full Stop.
 P. 177. l. 13. read thus, *resolve to cultivate, as much as possible,*
 P. 184. l. 7. read *publick*.
 ——— l. 24. after *of* read *the*.
 P. 191. l. 2. after *Sense* put a Comma.
 ——— l. 3. after *Benevolence* put a Comma.
 P. 216. l. 3. from the bottom, for *and* read *or*.

A N
I N Q U I R Y
C O N C E R N I N G
B E A U T Y, O R D E R, &c.


S E C T. I.

*Concerning some Powers of Perception;
distinct from what is generally under-
stood by Sensation.*

TO make the following Observations understood, it may be necessary to premise some Definitions, and Observations either universally acknowledg'd, or sufficiently prov'd by many Writers both ancient and modern, concerning our Perceptions called Sensations, and the Actions of the Mind consequent upon them.

*Art. I. THOSE Ideas that are rais'd in
the Mind upon the presence of external Ob-
jects*

B

Sect. 1. jects, and their acting upon our Bodys, are call'd *Sensations*. We find that the Mind in such Cases is passive, and has not Power directly to prevent the Perception or Idea, or to vary it at its Reception, as long as we continue our Bodys in a state fit to be acted upon by the external Object.

2. WHEN two Perceptions are entirely different from each other, or agree in nothing but the general Idea of Sensation, we call the Powers of receiving those different Perceptions, *different Senses*. Thus Seeing and Hearing denote the different Powers of receiving the Ideas of Colours and Sounds. And altho Colours have vast Differences among themselves, as also have Sounds; yet there is a greater Agreement among the most opposite Colours, than between any Colour and a Sound: Hence we call all Colours Perceptions of the same Sense. All the several Senses seem to have their distinct Organs, except Feeling, which is in some degree diffus'd over the whole Body.

3. THE Mind has a Power of compounding Ideas that were receiv'd separately, of comparing their Objects by means of the Ideas, and of observing their Relations and Proportions; of enlarging and diminishing its Ideas at pleasure, or in any certain Ratio,
or

BEAUTY, ORDER, &c.

3

or Degree; and of considering separately Sect. 1.
each of the simple Ideas, which might per-
haps have been impress'd jointly in the Sen-
sation. This last Operation we common-
ly call Abstraction.


4. THE Ideas of Substances are compound-
ed of the various simple Ideas jointly im-
press'd, when they presented themselves to
our Senses. We define Substances only by e-
numerating these sensible Ideas: And such
Definitions may raise an Idea clear enough
of the Substance in the Mind of one who
never immediately perceiv'd the Substance;
provided he has separately receiv'd by
his Senses all the simple Ideas that are in
the Composition of the complex one of
the Substance defin'd: But if he has not re-
ceived any of these Ideas, or wants the
Senses necessary for the Perception of them;
no Definition can ever raise in him any
Idea of that Sense in which he is deficient.

5. MANY of our sensitive Perceptions
are pleasant, and many painful, immedi-
ately, and that without any knowledge of
the Cause of this Pleasure or Pain, or how the
Objects excite it, or are the Occasions of
it; or without seeing to what further Ad-
vantage or Detriment the Use of such Ob-
jects might tend: Nor would the most ac-
curate Knowledge of these things vary ei-
ther the Pleasure or Pain of the Perception,

Sect. I. however it might give a rational Pleasure distinct from the sensible ; or might raise a distinct Joy, from prospect of further Advantage in the Object, or Aversion, from apprehension of Evil.

6. HENCE it follows, that when Instruction, Education, or Prejudice of any kind, raise any Desire or Aversion toward an Object, this Desire or Aversion must be founded upon an Opinion of some Perfection, or of some Deficiency in those Qualitys for Perception, of which we have the proper Senses. Thus if Beauty be desir'd by one who has not the Sense of Sight, the Desire must be rais'd by some apprehended Regularity of Figure, Sweetness of Voice, Smoothness or Softness, or some other Quality perceivable by the other Senses, without relation to the Ideas of Colour.

7. THE Ideas raised in different Persons by the same Object, are probably different, when they disagree in their Approbation or Dislike ; and in the same Person, when his Fancy at one time differs from what it was at another. This will appear from reflecting on those Objects, to which we have now an Aversion, tho they were formerly agreeable : And we shall generally find that there is some accidental Conjunction of a disagreeable Idea, which always recurs with the Object ; as in those Wines which Men

acquire an Aversion to, after they have ta- Sect. 1.
ken them in an Emetick Preparation: In 
this case we are conscious that the Idea is
alter'd from what it was when that Wine
was agreeable, by the Conjunction of the
Ideas of Loathing and Sickness of Stomach.
The like Change of Idea may be insensibly
made by the Change of our Bodys as we
advance in Years, which may occasion an
Indifference towards Meats we were fond
of in our Childhood.

WE shall not find it perhaps so easy to
account for the Diversity of Fancy in our
Dress, and some other Affairs; and yet this
may arise from a like accidental Conjunction
of Ideas: as for instance, if either from
any thing in Nature, or from the Opinion
of our Country or Acquaintance, the fancy-
ing of glaring Colours be look'd upon as
an evidence of Levity, or of any other evil
Quality of Mind; or if any Colour or Fa-
shion be commonly us'd by Rusticks, or
by Men of any disagreeable Profession, Em-
ployment, or Temper; these additional
Ideas may recur constantly with that of the
Colour or Fashion, and cause a constant Dis-
like to them in those who join the additio-
nal Ideas, altho the Colour or Form be no
way disagreeable of themselves, and actu-
ally do please others who join no such
Ideas to them. But there does not seem to
be any Ground to believe such a Diversity

Sect. I. in human Minds, as that the same Idea or Perception should give pleasure to one and pain to another, or to the same Person at different Times; not to say that it seems a Contradiction, that the same Idea should do so.

8. THE only Pleasure of Sense, that our Philosophers seem to consider, is that which accompanys the simple Ideas of Sensation: But there are vastly greater Pleasures in those complex Ideas of Objects, which obtain the Names of Beautiful, Regular, Harmonious. Thus every one acknowledges he is more delighted with a fine Face, a just Picture, than with the View of any one Colour, were it as strong and lively as possible; and more pleas'd with a Prospect of the Sun rising among settled Clouds, and colouring their Edges, with a starry Hemisphere, a fine Landskip, a regular Building; than with a clear blue Sky, a smooth Sea, or a large open Plain, not diversify'd by Woods, Hills, Waters, Buildings: And yet even these latter Appearances are not quite simple. So in Musick, the Pleasure of fine Composition is incomparably greater than that of any one Note, how sweet, full, or swelling soever.

9. LET it be observ'd, that in the following Papers, the word Beauty is taken for the Idea rais'd in us, and a Sense of Beauty

ty for our Power of receiving this Idea. Sect. 1.
Harmony also denotes our pleasant Ideas arising from composition of Sounds, and a good Ear (as it is generally taken) a Power of perceiving this Pleasure. In the following Sections, an Attempt is made to discover what is the immediate Occasion of these pleasant Ideas, or what real Quality in the Objects ordinarily excites them.

10. IT is of no consequence whether we call these Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, Perceptions of the External Senses of Seeing and Hearing, or not. I should rather chuse to call our Power of perceiving these Ideas, an *Internal Sense*, were it only for the Convenience of distinguishing them from other Sensations of Seeing and Hearing, which men may have without Perception of Beauty and Harmony. It is plain from Experience, that many Men have, in the common meaning, the Senses of Seeing and Hearing perfect enough; they perceive all the simple Ideas separately, and have their Pleasures; they distinguish them from each other, such as one Colour from another, either quite different, or the stronger or fainter of the same Colour; they can tell in separate Notes, the higher, lower, sharper or flatter, when separately sounded; in Figures they discern the Length, Breadth, Wideness, of each Line, Surface, Angle; and may be as capable of hearing and see-

Sect. I. ing at great distances as any men whatsoever: And yet perhaps they shall relish no pleasure in Musical Compositions, in Painting, Architecture, natural Landskip; or but a very weak one in comparison of what others enjoy from the same Objects. This greater Capacity of receiving such pleasant Ideas we commonly call a fine Genius or Taste: In Musick we seem universally to acknowledge something like a distinct Sense from the External one of Hearing, and call it a *good Ear*; and the like distinction we wou'd probably acknowledge in other Affairs, had we also got distinct Names to denote these Powers of Perception by.

II. THERE will appear another Reason perhaps afterwards, for calling this Power of perceiving the Ideas of Beauty, an *Internal Sense*, from this, that in some other Affairs, where our External Senses are not much concern'd, we discern a sort of Beauty, very like, in many respects, to that observ'd in sensible Objects, and accompany'd with like pleasure: Such is that Beauty perceiv'd in Theorems, or universal Truths, in general Causes, and in some extensive Principles of Action,

12. LET every one here consider, how different we must suppose the Perception to be, with which a Poet is transported upon the Prospect of any of those Objects
of

of natural Beauty, which ravish us even in Sect. 1.
his Description ; from that cold lifeless Con-
ception which we imagine to be in a dull
Critick, or one of the Virtuosi, without
what we call a fine Taste. This latter Class
of Men may have greater Perfection in that
Knowledge, which is deriv'd from exter-
nal Sensation ; they can tell all the speci-
fick Differences of Trees, Herbs, Minerals,
Metals ; they know the Form of every Leaf,
Stalk, Root, Flower, and Seed of all the
Species, about which the Poet is often very
ignorant : And yet the Poet shall have a
vastly more delightful Perception of the
Whole ; and not only the Poet, but any
man of a fine Taste. Our External Sense
may by Measuring teach us all the Propor-
tions of Architecture to the Tenth of an
Inch, and the Situation of every Muscle in
the human Body ; and a good Memory may
retain these ; and yet there is still some-
thing further necessary, not only to make
a compleat Master in Architecture, Paint-
ing, or Statuary, but even a tolerable Judge
in these Works ; or to receive the highest
pleasure in contemplating them. Since
then there are such different Powers of
Perception, where what are commonly
called the External Senses are the same ;
since the most accurate Knowledge of what
the External Senses discover, often does not
give the pleasure of Beauty or Harmony,
which yet one of a good Taste will en-
joy

Sect. 1. joy at once without much Knowledge ; we
 may justly use another Name for these
 higher and more delightful Perceptions of
 Beauty and Harmony, and call the Power
 of receiving such Impressions, an *Internal*
Sense. The Difference of the Perceptions
 seems sufficient to vindicate the Use of a
 different Name.

13. THIS superior Power of Perception
 is justly called a *Sense*, because of its Affi-
 nity to the other Senses in this, that the Plea-
 sure does not arise from any Knowledge of
 Principles, Proportions, Causes, or of the
 Usefulness of the Object ; but strikes us at
 first with the Idea of Beauty : nor does
 the most accurate Knowledge increase this
 Pleasure of Beauty, however it * may su-
 per-add a distinct rational Pleasure from
 prospects of Advantage, or from the In-
 crease of Knowledge.

14. AND further, the Ideas of Beauty
 and Harmony, like other sensible Ideas,
 are necessarily pleasant to us, as well as im-
 mediately so ; neither can any Resolution
 of our own, nor any Prospect of Advantage
 or Disadvantage, vary the Beauty or De-
 formity of an Object : For as in the exter-
 nal Sensations, no View of Interest will make
 an Object grateful, nor Detriment, distinct

* See above, Art. 5.

from immediate Pain in the Perception, Sect. I. make it disagreeable to the Sense ; so propose the whole World as a Reward, or threaten the greatest Evil, to make us approve a deform'd Object, or disapprove a beautiful one ; Dissimulation may be procur'd by Rewards or Threatnings, or we may in external Conduct abstain from any pursuit of the Beautiful, and pursue the Deform'd ; but our Sentiments of the Forms, and our Perceptions, would continue invariably the same.

15. HENCE it plainly appears, that some Objects are immediately the Occasions of this Pleasure of Beauty, and that we have Senses fitted for perceiving it ; and that it is distinct from that Joy which arises from Self-love upon prospect of Advantage : Nay, do not we often see Conveniency and Use neglected to obtain Beauty, without any other prospect of Advantage in the Beautiful Form, than the suggesting the pleasant Ideas of Beauty ? Now this shews us, that however we may pursue beautiful Objects from Self-love, with a view to obtain the Pleasures of Beauty, as in Architecture, Gardening, and many other Affairs ; yet there must be a Sense of Beauty, antecedent to Prospects of even this Advantage, without which Sense, these Objects would not be thus advantageous, nor excite in us this pleasure which constitutes them advantageous. Our
Sense

Sect. 1. Sense of Beauty from Objects, by which they are constituted good to us, is very distinct from our Desire of them when they are thus constituted: Our Desire of Beauty may be counter-ballanc'd by Rewards or Threatnings, but never our Sense of it; even as Fear of Death, or Love of Life, may make us chuse and desire a bitter Potion, or neglect those Meats which the Sense of Taste would recommend as pleasant; and yet no prospect of Advantage, or Fear of Evil, can make that Potion agreeable to the Sense, or Meats disagreeable to it, that were not so antecedently to this Prospect. Just in the same manner as to the Sense of Beauty and Harmony; that the pursuit of such Objects is frequently neglected, from prospects of Advantage, Aversion to Labour, or any other Motive of Self-love, does not prove that we have no Sense of Beauty, but only that our Desire of it may be counter-ballanced by a stronger Desire: So Gold out-weighing Silver, is never adduc'd as a proof that the latter is void of Gravity.

16. HAD we no such Sense of Beauty and Harmony; Houses, Gardens, Dress, Equipage might have been recommended to us as convenient, fruitful, warm, easy; but never as beautiful: And in Faces I see nothing that could please us, but Liveliness of Colour, and Smoothness of Surface: And yet

no-

nothing is more certain, than that all these Sect. 1.
Objects are recommended under quite different views on many occasions: And no Custom, Education, or Example could ever give us Perceptions distinct from those of the Senses which we had the use of before, or recommend Objects under another Conception than grateful to * them. But of the Influence of Custom, Education, Example, upon the Sense of Beauty, we shall treat below †.

17. BEAUTY is either Original, or Comparative; or if any like the Terms better, Absolute, or Relative: Only let it be noted, that by Absolute or Original Beauty, is not understood any Quality suppos'd to be in the Object, that should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any Mind which perceives it: For Beauty, like other Names of sensible Ideas, properly denotes the Perception of some Mind; so Cold, Heat, Sweet, Bitter, denote the Sensations in our Minds, to which perhaps there is no resemblance in the Objects that excite these Ideas in us, however we generally imagine that there is something in the Object just like our Perception. The Ideas of Beauty and Harmony being excited upon our Perception of some primary Quality, and having relation to Figure and Time, may indeed have

* See Art. 6.

† Sect. 7.

Sect. 2. a nearer resemblance to Objects, than these Sensations that seem not so much any Pictures of Objects, as Modifications of the perceiving Mind; and yet were there no Mind with a Sense of Beauty to contemplate Objects, I see not how they could be call'd beautiful. We therefore by * Absolute Beauty understand only that Beauty, which we perceive in Objects without comparison to any thing external, of which the Object is suppos'd an Imitation, or Picture; such as that Beauty perceiv'd from the Works of Nature, artificial Forms, Figures, Theorems. Comparative or Relative Beauty is that which we perceive in Objects, commonly considered as Imitations or Resemblances of something else. These two Kinds of Beauty employ the three following Sections.

S E C T. II.

Of Original or Absolute Beauty.

1. **S**INCE it is certain that we have Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, let us examine what Quality in Objects ex-

* This division of Beauty is taken from the different Foundations of Pleasure as to our Sense of it, rather than from the Objects themselves: for most of the following Instances of relative Beauty have also absolute Beauty; and many of the Instances of absolute Beauty, have also relative Beauty in some respect or other. But we may distinctly consider these two Fountains of Pleasure, Uniformity in the Object it self, and Resemblance to some Original.

cites these Ideas, or is the occasion of them. Sect. 2.
And let it be here observ'd, that our Inquiry is only about the Qualitys that are beautiful to Men, or about the Foundation of their Sense of Beauty; for, as was above hinted, Beauty has always relation to the Sense of some Mind; and when we afterwards shew how generally the Objects that occur to us, are beautiful, we mean agreeable to the Sense of Men: for as there are not a few Objects, which seem no way beautiful to Men, so we see a variety of other Animals who seem delighted with them; they may have Senses otherwise constituted than those of Men, and may have the Ideas of Beauty excited by Objects of a quite different Form. We see Animals fitted for every Place; and what to Men appears rude and shapeless, or loathsome, may be to them a Paradise.

2. THAT we may more distinctly discover the general Foundation or Occasion of the Ideas of Beauty among Men, it will be necessary to consider it first in its simpler Kinds, such as occurs to us in regular Figures; and we may perhaps find that the same Foundation extends to all the more complex Species of it.


3. THE Figures that excite in us the Ideas of Beauty, seem to be those in which there is *Uniformity amidst Variety*. There
are

Sect. 2. are many Conceptions of Objects that are agreeable upon other accounts, such as Grandeur, Novelty, Sanctity, and some others, that shall be touched at * afterwards. But what we call Beautiful in Objects, to speak in the Mathematical Style, seems to be in a compound Ratio of Uniformity and Variety; so that where the Uniformity of Bodies is equal, the Beauty is as the Variety; and where the Variety is equal, the Beauty is as the Uniformity. This will be plain from Examples.

FIRST, The Variety increases the Beauty in equal Uniformity. The Beauty of an equilateral Triangle is less than that of the Square; which is less than that of a Pentagon; and this again is surpass'd by the Hexagon. When indeed the Number of Sides is much increas'd, the Proportion of them to the Radius, or Diameter of the Figure, is so much lost to our Observation, that the Beauty does not always increase with the Number of Sides; and the want of Parallelism in the Sides of Heptagons, and other Figures of odd Numbers, may also diminish their Beauty. So in Solids, the Eicosiedron surpasses the Dodecaedron, and this the Octaedron, which is still more beautiful than the Cube; and this again surpasses the regular Pyramid: The obvious

* See *Sect. 6. Art. 11, 12, 13.*


Ground of this, is greater *Variety* with equal *Uniformity*. Sect. 2.



THE greater *Uniformity* increases the *Beauty* amidst equal *Variety*, in these Instances: An Equilateral *Triangle*, or even an *Isoceles*, surpasses the *Scalenum*: A *Square* surpasses the *Rhombus* or Lozenge, and this again the *Rhomboides*, which yet is still more beautiful than the *Trapezium*, or any Figure with irregularly curve Sides. So the regular Solids vastly surpass all other Solids of equal number of plain Surfaces: And the same is observable not only in the Five perfectly regular Solids, but in all those which have any considerable *Uniformity*, as *Cylinders*, *Prisms*, *Pyramids*, *Obelisks*; which please every Eye more than any rude Figures, where there is no *Unity* or Resemblance among the Parts.

INSTANCES of the compound *Ratio* we have in comparing *Circles* or *Spheres*, with *Ellipses* or *Spheroids* not very eccentric; and in comparing the compound Solids, the *Exoctaedron*, and *Eicosidodecaedron*, with the perfectly regular ones of which they are compounded: and we shall find, that the Want of that most perfect *Uniformity* observable in the latter, is compensated by the greater *Variety* in the others, so that the *Beauty* is nearly equal.


Sect. 2.



4. THESE Observations would probably hold true for the most part, and might be confirm'd by the Judgment of Children in the simpler Figures, where the *Variety* is not too great for their Comprehension. And however uncertain some of the particular afore said Instances may seem, yet this is perpetually to be observ'd, that Children are fond of all regular Figures in their little Diversions, altho they be no more convenient, or useful for them, than the Figures of our common Pebbles: We see how early they discover a *Taste* or Sense of *Beauty*, in desiring to see Buildings, regular Gardens, or even Representations of them in Pictures of any kind.

5. IT is the same Foundation which we have for our Sense of *Beauty* in the Works of NATURE; in every part of the World which we call *Beautiful*, there is vast *Uniformity* amidst almost infinite *Variety*. Many Parts of the Universe seem not at all design'd for the use of Man; nay, it is but a very small Spot with which we have any acquaintance. The Figures and Motions of the great Bodys are not obvious to our Senses, but found out by Reasoning and Reflection, upon many long Observations: and yet as far as we can by Sense discover, or by Reasoning enlarge our Knowledge, and extend our Imagination, we generally find the

Struc-

Structure, and Order, and Motion, agreeable Sect. 2.
 to our Sense of *Beauty*. Every particular 
 Object in *Nature* does not indeed appear
beautiful to us; but there is a vast Profusion
 of *Beauty* over most of the Objects which
 occur either to our Senses, or Reasonings up-
 on Observation: For not to mention the ap-
 parent Situation of the heavenly Bodys in
 the Circumference of a great Sphere, which
 is wholly occasion'd by the Imperfection
 of our Sight, in discerning Distances; the
 Forms of all the great Bodys in the Uni-
 verse are nearly Spherical; the Orbits of
 their Revolutions generally Elliptick, and
 without great Eccentricity in those which
 continually occur to our Observation: and
 these are Figures of great *Uniformity*, and
 therefore pleasing to us. Further, to pass
 by the less obvious *Uniformity* in the Pro-
 portion of their Quantitys of Matter, Dis-
 tances, Times of revolving, to each other;
 what can exhibit a greater Instance of *Uni-
 formity amidst Variety*, than the constant
 Tenour of Revolutions in nearly equal
 Times, in each *Planet*, around its Axis, and
 the central Fire or SUN, thro all the Ages
 of which we have any Records, and in near-
 ly the same Orbit? by which, after certain
 Periods, all the same Appearances are again
 renew'd; the alternate Successions of *Light*
 and *Shade*, or *Day* and *Night*, constantly
 pursuing each other around each *Planet*, with
 an agreeable and regular Diversity in the
 C 2 Times

Se^{ct}. 2. Times they possess the various Hemispheres, in the *Summer, Harvest, Winter, and Spring*; and the various *Phases, Aspects, and Situations*, of the *Planets*, to each other, their *Conjunctions* and *Oppositions*, in which they suddenly darken each other with their Conick Shades in Eclipses, are repeated to us at their fixed Periods with invariable Constancy: These are the *Beautys* which charm the *Astronomer*, and make his tedious Calculations pleasant.

Molliter austerum studio fallente laborem *.

6. AGAIN, as to the dry Part of the Surface of our Globe, a great Part of which is cover'd with a very pleasant inoffensive Colour, how *beautifully* is it diversify'd with various Degrees of *Light* and *Shade*, according to the different Situations of the Parts of its Surface, in *Mountains, Valleys, Hills*, and open *Plains*, which are variously inclin'd toward the great LUMINARY!

7 IF we descend to the minuter Works of NATURE, what vast *Uniformity* among all the Species of *Plants* and *Vegetables* in the manner of their Growth and Propagation! what exact Resemblance among all the Plants of the same Species, whose Numbers surpass our Imagination! And this *Uni-*

* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2. v. 12.

formity is not only observable in the Form Sect. 2. in gross; nay, in this it is not so very exact in all Instances, but in the Structure of their minutest Parts, which no Eye unassisted with Glasses can discern. In the almost infinite Multitude of *Leaves, Fruit, Seed, Flowers* of any one Species, we see an exact *Uniformity* in the Structure and Situation of the smallest Fibres. This is the *Beauty* which charms an ingenious *Botanist*. Nay, what vast *Uniformity* and Regularity of Figure is found in each particular *Plant, or Leaf, or Flower!* In all Trees and most smaller Plants, the Stalks or Trunks are either *Cylinders* nearly, or regular *Prisms*; the Branches similar to their several Trunks, arising at nearly regular Distances, when no Accidents retard their natural Growth: In one *Species* the Branches arise in Pairs on the opposite Sides; the perpendicular Plain of Direction of the immediately superior Pair, intersecting the Plain of Direction of the inferior, nearly at right Angles: In another *Species*, the Branches shall spring singly, and alternately, all around in nearly equal Distances: And the Branches in other *Species* shall sprout all in Knots around the Trunk, one for each Year. And in every *Species*, all the Branches in the first Shoots preserve the same Angles with their Trunk; and they again sprout out into smaller Branches exactly after the Manner of their Trunks. Nor ought we to

Sect. 2. pass over that great *Unity* of Colours in all the Flowers of the same Plant or Tree, and often of a whole Species; and their exact Agreement in many shaded Transitions into opposite Colours, in which all the Flowers of the same Plant generally agree, nay often all the Flowers of a Species.

8. AGAIN, as to the *Beauty* of *Animals*, either in their inward Structure, which we come to the Knowledge of by Experiment and long Observation, or their outward Form, we shall find vast *Uniformity* among all the Species which are known to us, in the Structure of those Parts, upon which Life depends more immediately. And how amazing is the *Unity* of Mechanism, when we shall find that almost infinite diversity of Motions, all their Actions in *walking, running, flying, swimming*; all their serious Efforts for *Self-preservation*, all their freakish *Contortions* when they are gay and sportful, in all their various Limbs, perform'd by one simple *Contrivance* of a contracting *Muscle*, apply'd with inconceivable Diversities to answer all these Ends! Various Engines might have obtain'd the same Ends; but then there had been less *Uniformity*, and the *Beauty* of our Animal Systems, and of particular Animals, had been much less, when this surprizing *Unity* of Mechanism had been remov'd from them.

9. AMONG Animals of the same Species, the *Unity* is very obvious, and this Resemblance is the very Ground of our ranking them in such Classes or Species, notwithstanding the great Diversities in Bulk, Colour, Shape, which are observ'd even in those call'd of the same Species. And then in each Individual, what vast *Beauty* arises from the exact Resemblance of all the external double Members to each other, which seems the universal Intention of NATURE, when no Accident prevents it! We see the Want of this Resemblance never fails to pass for an Imperfection, and Want of *Beauty*, tho no other Inconvenience ensues; as when the Eyes are not exactly like, or one Arm or Leg is a little shorter or smaller than its fellow.

10. THERE is a further *Beauty* in Animals, arising from a certain Proportion of the various Parts to each other, which still pleases the sense of Spectators, tho they cannot calculate it with the Accuracy of a *Statuary*. The *Statuary* knows what Proportion of each Part of the Face to the whole Face is most agreeable, and can tell us the same of the Proportion of the Face to the Body, or any Parts of it; and between the Diameters and Lengths of each Limb: When this Proportion of the Head to the Body is remarkably alter'd, we shall have a

Sect. 2. *Giant* or a *Dwarf*. And hence it is, that either the one or the other may be represented to us even in *Miniature*, without Relation to any external Object, by observing how the Body surpasses the Proportion it should have to the Head in *Giants*, and falls below it in *Dwarfs*. There is a further *Beauty* arising from that Figure, which is a natural Indication of *Strength*; but this may be pass'd over, because probably it may be alledg'd, that our Approbation of this Shape flows from opinion of *Advantage*, and not from the Form it self.

THE *Beauty* arising from Mechanism, apparently adapted to the Necessitys and Advantages of any Animal; which pleases us, even tho there be no Advantage to our selves ensuing from it; will be consider'd under the Head of *Relative Beauty*, or *Design* *.

II. THE peculiar *Beauty* of *Fowls* can scarce be omitted, which arises from the vast *Variety* of Feathers, a curious Sort of Machines adapted to many admirable Uses, which retain a vast Resemblance in their Structure among all the Species, and a perfect *Uniformity* in those of the same Species in the corresponding Parts, and in the two Sides of each Individual; besides all the *Beauty* of lively Colours and gradual Shades, not

* See Sect. 4. Art. 7.

only in the external Appearance of the Fowl, Sect. 2. resulting from an artful Combination of shaded Feathers, but often visible even in one Feather separately.

12. IF our Reasonings about the *Nature* of *Fluids* be just, the vast Stores of *Water* will give us an Instance of *Uniformity* in *Nature* above Imagination, when we reflect upon the almost infinite Multitude of small, polish'd, smooth Spheres, which must be suppos'd form'd in all the parts of this Globe. The same *Uniformity* there is probably among the Parts of other *Fluids* as well as *Water*; and the like must be observ'd in several other natural Bodys, as *Salts*, *Sulphurs*, and such like; whose uniform Properties do probably depend upon an *Uniformity* in the Figures of their Parts.

13. UNDER *Original Beauty* we may include *Harmony*, or *Beauty of Sound*, if that Expression can be allow'd, because *Harmony* is not usually conceiv'd as an Imitation of any thing else. *Harmony* often raises Pleasure in those who know not what is the Occasion of it: And yet the Foundation of this Pleasure is known to be a sort of *Uniformity*. When the several Vibrations of one Note regularly coincide with the Vibrations of another, they make an agreeable Composition; and such Notes are call'd *Chords*. Thus the Vibrations of a-

 Sect. 2. ny one Note coincide in Time with every second Vibration of its *Octave*; and two Vibrations of any Note coincide with three of its *Fifth*; and so on in the rest of the *Chords*. Now good Compositions, beside the Frequency of these *Chords*, must retain a general *Unity* of Key, an *Uniformity* among the Parts in *Bars*, *Risings*, *Fallings*, *Closes*. The Necessity of this will appear, by observing the *Dissonance* which would arise from racking Parts of different Tunes together as one, altho both were separately agreeable. A greater *Uniformity* is also observable among the *Bases*, *Tenors*, *Trebles* of the same Tune. Some other Powers of *Musick* may be consider'd afterwards *.

14. BUT in all these Instances of *Beauty* let it be observ'd, That the Pleasure is communicated to those who never reflected on this general Foundation; and that all here alledg'd is this, That the pleasant Sensation arises only from Objects, in which there is *Uniformity amidst Variety*: We may have the Sensation without knowing what is the Occasion of it; as a Man's Taste may suggest Ideas of Sweets, Acids, Bitters, tho he be ignorant of the Forms of the small Bodys, or their Motions, which excite these Perceptions in him.

* See Sect. 6. Art. 12.

S E C T. III.

Of the Beauty of Theorems.

1. **T**H E Beauty of *Theorems*, or universal Truths demonstrated, deserves a distinct Consideration, because of a Nature pretty different from the former kinds of *Beauty*; and yet there is none in which we shall see such an amazing *Variety* with *Uniformity*: and hence arises a very great Pleasure distinct from Prospects of any further Advantage.

2. F O R in one *Theorem* we may find included, with the most exact Agreement, an infinite Multitude of particular Truths; nay, often an Infinity of Infinites: so that altho the Necessity of forming abstract Ideas, and universal *Theorems*, arises perhaps from the Limitation of our Minds, which cannot admit an infinite Multitude of singular Ideas or Judgments at once, yet this Power gives us an Evidence of the Largeness of the human Capacity above our Imagination. Thus for instance, the 47th Proposition of the first Book of EUCLID's Elements contains an infinite Multitude of Truths, concerning the infinite possible Sizes of right-angled *Triangles*, as you make the Area greater or less; and in each of these Sizes you may find an infinite Multitude of dissimilar *Triangles*, as you vary


Sect. 3. vary the Proportion of the *Base* to the *Perpendicular*; all which Infinities of Infinites agree in the general *Theorem*. Thus also one *Fluxional Calculation* shall determine the *Tangents* of all Algebraick *Curves*; of these *Curves* there are infinite Orders and Species possible, of each Species infinite Sizes, or Magnitudes of Areas, of each Size infinite Individuals, of each Individual *Curve* an Infinity of Points, from which *Tangents* may be drawn. But all these Infinities of Infinites are exactly comprehended in the general *Theorem*, which fixes the Lengths of the *Subtangents*, or their Proportion to the *Abscissa*.

3. THAT we may the better discern this Agreement, or *Unity* of an Infinity of Objects in the general *Theorem*, to be the Foundation of the *Beauty* or Pleasure attending their Discovery, let us compare our Satisfaction in such Discoverys, with the uneasy state of Mind which we are in, when we can only measure Lines, or Surfaces, by a Scale, or are making Experiments which we can reduce to no general Canon, but only heaping up a Multitude of particular incoherent Observations. Now each of these Trials discovers a new Truth, but with no Pleasure or *Beauty*, notwithstanding the *Variety*, till we can discover some sort of *Unity*, or reduce them to some general Canon.

4. AGAIN,

4. AGAIN, let us take a Metaphysical Axiom, such as this, *Every Whole is greater than its Part*; and we shall find no *Beauty* in the Contemplation: Because however this Proposition does contain many Infinities of particular Truths; yet the *Unity* is inconsiderable, since they all agree only in a vague, undetermin'd Conception of Whole and Part, and in an indefinite Excess of the former above the latter, which is sometimes great and sometimes small. So, should we hear that the *Cylinder* is greater than the inscrib'd *Sphere*, and this again greater than the *Cone* of the same Altitude and Diameter of the Base, we shall find no pleasure in this Knowledge of a general Relation of greater and less, without any precise Difference or Proportion: But when we see the universal exact Agreement of all possible Sizes of such Systems of Solids, that they preserve to each other the constant *Ratio* of 3, 2, 1; how beautiful is the *Theorem*, and how are we ravish'd with its first Discovery!

5. THERE is another *Beauty* in Propositions, which cannot be omitted; which is this, When one *Theorem* shall contain a vast Multitude of Corollarys easily deducible from it. Thus that *Theorem* which gives us the Equation of a *Curve*, whence perhaps most of its Property's may be deduc'd,

Sect. 3.  duc'd, does some way please and satisfy our Mind above any other Proposition: Such a *Theorem* also is the 35th of the 1st Book of EUCLID, from which the whole Art of measuring right-lin'd Areas is deduc'd, by Resolution into *Triangles*, which are the halves of so many *Parallelograms*; and these are each respectively equal to so many *Rectangles* of the *Base* into the perpendicular *Altitude*: The 47th of the 1st is another of like *Beauty*, and so are many others. In the search of *Nature* there is the like *Beauty* in the Knowledge of some great Principles, or universal Forces, from which innumerable Effects do flow. Such is *Gravitation*, in Sir ISAAC NEWTON'S Scheme; such also is the Knowledge of the Original of *Rights*, *perfect* and *imperfect*, and *external*; *alienable* and *unalienable*, with their manner of *Translations*; from whence the greatest Part of moral Dutys may be deduc'd in the various Relations of human Life.

It is easy to see how Men are charm'd with the *Beauty* of such Knowledge, besides its Usefulness; and how this sets them upon deducing the Propertys of each Figure from one *Genesis*, and demonstrating the mechanic Forces from one *Theorem* of the Composition of Motion; even after they have sufficient Knowledge and Certainty in all these Truths from distinct independent Demonstrations. And this Pleasure we enjoy
even

even when we have no Prospect of obtaining any other Advantage in Life from such Manner of Deduction, besides the immediate Pleasure of contemplating the *Beauty*: nor could Love of *Fame* excite us to such regular Methods of Deduction, were we not conscious that Mankind are pleas'd with them immediately by this *internal Sense* of their *Beauty*. Sect. 3.

IT is no less easy to see into what absurd Whimsys Men have been led by this Sense of *Beauty*, and a silly Affectation of obtaining it in the other Sciences as well as the *Mathematicks*. 'Twas this probably which set DESCARTES on that hopeful Project of deducing all human Knowledge from one Proposition, viz. *Cogito, ergo sum*; while others with as little Sense contended, that *Impossibile est idem simul esse & non esse*, had much fairer Pretensions to the Style and Title of *Principium humanæ Cognitionis absolutè primum*. MR. LEIBNITZ had an equal Affectation for his favourite Principle of a *sufficient Reason* for every thing in *Nature*, and brags to Dr. CLARKE of the Wonders he had wrought in the intellectual World by its Assistance; but his learned Antagonist seems to think he had not sufficient Reason for his Boasting. If we look into particular Sciences, we may see in the Systems learned Men have given us of them, the Inconveniences of this Love of *Uniformity*.

Sect. 3. *formity*. Dr. CUMBERLAND has taken a great deal of needless Pains to reduce the *Laws of Nature* to one general practical *Proposition*; and how aukardly is PUFFENDORF forc'd to deduce the several Dutys of Men to *God, themselves, and their Neighbours*, from his single fundamental Principle of *Sociableness to the whole Race of Mankind*? As if they had not been better drawn, each respectively, from their immediate Sources, *viz. Religion, Self-Love, and Sociableness*. This Observation might easily be extended farther, were it necessary, and is a strong Proof that Men have a Sense of *Beauty in Uniformity* in the Sciences, notwithstanding the Contortions of common Sense they may be led into by pursuing it.


6. THIS Delight which accompanys Sciences, or universal *Theorems*, may really be call'd a kind of *Sensation*; since it necessarily accompanys the Discovery of any Proposition, and is distinct from bare Knowledge it self, being most violent at first, whereas the Knowledge is uniformly the same. And however Knowledge enlarges the *Mind*, and makes us more capable of comprehensive Views and Projects in some kinds of Business, whence Advantage may also arise to us; yet we may leave it in the Breast of every Student to determine, whether he has not often felt this Pleasure without

out any such prospect of Advantage from the Sect. 3. Discovery of his *Theorem*. All that can thence be infer'd is only this, that as in our external Senses, so in our *internal* ones, the pleasant Sensations generally arise from those Objects which calm Reason would have recommended, had we understood their Use, and which might have engag'd our pursuits from *Self-interest*.

6. As to the Works of ART, were we to run thro the various artificial Contrivances or Structures, we should find the Foundation of the *Beauty* which appears in them, to be constantly some kind of *Uniformity*, or *Unity* of Proportion among the Parts, and of each Part to the Whole. As there is a vast Diversity of Proportions possible, and different Kinds of *Uniformity*, so there is room enough for that Diversity of Fancys observable in *Architecture*, *Gardening*, and such like Arts in different *Nations*; they all may have *Uniformity*, tho the Parts in one may differ from those in another: The *Chinese* or *Persian* Buildings are not like the *Grecian* and *Roman*, and yet the former has its *Uniformity* of the various Parts to each other, and to the Whole, as well as the latter. In that kind of *Architecture* which the EUROPEANS call *Regular*, the *Uniformity* of Parts is very obvious, the several Parts are *regular Figures*, and either *equal* or *similar* at least

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in

Sect. 3.  in the same Range; the Pedestals are *Paralepipedons* or square *Prisms*; the Pillars, *Cylinders* nearly; the Arches *Circular*, and all those in the same Row *equal*; there is the same Proportion every where observ'd in the same Range between the *Diameters* of Pillars and their *Heights*, their *Capitals*, the *Diameters* of *Arches*, the *Heights* of the *Pedestals*, the *Projections* of the *Cornice*, and all Ornaments in each of our *five Orders*. And tho other Countrys do not follow the *Grecian* or *Roman* Proportions; yet there is even among them a Proportion retain'd, a *Uniformity*, and Resemblance of corresponding Figures; and every Deviation in one part from that Proportion which is observ'd in the rest of the Building, is displeasing to every Eye, and destroys or diminishes at least the *Beauty* of the Whole.

7. THE same might be observ'd thro all other Works of *Art* even to the meanest *Utenfil*, the *Beauty* of every one of which we shall always find to have the same Foundation of *Uniformity amidst Variety*, without which they shall appear mean, irregular and deform'd.

S E C T. IV.

Of Relative or Comparative Beauty.

1. **I**F the preceding Thoughts concerning the Foundation of *absolute Beauty* be just, we may easily understand wherein *relative Beauty* consists. All *Beauty* is relative to the Sense of some Mind perceiving it; but what we call *relative* is that which is apprehended in any *Object*, commonly consider'd as an *Imitation* of some Original: And this *Beauty* is founded on a *Conformity*, or a kind of *Unity* between the Original and the Copy. The Original may be either some *Object* in *Nature*, or some *establish'd Idea*; for if there be any known *Idea* as a Standard, and Rules to fix this Image or *Idea* by, we may make a *beautiful Imitation*. Thus a *Statuary*, *Painter*, or *Poet*, may please us with an *HERCULES*, if his Piece retains that *Grandeur*, and those marks of *Strength*, and *Courage*, which we imagine in that Hero. And farther, to obtain *comparative Beauty* alone, it is not necessary, that there be any *Beauty* in the Original; the Imitation of *absolute Beauty* may indeed in the whole make a more lovely Piece, and yet an exact Imitation shall still be *beautiful*, tho the Original were intirely void of it: Thus the *Defor-mitys* of old Age in a Picture, the *rudest*


Sect. 4. *Rocks or Mountains in a Landskip*, if well represented, shall have abundant *Beauty*, tho perhaps not so great as if the Original were *absolutely beautiful*, and as well represented.

2. THE same Observation holds true in the Descriptions of the Poets either of *natural Objects* or *Persons*; and this *relative Beauty* is what they shou'd principally endeavour to obtain, as the peculiar *Beauty* of their Works. By the *Moralæ Fabulæ*, or the use of ARISTOTLE, we are not to understand *virtuous Manners* in a moral Sense, but a *just Representation* of *Manners* or *Characters* as they are in *Nature*; and that the *Actions* and *Sentiments* be suited to the *Characters* of the *Persons* to whom they are ascrib'd in *epick* and *dramatick Poetry*. Perhaps very good Reasons may be suggested from the Nature of our *Passions*, to prove that a Poet should not out of choice draw the *finest Characters* possible for *Virtue*; these Characters indeed abstractly consider'd might give more Pleasure, and have more *Beauty* than the *imperfect* ones which occur in Life with a mixture of Good and Evil: But it may suffice at present to suggest against this Choice, that we have more lively Ideas of *imperfect Men* with all their *Passions*, than of *morally perfect Heroes*, such as really never occur to our Observation; and of which consequently we cannot judg exactly

actly as to their Agreement with the Copy. Sect 4.
 And further, thro Consciousness of our own State, we are more nearly touch'd and affected by the *imperfect Characters*; since in them we see represented, in the Persons of others, the *Contrasts* of Inclinations, and the *Struggles* between the Passions of *Self-Love* and those of *Honour* and *Virtue*, which we often feel in our own Breasts. This is the Perfection of *Beauty* for which HOMER is justly admir'd, as well as for the *Variety* of his *Characters*.

3. MANY other Beautys of Poetry may be reduc'd under this Class of *relative Beauty*: The *Probability* is absolutely necessary to make us imagine *Resemblance*; it is by *Resemblance* that the *Similitudes*, *Metaphors* and *Allegorys* are made *beautiful*, whether either the Subject or the Thing compar'd to it have *Beauty* or not; the Beauty indeed is greater, when both have some *original Beauty* or Dignity as well as *Resemblance*: and this is the foundation of the Rule of studying *Decency* in *Metaphors* and *Similys* as well as *Likeness*. The *Measures* and *Cadence* are instances of *Harmony*, and come under the head of *absolute Beauty*.

4. WE may here observe a strange Prone-ness in our Minds to make *perpetual Comparisons* of all things which occur to our Ob-
 D 3 servation,

Sect. 4.  servation, even those which would seem very remote: there are certain *Resemblances* in the Motions of all Animals upon like Passions, which easily found a *Comparison*; but this does not serve to entertain our Fancy: *Inanimate Objects* have often such Positions as resemble those of the *human Body* in various Circumstances; these *Airs* or *Gestures* of the *Body* are *Indications* of *Dispositions* in the *Mind*, so that our very *Passions* and *Affections* as well as other Circumstances obtain a *Resemblance* to *natural inanimate Objects*. Thus a *Tempest* at Sea is often an Emblem of *Wrath*; a *Plant* or *Tree* drooping under the Rain, of a *Person* in *Sorrow*; a *Poppy* bending its Stalk, or a *Flower* withering when cut by the Plow, resembles the *Death* of a *blooming Hero*; an *aged Oak* in the Mountains shall represent an *old Empire*, a *Flame* seizing a *Wood* shall represent a *War*. In short, every thing in *Nature*, by our strange inclination to *Resemblance*, shall be brought to represent other things, even the most remote, especially the *Passions* and *Circumstances* of human Nature in which we are more nearly concern'd; and to confirm this, and furnish Instances of it, one need only look into HOMER or VIRGIL. A fruitful Fancy would find in a *Grove* or a *Wood*, an Emblem for every *Character* in a *Commonwealth*, and every turn of *Temper*, or *Station* in *Life*.

5. CONCERNING that kind of *comparative Beauty* which has a necessary relation to some establish'd Idea, we may observe, that some Works of *Art* acquire a *distinct Beauty* by their Correspondence to some universally suppos'd *Intention* in the Artificer, or the Persons who employ'd him : And to obtain this *Beauty*, sometimes they do not form their Works so as to attain the highest Perfection of *original Beauty* separately consider'd ; because a Composition of this *relative Beauty*, along with some degree of the *original Kind*, may give more Pleasure, than a more perfect *original Beauty* separately. Thus we see that strict *Regularity* in laying out of Gardens in *Parterres*, *Vista's*, *parallel Walks*, is often neglected to obtain an Imitation of *Nature* even in some of its *Wildnesses*. And we are more pleas'd with this *Imitation*, especially when the Scene is large and spacious, than with the more confin'd Exactness of *regular Work*. So likewise in the *Monuments* erected in honour of deceased *Heroes*, altho a *Cylinder*, or *Prism*, or *regular Solid*, may have more *original Beauty* than a very acute *Pyramid* or *Obelisk*, yet the latter pleases more, by answering better the suppos'd Intentions of *Stability*, and being *conspicuous*. For the same reason *Cubes*, or square *Prisms*, are generally chosen for the *Pedestals* of *Statues*, and not

Sect. 4. any of the more *beautiful Solids*, which do not seem so secure from rolling. This may be the reason too why *Columns* or *Pillars* look best when made a little taper from the middle, or a third from the bottom, that they may not seem top-heavy and in danger of falling.

6. THE like reason may influence Artists, in many other Instances, to depart from the Rules of *original Beauty*, as above laid down. And yet this is no Argument against our Sense of *Beauty* being founded, as was above explain'd, on *Uniformity amidst Variety*, but only an Evidence that our Sense of *Beauty* of the *Original* Kind may be vary'd and overballanc'd by another kind of *Beauty*.

7. THIS *Beauty* arising from Correspondence to *Intention*, would open to curious Observers a new Scene of *Beauty* in the Works of NATURE, by considering how the *Mechanism* of the various Parts known to us seems adapted to the Perfection of that Part, and yet in Subordination to the Good of some *System* or *Whole*. We generally suppose the Good of the *greatest Whole*, or of *all Beings*, to have been the *Intention* of the AUTHOR of *Nature*; and cannot avoid being pleas'd when we see any part of this *Design* executed in the *Systems* we are acquainted with.

with. The Observations already made on Sect. 4. this Subject are in every one's hand, in the Treatises of our late Improvers of *mechanical Philosophy*. We may only here observe the Pleasure which any one shall receive from seeing any Design well executed by curious *Mechanism*, even when his own Advantage is no way concern'd ; as also that pleasant Sensation he shall have in discovering the Design to which any complex *Machine* is adapted, when he has perhaps had a general Knowledge of the *Machine* before, without seeing its Correspondence or Aptness to execute any Design.

THE Arguments by which we prove *Reason* and *Design* in any *Cause* from the *Beauty* of the *Effects*, are so frequently us'd in some of the highest Subjects, that it may be necessary to enquire a little more particularly into them, to see how far they will hold, and with what degree of Evidence.

S E C T.



S E C T. V.

Concerning our Reasonings about Design
and Wisdom in the Cause, from the
Beauty or Regularity of Effects.

1. **T**H E R E seems to be no necessary
Connection of our pleasing Ideas
of *Beauty* with the *Uniformity* or *Regu-*
larity of the Objects, from the *Nature* of
things, antecedently to some *Constitution* of
the AUTHOR of our Nature, which has made
such Forms pleasant to us. Other *Minds*
may possibly be so fram'd as to receive
no Pleasure from *Uniformity*; and we
actually find that the same regular Forms
do not seem equally to please all the Ani-
mals known to us, as shall probably ap-
pear afterwards. Therefore let us make
what is the most unfavourable Supposition
to the present Argument possible; That
the Constitution of our Sense so as to ap-
prove *Uniformity*, is merely arbitrary in
the AUTHOR of our Nature; and that there
are an infinity of *Tastes* or *Relishes* of
Beauty possible; so that it would be impossi-
ble to throw together fifty or a hundred
Pebbles, which should not make an agreeable
Habitation for some Animal or other, and
appear *beautiful* to it. And then it is
plain, that from the Perception of *Beauty*
in

in any one Effect, we should have no Sect. 5.
 reason to conclude *Design* in the Cause: ~~~~~
 for a Sense might be so constituted as to be
 pleas'd with such *Irregularity* as may be
 the effect of an * *undirected Force*. But
 then, as there are an Infinity of *Forms*
 possible into which any System may be re-
 duc'd, an Infinity of *Places* in which Ani-
 mals may be situated, and an Infinity of
Relishes or *Senses* is suppos'd possible; that
 in the immense Spaces any one Animal
 should by Chance be plac'd in a System a-
 greeable to its Taste, must be improbable as
infinite to one at least: And much more
 unreasonable is it to expect from Chance,
 that a multitude of Animals agreeing in
 their Sense of *Beauty* should obtain agree-
 able *Places*.

2. It is also certain that there is the
 same Probability that in any one System of
 Matter an *Undirected Force* may produce a
regular Form, as any one given *irregular*

* This Expression is taken from the Cartesian Scheme, in
 which the Author of Nature is supposed to have design'dly im-
 press'd a general Force or Conatus ad motum upon the Mass of
 Matter, without any Direction whatsoever. This nonsensical
 Notion did so much prevail, And men have so many confused
 Conceptions of Nature and Chance, as real Beings operating
 without Wisdom or Design, that it may be useful to shew that
 their very absurd Postulatum is wholly insufficient, tho it were
 granted them, to answer the Appearances in the Regularity of
 the World. And this is what is attempted in the first fourteen
 Articles of this Section.

Sect. 5. one, of the same degree of Complication :
 But still the *irregular Forms* into which any System maybe rang'd, surpass in multitude the *Regular*, as *Infinite* does *Unity* ; for what holds in *one* small System will hold in a *Thousand*, a *Million*, a *Universe*, with more Advantage, *viz.* that the *irregular Forms* possible infinitely surpass the *Regular* ; for Instance, the *Area* of an *Inch Square* is capable of an *Infinity* of *regular Forms*, the *Equilateral Triangle*, the *Square*, the *Pentagon*, *Hexagon*, *Heptagon*, &c. but for each one regular Form, there are an *Infinity* of *Irregular*, as an *Infinity* of *Scalena* for the one *equilateral Triangle*, an *Infinity* of *Trapezia* for the one *Square*, of *irregular Pentagons* for the one *Regular*, and so on ; and therefore supposing any one System agitated by *undesigned Force*, it shall be infinitely more probable that it shall resolve itself into an *irregular Form* than a *regular* ; thus, that a System of *six* Parts upon Agitation shall not obtain the Form of a regular *Hexagon*, is at least *infinite* to *Unity* ; and the more complex we make the System, the greater is the hazard, from a very obvious Reason. We see this confirm'd by our constant Experience, that *Regularity* never arises from any *undesign'd Force* of ours ; and from this we conclude, that wherever there is any *Regularity* in the disposition of a System capable of many other Positions, there must have been *Design* in the Cause ;
 and

and the Force of this Evidence increases, according to the Multiplicity of Parts employ'd. Sect. 5.

BUT this Conclusion is too rash, unless some further Proof be introduc'd ; and what leads us into it is this. Men who have a Sense of *Beauty* in *Regularity*, are led generally in all their Arrangements of Bodys to study some kind of *Regularity*, and seldom ever design *Irregularity* ; and hence we judge the same of other Beings too, that they study *Regularity*, and presume upon *Intention* in the *Cause* wherever we see it, making *Irregularity* always a Presumption of Want of *Design* : Whereas if different Senses of *Beauty* be in other Agents, or if they have no Sense of it at all, *Irregularity* may as well be design'd as *Regularity* : and then let it be observ'd that in this Case there is just the same reason to conclude *Design* in the *Cause* from any one irregular Effect as from a regular one ; for since there are an Infinity of other *Forms* possible as well as this irregular one produc'd, and since to such a Being
* void of a Sense of *Beauty* all Forms are as
to

* There is a great Difference between such a Being as is here mention'd, and a Being which has no Intention for any reason whatsoever to produce one Form more than another. This latter sort of Being, as to the present Argument, would be the same
with

Se^{ct}. 5. to its own Relish indifferent, and all agitated
 ~~~~~ Matter meeting must make some Form or  
 other, and all Forms upon Supposition that  
 the Force is apply'd by an Agent void of a  
 Sense of *Beauty*, would equally prove *De-*  
*sign*; it is plain that no one Form proves it  
 more than another, or can prove it at all;  
 except from a general metaphysical Conside-  
 ration, too subtil to be certain, that there  
 is no proper Agent without *Design* and *In-*  
*tention*, and that every *Effect* flows from  
 the *Intention* of some *Cause*.

3. THIS however follows from the  
 above offer'd Considerations, that supposing  
 a Mass of Matter surpassing a *cubick* Inch as  
*infinite* of the *first* Power does *Unity*, and  
 that this whole Mass were some way deter-  
 min'd from its own Nature without any *De-*  
*sign* in a *Cause* (which perhaps is scarce  
 possible) to resolve it self into *cubick* Inches  
 solid Content, and into a *prismatick* Form

---

with Chance, but not the former. For tho a Being has no sense  
 of Beauty, he may notwithstanding be capable of Design, and  
 of Intention to produce regular Forms; and the observation of  
 greater Regularity in any number of Effects, than cou'd be  
 expell'd from undirected Force, is a presumption of Design  
 and Intention in the Cause, even where the Cause is suppos'd  
 to have no sense of Beauty in such Forms, since perhaps he may  
 have other Reasons moving him to chuse such Forms. Thus  
 supposing the DEITY no way necessarily pleas'd with Regu-  
 larity, Uniformity, or Similarity in Bodys, yet there may be  
 Reasons moving him to produce such Objects, such as the pleasing  
 his Creatures, having given them a sense of Beauty founded on  
 these Qualitys. See the two last Paragraphs of the last Section.

whole

whose *Base* should always be  $\frac{1}{4}$  of a *square* Sect. 5.  
Inch; suppose these Conditions determin'd, and all others left to *undirected Force*; all that we could expect from *undirected Force* in this Case would be one equilateral *Prism* or two, perhaps; because there are an Infinity of irregular *Prisms* possible of the same *Base* and *solid Content*: and when we meet with many such *Prisms*, we must probably conclude *Design* as producing them, since they are more than could have been expected by the Laws of *Hazard*.

4. BUT if the *infinite Mass* was no way determin'd to a *prismatick* Form, since there are an infinity of other Forms possible, we could only expect from the *casual Concourse* of such a *Mass* as was suppos'd in the last Case, one *Prism* of any Kind, since there are an Infinity of other Solids possible into which the *Mass* might be resolv'd; and if we found any great number of *Prisms*, we should have Presumption for *Design*: so that in a *Mass* of Matter as infinite of the *first* Power, we could not from any *Concourse* or *Agitation* expect with any good ground a Body of any given Dimensions or Size, and of any given Form; since of any Dimension there are infinite Forms possible, and of any Form there are an Infinity of Dimensions; and if we found several Bodys of the same Dimension

Sect. 5. mention and Form, we would have so much  
 ~~~~~ Presumption for *Design*.

5. THERE is one trifling Objection which may perhaps arise from the *chrystallizing* of certain Bodys, when the Fluid is evaporated in which they were swimming; for in this we frequently see *regular Forms* arising, tho there is nothing in this Affair but an *undirected Force* of *Attraction* suppos'd. But to remove this Objection, we need only consider, that we have good Reason to believe that the smallest Particles of *chrystalliz'd* Bodys have fixed *regular Forms* given to them in the Constitution of *Nature*; and then it is easy to conceive how their *Attractions* may produce *regular Forms*: but unless we suppose some preceding *Regularity* in the Figures of *attracting* Bodys, they shall never form any regular Body at all. And hence we see how improbable it is, that the whole Mass of *Matter*, not only in this Globe, but in all the fixed Stars known to us by our Eyes or Glasses, were they a thousand times larger than our Astronomers suppose, could in any *Course* have produc'd any Number of *similar* Bodys *Regular* or *Irregular*.

6. AND let it be here observ'd, that there are many Compositions of Bodys which the smallest Degree of *Design* could easily effect, which yet we would in vain expect

pect from all the Powers of *Chance* or *Sect. 3.*
undesigned Force, even after an *Infinity*
of Rencounters; even supposing a Dissolution of every Form except the *regular one*, that the Parts might be prepar'd for a new Agitation: Thus, supposing we could expect *one* equilateral *Prism* of any given Dimensions should be form'd from *undirected Force*, in an *Infinity* of Matter some way determin'd to resolve into Bodys of a given solid Content, (which is all we could expect, since it is *infinite* to *one* after the *solid Content* is obtain'd, that the Body shall not be *Prismatical*; and allowing it *Prismatical*, it is *infinite* to *one* that it shall not be *Equilateral*;) And again, supposing another *Infinity* of Matter determin'd to resolve it self into *Tubes*, of *Orifices* exactly equal to the *Bases* of the former *Prisms*, it is again at least as the *second Power* of *Infinite* to *Unity*, that not one of these *Tubes* shall be both *Prismatick* and *Equiangular*; and then if the *Tube* were thus form'd so as to be exactly capable of receiving one of the *Prisms* and no more, it is *infinite* to *one* that they shall never meet in *infinite Space*; and should they meet, it is *infinite* to *one* that the *Axes* of the *Prism* and *Tube* shall never happen in the same strait *Line*; and supposing they did, it is again as *infinite* to *three*, that *Angle* shall not meet *Angle*, so as to enter. We see then how infinitely improbable it is,

E

" that

Sect. 5.

“ that all the Powers of *Chance* in *infinite Matter* agitated thro *infinite Ages*,
 “ could ever effect this small Composition
 “ of a *Prism* entring a *Prismatick Bore* ;”
 and, “ that all our hazard for it would
 “ at most be but as *three* is to the *third*
 “ Power of *Infinite*.” And yet the smallest *Design* could easily effect it.

7. MAY we not then justly count it altogether absurd, and next to an absolute strict *Impossibility*, “ That all the Powers
 “ of *undirected Force* could ever effect
 “ such a complex Machine as is that of
 “ the most imperfect *Plant*, or the meanest
 “ *Animal*, even in *one Instance* ?” for the *Improbability* just increases, as the Complication of Mechanism in these *natural Bodys* surpasses that *simple Combination* above mention’d.

8. LET it be here observ’d, “ That the
 “ preceding Reasoning from the *Frequency*
 “ of *regular Bodys* of one Form in the
 “ *Universe*, and from the *Combinations*
 “ of various Bodys, is intirely independent
 “ on any Perception of *Beauty* ; and
 “ would equally prove *Design* in the
 “ *Cause*, altho there were no *Being* which
 “ perceived *Beauty* in any Form whatsoever :” for it is in short this, “ That
 “ the recurring of any Effect oftner than
 “ the *Laws of Hazard* do determine,
 “ gives

“gives *Presumption of Design* ;” and, *Sect. 5.*
 “That *Combinations* which no *undesign’d*
 “*Force* could give us reason to expect,
 “must necessarily prove the same; and
 “that with superior probability, as the
 “multitude of *Cases*, in which the contrary
 “might possibly happen, surpasses all the
 “*Cases* in which this could happen :”
 which appears to be in the simplest *Cases*.
 at least as *Infinite* does *Unity*. And
 the frequency of *similar irregular Forms*,
 or *exact Combinations* of them, is an equal
 Argument of *Design* in the Cause, since
 the *Similarity*, or *exact Combinations* of
irregular Forms are as little to be ex-
 pected from all the Powers of *undirected*
Force as any fort whatsoever.

9. To bring this nearer to something like
 a *Theorem*, altho the *Idea* of *Infinite* be
 troublesome enough to manage in Reason-
 ing; the Powers of *Chance* with *infinite*
Matter in *infinite Ages* may answer *Ha-*
zards as the *fifth Power* of *Infinite* and
 no more: thus the *Quantity* of *Matter*
 may be conceiv’d as the *third Power* of
Infinite and no more, the *various Degrees*
 of *Force* may make *another Power* of *In-*
finite, and the *Number* of *Rencounters* may
 make the *fifth*. But this last only holds on
 Supposition that after every *Rencounter*
 there is no *Cohesion*, but all is dissolved again
 for a new *Concourse*, except in *similar*

Sect. 5. *Forms or exact Combinations*; which Supposition is entirely groundless, since we see *dissimilar Bodys* cohering as strongly as any, and *rude Masses* more than any Combinations. Now to produce any *given Body*, in a *given Place* or *Situation*, and of *given Dimensions*, or *Shape*, the Hazards of the contrary are, *one Power of Infinite* at least to obtain the *Place* or *Situation*; when the *Situation* is obtain'd, the *solid Content* requires *another Power of Infinite* to obtain it; the *Situation* and *Solidity* obtain'd require, for accomplishing the *simplest given Shape*, at least the other *three Powers of Infinite*. For instance, let the *Shape* be a four-sided *Prism* or *Parallelipiped*; that the *Surfaces* should be *Planes* requires *one Power*, that they should be *Parallel* in this Case; or *inclin'd* in any *given Angle* in any other Case, requires *another Power of Infinite*; and that they should be in any *given Ratio* to each other requires at least the *third Power*: for in each of these Heads there are at least still an *Infinity* of other Cases possible beside the one *given*. So that all the Powers of *Chance* could only produce perhaps *one Body* of every simpler *Shape* or *Size* at most, and this is all we could expect: we might expect one *Pyramid*, or *Cube*, or *Prism* perhaps; but when we increase the Conditions required, the Prospect must grow more improbable, as in more

more complex *Figures*, and in all *Combinations* of Bodys, and in *similar Species*, which we never could reasonably hope from *Chance*, and therefore where we see them we must certainly ascribe them to *Design*. Sect. 5.

10. THE *Combinations* of *regular Forms*, or of *irregular ones* exactly adapted to each other, require such *vast Powers* of *Infinite* to effect them, and the *Hazards* of the *contrary Forms* are so *infinitely* numerous, that all *Probability* or *Possibility* of their being accomplish'd by *Chance* seems quite to vanish. Let us apply the Cases in Art. 6th of this Section about the *Prism* and *Tube*, to our simplest *Machines*, such as a *pair of Wheels* of our ordinary Carriages; each *Circular*, *Spokes* equal in *length*, *thickness*, *shape*; the *Wheels* set *Parallel*, the *Axle-tree* fix'd in the *Nave* of both, and secur'd from coming out at either End: the Cases in which the contrary might have happen'd from *undirected Concourses*, were there no more requir'd than what is just now mention'd, must amount in Multitude to a Power of *Infinite* equal to every Circumstance requir'd. What shall we say then of a *Plant*, a *Tree*, an *Animal*, a *Man*, with such multitudes of adapted *Vessels*, such *Articulations*, *Insertions* of *Muscles*, *Diffusion* of *Veins*, *Arterys*, *Nerves*: The *Improbability* that such *Machines* should be the Effect of

Sect. 5. *Chance* must be near the *infinitesimal*
 Power of *Infinite* to *Unity*.

II. FURTHER, were all the former Reasoning from *Similarity* of Forms and Combinations groundless, and could *Chance* give us ground to expect such Forms, with exact Combination, yet we could only promise *one* of these Forms among an *Infinity* of others; when we see then such a *multitude* of Individuals of a Species *similar* to each other in a vast number of Parts, and when we see in each *Individual*, the corresponding Members so exactly like to each other, what possible room is there left for questioning *Design* in the *Universe*? None but the barest *Possibility* against an inconceivably great *Probability*, surpassing every thing which is not *strict Demonstration*.

12. THIS Argument, as it has been already observ'd *, is quite abstracted from any Sense of *Beauty* in any particular Form; for the *exact Similarity* of a hundred or a thousand *Trapezia* proves *Design* as well as the *Similarity* of *Squares*, since both are equally above all the Powers of *undirected Force* or *Chance*, as the *hundredth* or *thousandth* Power of *Infinite* surpasses

* See above, *Art.* 8.

Unity; and what is above the Powers of Sect. 5. *Chance*, must give us proportionable Pre-
sumption for *Design*.

THUS, allowing that a *Leg*, or *Arm*, or *Eye*, might have been the Effect of *Chance*, (which was shewn to be *most absurd*, and next to absolutely *impossible*) that it should not have a corresponding *Leg*, *Arm*, *Eye*, exactly *similar*, must be a hazard of a Power of *Infinite* proportion'd to the Complication of Parts; for in Proportion to this is the multitude of Cases increased, in which it would not have a corresponding Member *similar*: so that allowing twenty or thirty Parts in such a Structure, it would be as the *twentieth* or *thirtieth* Power of *Infinite* to *Unity*, that the corresponding Part should not be *similar*. What shall we say then of the *similar Forms* of a whole *Species*?

12. IF it be objected, " That *natural* Bodys are not *exactly similar*, but
" only *grossly so* to our Senses, as that a
" *Vein*, an *Artery*, a *Bone* is not perhaps
" exactly similar to its Correspondent in
" the same Animal, tho it appears so to
" our Senses, which only judge of the
" Bulk, and do not discern the small con-
" stituent Parts; and that in the several In-
" dividuals of a Species the *Dissimilarity* is
" always sensible, often in the internal

Sect. 5. " Structure, and often, nay always in the
 ~~~~~ " external Appearance." To remove this  
 Objection it will be sufficient to shew,  
 " That the multitude of Cases wherein *sen-*  
 " *sible Dissimilitude* could have happen'd,  
 " are still infinitely more than all the Cases  
 " in which *sensible Similitude* might ;" so  
 that the same Reasoning holds from *sensible*  
*Similarity*, as from the *mathematically*  
*exact* : And again, " That the Cases of  
 " *gross Dissimilarity* do in the same man-  
 " ner surpass the Cases of *gross Similarity*  
 " possible, as *infinite* does *one*."

13. To prove both these Assertions, let  
 us consider a simple Instance ; a *Trapezium*  
 of a foot Square in *Area* shall appear *simi-*  
*lar* to another, while no one *side* differs, by  
 $\frac{1}{10}$  of an Inch ; or no *Angle* in one sur-  
 passes the corresponding one in the other  
 above ten Minutes perhaps : now this tenth  
 of an Inch is *infinitely* divisible, as also are  
 the ten Minutes, so that the Cases of *insen-*  
*sible Dissimilarity* under *apparent Simila-*  
*rity* are really *Infinite*. But then it is also  
 plain that there are an *Infinity* of different  
 sensibly dissimilar *Trapezia*, even of the  
 same *Area*, according as we vary a *Side* by  
 one Tenth, two Tenths, three Tenths,  
 and so on, and varying the *Angles* and  
 another *Side* so as to keep the *Area* equal.  
 Now in each of these infinite Degrees of  
*sensible Dissimilitude* the several Tenths are  
*infinitely*

*infinitely* divisible as well as in the first Sect. 5. Case; so that the multitude of *sensible* *Dissimilarities* are to the multitude of *insensible* *Dissimilarities* under apparent Resemblance, still as the *second* Power of *Infinite* to the *first*, or as *Infinite* to *Unity*. And then how vastly greater must the Multitude be, of all possible *sensible* *Dissimilarities* in such complex Bodys as *Legs, Arms, Eyes, Arterys, Veins, Skeletons?*

14. As to the *Dissimilarities* of Animals of the same Species, it is in the same manner plain that the possible Cases of *gross* *Dissimilarity* are *Infinite*, and then every Case of *gross* *Dissimilarity* contains also all the Cases of *insensible* *Dissimilarity*. Thus, if we would count all Animals of a Species *grossly* *similar*, while there was no Limb which in Length or Diameter did exceed the ordinary Shape by above a third of the Head; it is plain that there are an Infinity of *gross* *Dissimilarities* possible, and then in each of these Cases of *gross* *Dissimilarity*, there are an Infinity of Cases of *nicer* *Dissimilarity*, since  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the Head may be infinitely divided. To take a low but easy Instance; two *Cockle-Shells* which fitted each other naturally, may have an Infinity of *insensible* *Differences*, but still there are an Infinity of possible *sensible* *Differences*, and then in any one of the *sensibly* *diffe-*



Sect. 5. *different* Forms, there may be the same Infinity of *insensible Differences* beside the *sensible one* : So that still the hazard for even *gross Similarity* from *Chance* is *Infinite* to *one*, and this always increases by a Power of Infinite for every distinct Member of the Animal, in which even *gross Similarity* is retain'd ; since the Addition of every Member or Part to a complex Machine, makes a new Infinity of Cases, in which *sensible Dissimilarity* may happen ; and this Infinity combin'd with the infinite Cases of the former Parts, raises the Hazard by a Power of Infinite.

Now this may sufficiently shew us the Absurdity of the *Cartesian* or *Epicurean Hypothesis*, even granting their *Postulatum* of *undirected Force* impressed on *infinite Matter* ; and seems almost a Demonstration of *Design* in the *Universe*.

15. LET it be here observ'd also, “ That  
 “ a *rational Agent* may be capable of im-  
 “ pressing Force when he is not intend-  
 “ ing to produce any particular Form,  
 “ and of designedly producing *irregu-*  
 “ *lar* or *dissimilar Forms*, as well as  
 “ *regular* and *similar* ;” and hence it  
 follows, “ That altho all the *Regula-*  
 “ *rity*, *Combination* and *Similarity* in the  
 “ *Universe*, are Presumptions of *Design*,  
 “ yet *Irregularity* is no Presumption of the  
 “ con-

“ contrary ; unless we suppose that the Sect. 5.

“ *Agent* is determined from a Sense of ~~~~~

“ *Beauty* always to act *regularly*, and de-

“ light in *Similarity* ; and that he can have

“ no other inconsistent Motive of Action :”

Which last is plainly absurd. We do not want in the *Universe* many Effects which seem to have been left to the general *Laws* of *Motion* upon some great *Impulse*, and have many Instances where *Similarity* has been designed plainly in some respects, and probably neglected in others ; or even *Dissimilarity* designed : Thus we see the *general exact Resemblance* between the two *Eyes* of most persons ; and yet perhaps no other third *Eye* in the world *exactly* like them. We see a *gross Conformity* of shape in all Persons in innumerable Parts, and yet no two *Individuals* of any Species are undistinguishable ; which perhaps is intended for valuable Purposes to the whole Species.

16. HITHERTO the Proof amounts only to *Design* or *Intention* barely, in opposition to *blind Force* or *Chance* ; and we see the Proof of this is independent on the *arbitrary Constitution* of our *internal Sense of Beauty*. *Beauty* is often supposed an Argument of more than *Design*, to wit, *Wisdom* and *Prudence* in the *Cause*. Let us enquire also into this.

Sect. 5. *WISDOM* denotes *the pursuing of the best Ends by the best Means*; and therefore before we can from any Effect prove the Cause to be *wise*, we must know what is *best* to the Cause or Agent. Among men who have pleasure in contemplating *Uniformity*, the *Beauty* of Effects is an Argument of *Wisdom*, because this is *Good* to them; but the same Argument would not hold as to a *Being* void of this *Sense* of *Beauty*. And therefore the *Beauty* apparent to us in *Nature* will not of it self prove *Wisdom* in the Cause, unless this Cause, or AUTHOR of *Nature* be suppos'd *BENEVOLENT*; and then indeed the Happiness of Mankind is desirable or *Good* to the SUPREME CAUSE; and that Form which pleases us, is an Argument of his *Wisdom*. And the Strength of this Argument is increased always in proportion to the Degree of *Beauty* produced in *Nature*, and expos'd to the View of any *rational Agent*; since upon supposition of a *Benevolent DEITY*, all the apparent *Beauty* produc'd is an Evidence of the Execution of a *Benevolent Design*, to give him the Pleasures of *Beauty*. But what more immediately proves *Wisdom* is this; when we see any Machine with a vast Complication of Parts actually obtaining an *End*, we justly conclude, " That since this could not have " been the Effect of *Chance*, it must have " been *intended* for that *End*, which is ob-  
tained

“ tained by it;” and then the *Ends* or *In- Sect. 5.*  
*tentions*, being in part known, the Com-  
 plication of Organs, and their nice Dispo-  
 sition adapted to this *End*, is an Evidence  
 “ of a *comprehensive large Understand-*  
 “ *ing* in the *Cause*, according to the Mul-  
 “ tiplicity of Parts, and the Appositeness  
 “ of their Structure, even when we do  
 “ not know the *Intention* of the *Whole*.”

17. THERE is another kind of *Beauty*  
 also which is still pleasing to our *Sense*, and  
 from which we conclude Wisdom in the  
 Cause as well as Design, and that is,  
*when we see many useful or beautiful Ef-*  
*fects flowing from one general Cause.*  
 There is a very good Reason for this Con-  
 clusion among Men. *Interest* must lead  
*Beings* of limited Powers, who are un-  
 capable of a great diversity of Operations,  
 and distracted by them, to chuse this *fru-*  
*gal Oeconomy* of their Forces, and to look  
 upon such Management as an Evidence of  
*Wisdom* in other *Beings* like themselves.  
 Nor is this speculative Reason all which in-  
 fluences them, for even beside this Con-  
 sideration of *Interest*, they are determin'd  
 by a *Sense of Beauty* where that Reason  
 does not hold; as when we are judging of  
 the Productions of other *Agents* about  
 whose Oeconomy we are not solicitous.  
 Thus, who does not approve of it as a  
 Perfection in *Clock-work*, that three or four  
 Motions



Sect. 5. *Motions of the Hour, Minute, and Second Hands, and Monthly Plate, should arise from one Spring or Weight, rather than from three, or four Springs, or Weights, in a very Compound Machine, which should perform the same Effects, and answer all the same Purposes with equal exactness? Now the Foundation of this Beauty plainly appears to be Uniformity or Unity of Cause amidst Diversity of Effects.*

18. WE may perhaps \* afterwards offer some Reasons, why the AUTHOR of Nature may possibly chuse to operate in this manner by *General Laws* and *Universal extensive Causes*, altho the Reason just now mention'd does not hold with an *Almighty Being*. This is certain, "That we have some  
 " of the most delightful Instances of *Uni-*  
 " *versal Causes* in the *Works of Nature*,  
 " and that the most studious men in these  
 " Subjects are so delighted with the Obser-  
 " vation of them, that they always look  
 " upon them as Evidences of *Wisdom* in  
 " the Administration of *Nature*, from a  
 " SENSE OF BEAUTY."

19. THE wonderfully simple *Mechanism* which performs all Animal Motions, was mentioned † already; nor is *that*

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\* See the last Section.

† See above, Sect. 2. Art. 8.


of the inanimate Parts of *Nature* less ad- Sect. 5.  
mirable. How innumerable are the Effects ~~~~~  
of that one Principle of *Heat*, deriv'd to  
us from the *Sun*, which is not only de-  
lightful to our Sight and Feeling, and the  
Means of discerning Objects, but is the  
Cause of *Rains*, *Springs*, *Rivers*, *Winds*,  
and the universal Cause of *Vegetation*!  
The *uniform Principle of Gravity* pre-  
serves at once the *Planets* in their *Orbits*,  
gives *Cohesion* to the Parts of each *Globe*,  
and *Stability* to *Mountains*, *Hills*, and ar-  
*tificial Structures*; it raises the *Sea* in  
Tides, and sinks them again, and restrains  
them in their Channels; it drains the *Earth*  
of its superfluous Moisture, by *Rivers*; it  
raises the *Vapours* by its Influence on the  
*Air*, and brings them down again in *Rains*;  
it gives an *uniform Pressure* to our *At-*  
*mosphere*, necessary to our Bodys in general,  
and more especially to *Inspiration* in  
Breathing; and furnishes us with an *uni-*  
*versal Movement*, capable of being ap-  
ply'd in innumerable Engines. How in-  
comparably more *beautiful* is this Struc-  
ture than if we suppos'd so many *distinct*  
*Volitions* in the DEITY, producing every  
particular Effect, and preventing some of  
the accidental Evils which casually flow  
from the *general Law*! And yet this lat-  
ter manner of Operation might have been  
more useful to us, and would have been no  
distracti<sup>o</sup>n to *Omnipotence*: But then the  
great

Sect. 5. great *Beauty* had been lost, and there had been no more Pleasure in the Contemplation of this Scene which is now so delightful. One would rather chuse to run the hazard of its *casual Evils*, than part with that *harmonious Form* which has been the unexhausted Source of Delight to the successive Spectators in all Ages.

20. HENCE we see, “ That however  
 “ *Miracles* may prove the Superintendency  
 “ of a *voluntary Agent*, and that the *Universe* is not guided by *Necessity* or *Fate*,  
 “ yet that *Mind* must be *weak* and *inadvertent*, which needs them to confirm  
 “ the Belief of a *Wise* and *Good DEITY*;  
 “ since the deviation from *general Laws*,  
 “ unless upon very extraordinary Occasions, must be a presumption of *Inconstancy*  
 “ and *Weakness*, rather than of a *steady*  
 “ *Wisdom* and *Power*, and must weaken  
 “ the best Arguments we can have for the  
 “ *Sagacity* and *Power* of the *universal*  
 “ *MIND*.”

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SECT.



## S E C T. VI.

Of the Universality of the Sense of  
Beauty among Men.

I. **W**E before \* insinuated, “ That  
 “ all *Beauty* has a relation to  
 “ some *perceiving Power* ;” and conse-  
 quently since we know not the *variety* of  
 Senses which may be among Animals, there  
 is no Form in *Nature* concerning which  
 we can pronounce, “ That it has no  
 “ *Beauty* ;” for it may still please some  
*perceiving Power*. But our *Inquiry* is  
 confin’d to Men ; and before we examine  
 the *Universality* of this *Sense of Beauty*,  
 or their agreement in approving *Unifor-*  
*mity*, it may be proper to consider, “ if,  
 “ as the other *Senses* which give us Plea-  
 “ sure do also give us Pain, so this *Sense of*  
 “ *Beauty* does make some Objects disagree-  
 “ able to us, and the occasion of Pain.”  
 That many Objects give no pleasure to our  
*Sense* is obvious, many are certainly void  
 of *Beauty* : But then there is no Form  
 which seems necessarily disagreeable of it  
 self, when we dread no other Evil from it,  
 and compare it with nothing better of the  
 Kind. Many Objects are naturally dis-

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\* See above Sect. I. Art. 17. Sect. 4. Art. 1.




Sect. 6. pleasing, and distasteful to our *external Senses*, as well as others pleasing and agreeable; as *Smells, Tastes*, and some separate *Sounds*: but for our *Sense of Beauty*, no Composition of Objects which give not unpleasant simple Ideas, seems positively unpleasant or painful of it self, had we never observ'd any thing better of the Kind. *Deformity* is only *the absence of Beauty*, or *deficiency in the Beauty expected in any Species*: Thus *bad Musick* pleases *Rusticks* who never heard any better, and the *finest Ear* is not offended with *tuning* of Instruments if it be not too tedious, where no *Harmony* is expected; and yet much smaller *Dissonancy* shall offend amidst the Performance, where *Harmony* is expected. A *rude Heap* of Stones is no way offensive to one who shall be displeas'd with *Irregularity* in *Architecture*, where *Beauty* was expected. And had there been a Species of that Form which we call now *ugly* or *deform'd*, and had we never seen or expected greater *Beauty*, we should have receiv'd no disgust from it, altho the Pleasure would not have been so great in this Form as in those we now admire. Our *Sense of Beauty* seems design'd to give us positive Pleasure, but not positive Pain or Disgust, any further than what arises from disappointment.

2. THERE are indeed many Faces which at first View are apt to raise Dislike; but this is

is generally not from any positive Deformity which of it self is positively displeasing, but either from want of *expected Beauty*, or much more from their carrying some natural Indications of *morally bad Dispositions*, which we all acquire a Faculty of discerning in *Countenances, Airs, and Gestures*. That this is not occasion'd by any Form positively disgusting, will appear from this, " That if upon long Acquaintance we are sure of finding *sweetness of Temper, Humanity and Cheerfulness*, altho the bodily Form continues, it shall give us no Disgust or Displeasure;" whereas what were naturally disagreeable, or the occasion of Pain, or positive Distaste, would always continue so, even altho the Aversion we might have toward it were counterballanc'd by other Considerations. There are Horrors rais'd by some Objects which are only the Effect of *Fear* for our selves, or *Compassion* towards others, when either *Reason*, or some foolish *Association of Ideas*, makes us apprehend Danger, and not the Effect of any thing in the Form it self: for we find that most of these Objects which excite Horror at first, when Experience or Reason has remov'd the Fear, may become the occasions of Pleasure; as in *ravenous Beasts, a tempestuous Sea, a craggy Precipice, a dark shady Valley*.

Sect. 6.



3. WE shall see \* afterwards, “ That  
 “ *Associations of Ideas* make Objects plea-  
 “ sant, and delightful, which are not na-  
 “ turally apt to give any such Pleasures;  
 “ and the same way the *casual Conjun-*  
 “ *tions of Ideas* may give a Disgust, where  
 “ there is nothing disagreeable in the Form  
 “ it self.” And this is the occasion of  
 many fantastick Aversions to Figures of  
 some Animals, and to some other Forms:  
 Thus *Swine*, *Serpents* of all Kinds, and  
 some *Insects* really beautiful enough, are  
 beheld with Aversion by many People, who  
 have got *some accidental Ideas* associated  
 to them. And for *Distastes* of this Kind,  
 there is no other Account can be given.

4. BUT as to the *universal Agreement*  
 of Mankind in their *Sense of Beauty* from  
*Uniformity amidst Variety*, we must con-  
 sult Experience: and as we allow all Men  
 Reason, since all Men are capable of under-  
 standing simple Arguments, tho few are  
 capable of complex Demonstrations; so in  
 this Case it must be sufficient to prove  
*this Sense of Beauty universal*, “ if all  
 “ Men are better pleas’d with *Uniformity*  
 “ in the simpler Instances than *the con-*  
 “ *trary*, even when there is no Advantage  
 “ observ’d attending it; and likewise if all

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\* See below *Art. 11, 12.* of this Section.

“ Men,

“ Men, according as their Capacity en- Sect. 6.  
 “ larges, so as to receive and compare  
 “ more complex Ideas, do further extend  
 “ their Delight in *Uniformity*, and are  
 “ pleas’d with its more complex Kinds,  
 “ both *Original* and *Relative*.”

Now let us consider if ever any Person was void of *this Sense* in simpler Instances. Few Trials have been made in the simplest Instances of *Harmony*, because as soon as we find an *Ear* not capable of relishing complex Compositions, such as our *Tunes* are, no further Pains are employ’d about such. But in *Figures*, did ever any Man make choice of a *Trapezium*, or any irregular *Curve*, for the *Ichnography* of his House without Necessity, or some great Motive of Conveniency? or to make the opposite Walls *not parallel* or *unequal* in Height? Were ever *Trapeziums*, irregular *Polygons* or *Curves* chosen for the Forms of *Doors* or *Windows*, tho these Figures might have answer’d the Uses as well, and would have often sav’d a great part of the Time and Labour and Expence to Workmen, which is now employ’d in suiting the Stones and Timber to the *regular* Forms? Among all the fantastick Modes of *Dress*, none was ever quite void of *Uniformity*, if it were only in the *resemblance* of the two Sides of the same *Robe*, and in *some general Aptitude* to the human Form; the



Sect. 6. *Pictish Painting* had always *relative Beauty* by resemblance to other Objects, and often those Objects were *originally beautiful*: however justly we might apply HORACE's Censure of impertinent Descriptions in *Poetry*, \* *Sed non erat his locus*. But never were any so extravagant as to affect such Figures as are made by the casual spilling of liquid Colours. Who was ever pleas'd with an *inequality* of Heights in *Windows* of the same Range, or *dissimilar Shapes* of them? with *unequal Legs* or *Arms* or *Eyes* or *Cheeks* in a *Mistress*? It must be however acknowledged, "That *Interest* often may counterballance our *Sense of Beauty* in this  
 " Affair as well as in others, and superior  
 " good Qualities may make us overlook  
 " such Imperfections."

5. NAY further, it may perhaps appear,  
 " That *Regularity* and *Uniformity* are so  
 " copiously diffus'd thro the *Universe*, and  
 " we are so readily determin'd to pursue  
 " this as the Foundation of *Beauty* in  
 " *Works of Art*, that there is scarcely  
 " any thing ever fancy'd as *Beautiful*,  
 " where there is not really something of  
 " this *Uniformity* and *Regularity*." We  
 are indeed often mistaken in imagining that  
 there is the greatest possible *Beauty*, where

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\* Hor. de Arte Poet. v. 19.

it is but very imperfect; but still it is some Sect 6. degree of *Beauty* which pleases, altho there may be higher Degrees which we do not observe; and our *Sense* acts with full Regularity when we are pleas'd, altho we are kept by a false Prejudice from pursuing Objects which would please us more. A GOTH, for instance, is mistaken, when from Education he imagines the *Architecture* of his Country to be the most perfect; and a *Conjunction* of some of the *hostile Ideas*, may make him have an Aversion to *Roman Buildings*, and study to demolish them, as some of our *Reformers* did the *Popish Buildings*, not being able to separate the Ideas of the superstitious Worship, from the Forms of the Buildings where it was practised: and yet it is still *real Beauty* which pleases the GOTH, founded upon *Uniformity amidst Variety*. For the *Gothick Pillars* are *uniform* to each other, not only in their *Sections*, which are *Lozenge-formed*; but also in their *Heights* and *Ornaments*: Their *Arches* are not one *uniform Curve*, but yet they are *Segments of similar Curves*, and generally equal in the same Ranges. The very *Indian Buildings* have some kind of *Uniformity*, and many of the *EASTERN NATIONS*, tho they differ much from us, yet have great *Regularity* and *Beauty* in their Manner, as well as the *ROMANS* in theirs; our *Indian Screens*, which wonderfully supply the

Sect. 6. *regular* Imaginations of our *Ladys* with Ideas of Deformity, in which *Nature* is very churlish and sparing, do want indeed all the *Beauty* arising from Proportion of Parts, and Conformity to *Nature*; and yet they cannot divest themselves of all *Beauty* and *Uniformity* in the separate Parts: And this diversifying the human Body into various Contortions, may give some wild Pleasure from *Variety*, since some *Uniformity* to the human Shape is still retain'd.

6. THERE is one sort of *Beauty* which might perhaps have been better mention'd before; but will not be impertinent here, because the Taste or Relish of it is *universal* in all Nations, and with the Young as well as the Old, and that is the *Beauty* of *History*. Every one knows how dull a Study it is to read over a Collection of *Gazettes*, which shall perhaps relate all the same Events with the *Historian*: The superior Pleasure then of *History* must arise, like that of *Poetry*, from the *Manners*; as when we see a *Character* well drawn, wherein we find the secret Causes of a great Diversity of seemingly inconsistent Actions; or an *Interest of State* laid open, or an *artful View* nicely unfolded, the Execution of which influences very different and opposite Actions, as the Circumstances may alter. Now this reduces the whole

to an *Unity* of Design at least: And this Sect. 6. may be observ'd in the very Fables which entertain Children, otherwise we cannot make them relish them.

7. WHAT has been said will probably be assented to, if we always remember in our Inquiries into the *Universality* of the *Sense of Beauty*, "That there may be *real Beauty*, where there is not the *greatest*; and that there are an Infinity of different Forms which shall all have some *Unity*, and yet differ from each other." So that Men may have different Fancies of *Beauty*, and yet *Uniformity* be the *universal Foundation* of our Approbation of any Form whatsoever as *Beautiful*. And we shall find that it is so in the *Architecture, Gardening, Dress, Equipage, and Furniture* of Houses, even among the most uncultivated Nations; where *Uniformity* still pleases, without any other Advantage than the Pleasure of the Contemplation of it.

8. It will deserve our Consideration on this Subject, how, in like Cases, we form very different Judgments concerning the *internal and external Senses*. Nothing is more ordinary among those, who after Mr. LOCKE have shaken off the groundless Opinions about *innate Ideas*, than to alledge, "That all our Relish for *Beauty*,  
" and




Sect. 6. “ and Order, is either from *Advantage*,  
 “ or *Custom*, or *Education*,” for no other  
 Reason but the *Variety* of *Fancys* in the  
 World: and from this they conclude,  
 “ That our *Fancys* do not arise from any  
 “ *natural Power of Perception*, or *Sense*.”  
 And yet all allow our *external Senses* to  
 be *Natural*, and “ that the Pleasures or  
 “ Pains of their Sensations, however they  
 “ may be increased, or diminished, by  
 “ *Custom*, or *Education*, and counter-  
 “ ballanc’d by *Interest*, yet are really an-  
 “ tecedent to *Custom*, *Habit*, *Education*,  
 “ or Prospect of *Interest*.” Now it is cer-  
 tain, “ That there is at least as great a va-  
 “ riety of *Fancys* about their Objects, as  
 “ the Objects of *Beauty* :” Nay it is much  
 more difficult, and perhaps impossible, to  
 bring the *Fancys* or *Relishes* of the *exter-  
 nal Senses* to any general Foundation at all,  
 or to find any Rule for the *agreeable* or  
*disagreeable* : and yet we all allow “ that  
 “ these are *natural Powers of Percep-  
 “ tion*.”

9. THE Reason of this different Judg-  
 ment can be no other than this, “ That  
 “ we have got distinct Names for the *ex-  
 “ ternal Senses*, and none, or very few,  
 “ for the *Internal* ;” and by this are led, as  
 in many other Cases, to look upon the  
 former as some way more *fix’d*, and *real*  
 and *natural*, than the latter. The *Sense*  
 of

of *Harmony* has got its Name, a good Ear ; Sect. 6. and we are generally brought to acknowledge this a *natural* Power of *Perception*, or a *Sense* some way distinct from *Hearing* : now it is certain, “ That there is as “ necessary a Perception of *Beauty* upon “ the presence of *regular Objects*, as of “ *Harmony* upon hearing certain *Sounds*. ~~~~~


10. BUT let it be observ'd here once for all, “ That an *internal Sense* no more presupposes an *innate Idea*, or Principle of “ Knowledge, than the *external*.” Both are *natural* Powers of *Perception*, or *Determinations* of the *Mind* to receive necessarily certain Ideas from the presence of Objects. The *internal Sense* is, a *passive Power of receiving Ideas of Beauty from all Objects in which there is Uniformity amidst Variety*. Nor does there seem any thing more difficult in this matter, than “ that the Mind should be always determin'd to receive the Idea of *Sweet*, “ when Particles of such a Form enter the “ Pores of the Tongue ; or to have the “ Idea of *Sound* upon any quick Undulation of the Air.” The one seems to have as little Connection with its Idea, as the other : And the same Power could with equal ease constitute the former the occasion of Ideas as the latter.



II. THE *Association* of Ideas \* above hinted at, is one great Cause of the apparent Diversity of Fancys in the *Sense of Beauty*, as well as in the *external Senses*; and often makes Men have an aversion to Objects of *Beauty*, and a liking to others void of it, but under different Conceptions than those of *Beauty* or *Deformity*. And here it may not be improper to give some Instances of some of these *Associations*. The *Beauty of Trees*, their *cool Shades*, and their *Aptness* to conceal from Observation, have made *Groves* and *Woods* the usual Retreat to those who love *Solitude*, especially to the *Religious*, the *Pensive*, the *Melancholy*, and the *Amorous*. And do not we find that we have so join'd the Ideas of these Dispositions of Mind with those external Objects, that they always recur to us along with them? The Cunning of the *Heathen Priests* might make such obscure Places the Scene of the fictitious Appearances of their *Deitys*; and hence we join Ideas of something *Divine* to them. We know the like Effect in the Ideas of our *Churches*, from the perpetual use of them only in *religious Exercises*. The faint Light in *Gothick Buildings* has had the same Association of a very foreign

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\* See above Art. 3. of this Section.

Idea, which our *Poet* shews in his *Epi-Sect. 6.*  
*thet.* 

————— *A Dim religious Light.* \*

IN like manner it is known, “ That  
 “ often all the Circumstances of *Actions* or  
 “ *Places*, or *Dresses* of Persons, or *Voice*,  
 “ or *Song*, which have occur’d at any  
 “ time together, when we were strongly  
 “ affected by any Passion, will be so con-  
 “ nected that any one of these will make  
 “ all the rest recur.” And this is often  
 the occasion both of great Pleasure and  
 Pain, Delight and Aversion to many Ob-  
 jects, which of themselves might have been  
 perfectly indifferent to us: but these *Appro-*  
*bations*, or *Dislikes* are remote from the I-  
 deas of *Beauty*, being plainly different Ideas.

12. THERE is also another Charm in  
*Musick* to various Persons, which is distinct  
 from the *Harmony*, and is occasion’d by  
 its raising agreeable Passions. The *human*  
*Voice* is obviously vary’d by all the stronger  
 Passions; now when our *Ear* discerns  
 any resemblance between the *Air* of a  
*Tune*, whether sung or play’d upon an  
 Instrument, either in its *Time* or *Key*,  
 or any other Circumstance, to the sound  
 of the *human Voice* in any Passion, we  
 shall be touch’d by it in a very sensible  
 manner, and have *Melancholy*, *Joy*, *Gra-*

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\* Milt, ll Penferoso.



*Sect. 6. vity, Thoughtfulness* excited in us by a sort of *Sympathy* or *Contagion*. The same Connection is observable between the very *Air* of a *Tune*, and the *Words* expressing any *Passion* which we have heard it fitted to, so that they shall both recur to us together, tho but one of them affects our *Senses*. Now in such a diversity of pleasing or displeasing Ideas which may be conjoin'd with Forms of *Bodys*, or *Tunes*, when Men are of such different Dispositions, and prone to such a variety of Passions, it is no wonder "that they should often disagree in  
 " their Fancys of Objects, even altho  
 " their *Sense of Beauty* and *Harmony* were  
 " perfectly uniform;" because many other Ideas may either please or displease, according to Persons, Tempers, and past Circumstances. We know how agreeable a very *wild Country* may be to any Person who has spent the chearful Days of his Youth in it, and how disagreeable very *beautiful Places* may be if they were the Scenes of his Misery. And this may help us in many Cases to account for the Diversities of Fancy, without denying the *Uniformity* of our *internal Sense of Beauty*.

13. GRANDEUR and *Novelty* are two Ideas different from *Beauty*, which often recommend Objects to us. The Reason of this is foreign to the present Subject. See *Spectator* N<sup>o</sup>. 412.

S E C T.

## S E C T. VII.


*Of the Power of Custom, Education, and Example, as to our internal Senses.*

1. **C**USTOM, *Education*, and *Example* are so often alledg'd in this Affair, as the occasion of our Relish for *beautiful Objects*, and for our Approbation of, or Delight in a certain *Conduct in Life* in a *moral Sense*, that it is necessary to examine these three particularly, to make it appear "that there is a *natural Power* of *Perception*, or *Sense of Beauty* in *Objects*, antecedent to all *Custom*, *Education*, or *Example*."

2. **C**USTOM, as distinct from the other two, operates in this manner. As to *Actions*, it only gives a disposition to the Mind or Body more easily to perform those *Actions* which have been frequently repeated, but never leads us to apprehend them under any other View than what we were capable of apprehending them under at first; nor gives us any new Power of Perception about them: We are naturally capable of Sentiments of *Fear*, and *Dread*, of any powerful *Presence*; and so *Custom* may connect the Ideas of religious  
*Horror*

*Sect. 7.* *Horror* to certain Buildings: but no *Custom* could have made a *Being* naturally incapable of *Fear*, receive such Ideas. So had we no other Power of perceiving, or forming Ideas of Actions, but as they were *advantageous* or *disadvantageous*, *Custom* could only have made us more ready at perceiving the *Advantage* or *Disadvantage* of Actions. But this is not to our present Purpose.

As to our Approbation of, or Delight in external Objects, when the *Blood* or *Spirits* of which *Anatomists* talk are rous'd, quicken'd, or fermented as they call it, in any agreeable manner by Medicine or Nutriment; or any *Glands* frequently stimulated to Secretion; it is certain that to preserve the Body easy, we will delight in Objects of Taste, which of themselves are not immediately pleasant to the Taste, if they promote that agreeable State, which the Body had been *accustom'd* to. Further, *Custom* will so alter the State of the Body, that what at first rais'd uneasy Sensations will cease to do so, or perhaps raise another agreeable Idea of the same Sense; but *Custom* can never give us any Idea of a different Sense from what we had antecedent to it: It will never make the *Blind* approve Objects as *coloured*, or those who have no *Taste* approve Meats as *delicious*, however they might like such as proved  
*strength-*

*Strengthening or Exhilarating*: Were our *Sect. 7.*  
*Glands* and the Parts about them void of   
Feeling, did we perceive no Pleasure from  
certain brisker Motions in the *Blood*, no  
*Custom* would make stimulating or intoxicating  
Fluids or Medicines agreeable, when they were not so to the Taste: So by like  
Reasoning, had we no *natural Sense* of  
*Beauty* from *Uniformity*, *Custom* could never  
have made us imagine any *Beauty* in  
Objects; if we had had no *Ear*, *Custom*  
could never have given us the Pleasures  
of *Harmony*. When we have these *natural Senses*  
antecedently, *Custom* may make us capable of  
extending our Views further, and of receiving more  
complex Ideas of *Beauty* in Bodys, or *Harmony* in  
Sounds, by increasing our Attention and quickness  
of Perception. But however *Custom* may increase our  
Power of receiving or comparing complex Ideas, yet it  
seems rather to weaken than strengthen the Ideas of  
*Beauty*, or the Impressions of Pleasure from regular  
Objects; else how were it possible that any Person  
could go into the open Air on a sunny Day, or clear  
Evening, without the most extravagant Raptures,  
such as MILTON \* represents our *Ancestor* in upon  
his first Creation? For such any Person would  
certainly fall into, upon the first Representation of  
such a Scene.

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\* See *Paradise Lost*, Book 8.



Sect. 7.

CUSTOM in like manner could make it easier for any Person to discern the Use of a complex Machine, and approve it as advantageous ; but he would never have imagin'd it *Beautiful*, had he no *natural Sense of Beauty*. *Custom* may make us quicker in apprehending the Truth of complex *Theorems*, but we all find the Pleasure or *Beauty of Theorems* as strong at first as ever : *Custom* makes us more capable of retaining and comparing complex Ideas, so as to discern more complicated *Uniformity*, which escapes the Observation of *Novices* in any Art ; but all this presupposes a *natural Sense of Beauty in Uniformity* : for had there been nothing in Forms which was constituted necessarily the occasion of Pleasure to our Senses, no Repetition of indifferent Ideas as to Pleasure or Pain, *Beauty* or *Deformity*, could ever have made them grow pleasing or displeasing.

3. THE Effect of EDUCATION is this, that thereby we receive many speculative Opinions, sometimes true and sometimes false ; and are often led to believe that Objects may be naturally apt to give Pleasure or Pain to our external Senses, when in reality the Object has no such Qualitys : And further, by *Education* there are some strong Associations of Ideas, without any Reason, by mere Accident sometimes, as well as by


by Design, which it is very hard for us Sect. 7.  
 ever after to break afunder. Thus Aversions are rais'd to Darknes, and to many kinds of Meats, and to certain innocent Actions: Approbations without Ground are rais'd in like manner. But in all these Instances, *Education* never makes us apprehend any Qualitys in Objects, which we have not naturally Senses capable of perceiving. We know what Sickness of the Stomach is, and may without Ground believe that very healthful Meats will raise this; we by our Sight and Smell receive disagreeable Ideas of the Food of Swine, and their Styes, and perhaps cannot prevent the recurring of these Ideas at Table: but never were Men naturally *Blind* prejudic'd against Objects as of a disagreeable Colour, or in favour of others as of a beautiful Colour; they hear perhaps Men dispraise one Colour, they imagine this Colour to be some quite different sensible Quality of the other Senses: And the same way a Man naturally void of *Taste* could by no *Education* receive the Ideas of Taste, or be prejudic'd in favour of Meats as delicious: so, had we no *natural Sense* of *Beauty* and *Harmony*, we never could be prejudic'd in favour of Objects or Sounds as *Beautiful* or *Harmonious*. *Education* may make an unattentive GOTH imagine that his Countrymen have attain'd the Perfection of *Architecture*; and an Aversion

Sect. 7. to their Enemys the ROMANS, may have join'd some disagreeable Ideas to their very Buildings, and excited them to their Demolition; but he had never form'd these Prejudices, had he been void of a *Sense* of *Beauty*. Did ever *blind Men* debate whether *Purple* or *Scarlet* were the finer *Colour*? or could any *Education* prejudice them in favour of either as *Colours*?

THUS *Education* and *Custom* may influence our *internal Senses*, where they are antecedently, by enlarging the Capacity of our Minds to retain and compare the Parts of complex Compositions: And if the finest Objects are presented to us, we grow conscious of a Pleasure far superior to what common Performances excite. But all this presupposes our *Sense* of *Beauty* to be *natural*. Instruction in *Anatomy*, Observation of *Nature*, and of those *Airs* of the Countenance and *Attitudes* of Body, which accompany any *Sentiment*, *Action* or *Passion*, may enable us to know where there is a just Imitation; but why should an exact Imitation please upon Observation, if we had not *naturally* a *Sense* of *Beauty* in it, more than the observing the Situation of fifty or a hundred Pebbles thrown at random? and should we repeat our Attention to them ever so often, we shall never dream of their growing *Beautiful*.

4. THERE is something worth our Observation as to the manner of rooting out the *Prejudices* of *Education*, not quite foreign to the present purpose. When the *Prejudice* arises from Associations of Ideas without any natural Connection, we must frequently force our selves to bear Representations of those Objects, or the Use of them when separated from the disagreeable Idea; and this may at last disjoin the unreasonable Association, especially if we can join new agreeable Ideas to them: Thus Opinions of *Superstition* are best remov'd by pleasant Conversation of Persons we esteem for their *Virtue*, or seeing them despise such Opinions. But when the *Prejudice* arises from an Apprehension or Opinion of *natural Evil*, as the Attendant, or Consequent of any Object or Action; if the *Evil* be apprehended to be the constant and immediate Attendant, a few Trials without receiving any Damage will remove the *Prejudice*, as in that against *Meats*: But where the *Evil* is not represented as the perpetual Concomitant, but as what may possibly or probably at some time or other accompany the use of the Object, there must be frequent Reasoning with our selves, or a long Series of Trials without any Detriment, to remove the *Prejudice*; such is the Case of our Fear of *Spirits* in the *dark*, and in *Church-yards*. And when



 Sect. 7. the *Evil* is represented as the Consequence perhaps a long time after, or in a *future State*, it is then hardest of all to remove the *Prejudice*; and this is only to be effected by slow Processes of Reason, because in this Case there can be no Trials made: and this is the Case of *superstitious Prejudices* against Actions apprehended as offensive to the DEITY; and hence it is that they are so hard to be rooted out.


5. EXAMPLE seems to operate in this manner. We are conscious that we act very much for *Pleasure*, or *private Good*; and hence are led to imagine that others do so too: hence we conclude there must be some *Perfection* in the Objects which we see others pursue, and *Evil* in those which we observe them constantly shunning. Or, the *Example* of others may serve to us as so many Trials to remove the Apprehension of *Evil* in Objects which we had an Aversion to. But all this is done upon an Apprehension of Qualities perceivable by the Senses which we have; for no *Example* will induce the *Blind* or *Deaf* to pursue Objects as *Colour'd* or *Sonorous*; nor could *Example* any more engage us to pursue Objects as *Beautiful* or *Harmonious*, had we no *Sense* of *Beauty* or *Harmony* naturally.

EXAMPLE may make us without Examination conclude, that our Countrymen have obtain'd the Perfection of *Beauty* in their *Works*, or that there is less *Beauty* in the Orders of *Architecture* or *Painting* us'd in other *Nations*, and so content our selves with very imperfect Forms. And often Fear of Contempt as void of *Taste* or *Genius*, makes us join in approving the Performances of the reputed Masters in our Country, and restrains those who have naturally a fine *Genius*, or the *internal Senses* very acute, from studying to obtain the greatest Perfection: it makes also those of a bad *Taste* pretend a Perception of Ideas of *Beauty* when they do not perceive them: But all this presupposes some *natural Power* of receiving Ideas of *Beauty* and *Harmony*. Nor can *Example* effect any thing further, unless it be to lead Men to pursue Objects by implicit Faith, for some Perfection which the Pursuer is conscious he does not know, or which perhaps is some very different Quality from the Idea perceiv'd by those of a good *Taste* in such Affairs.

## S E C T. VIII.

*Of the Importance of the internal Senses in Life, and the final Causes of them.*

1. **T**HE busy part of Mankind may look upon these things as airy Dreams of an inflam'd Imagination, which a w. f. Man should despise, who rationally pursues more solid Possessions independent on Fancy : but a little Reflection will convince us, “ That the Gratifications of our “ *internal Senses* are as natural, real, and “ satisfying Enjoyments as any sensible “ Pleasure whatsoever ;” and “ that they “ are the chief Ends for which we com- “ monly pursue *Wealth* and *Power*.” For how is *Wealth* or *Power* advantageous ? How do they make us *happy*, or prove *good* to us ? No otherwise than as they supply Gratifications to our *Senses* or *Facultys* of perceiving Pleasure. Now, are these *Senses* or *Facultys* only the *External ones* ? No : Every Body sees, that a small portion of *Wealth* or *Power* will supply more Pleasures of the *external Senses* than we can enjoy ; we know that Scarcity often heightens these Perceptions more than Abundance, which cloy's that Appetite which is necessary to all Pleasure in Enjoyment :  
and

and hence the *Poet's* Advice is perfectly Sect. 8.  
just; 

—*Tu pulmentaria quare*

*Sudando,* ————— \*

In short, the only use of a great Fortune, above a very small one (except in *good Offices* and *moral Pleasures*) must be to supply us with the Pleasures of *Beauty*, *Order*, and *Harmony*.

THIS is confirm'd by the constant Practice of the very *Enemys* to these *Senses*: As soon as they think they are got above the *World*; or extricated from the Hurrys of *Avarice* and *Ambition*, banish'd *Nature* will return upon them, and set them upon Pursuits of *Beauty* and *Order* in their *Houses*, *Gardens*, *Dress*, *Table*, *Equipage*; they are never easy without some degree of this: and were their Hearts open to our View, we should see *Regularity*, *Decency*, *Beauty*, as what their Wishes terminate upon, either to themselves or their Posterity, and what their Imagination is always presenting to them as the possible Effect of their Labours; nor without this could they ever justify their Pursuits to themselves.

THERE may perhaps be some Instances of human Nature perverted into a thorow

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\* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2. v. 20.



*Sect. 8. Miser*, who loves nothing but Money, and whose Fancy arises no higher than the cold dull Thought of Possession. But such an Instance in an Age must not be made the Standard of Mankind against the whole Body.

IF we examine the Pursuits of the *Luxurious*, who in the opinion of the World is wholly devoted to his Belly; we shall generally find that the far greater part of his Expence is employ'd to procure other Sensations than those of Taste; such as *fine Attendants, regular Apartments, Services of Plate*, and the like. Beside, a large share of the Preparation must be suppos'd design'd for some sort of generous friendly Purposes, as to please *Acquaintance, Strangers, Parasites*: How few would be contented to enjoy the same Sensations alone, in a Cottage, or out of earthen Pitchers? To conclude this Point, however these *internal Sensations* may be overlook'd in our Philosophical Inquiries about the human Facultys, we shall find in Fact, " That they employ us more, and are more efficacious in *Life*, either to our *Pleasure*, or *Uneasiness*, than all our external Senses taken together."

2. As to the *final Causes* of this *internal Sense*, we need not enquire, " whether to an *almighty and all-knowing Being* there  
" be

“ be any real Excellence in *regular Forms*, Sect. 8.  
“ in acting by *general Laws*, in knowing  
“ by *Theorems*.” We seem scarce capable of answering such Questions any way; nor need we enquire, “ whether other Animals may not discern *Uniformity* and *Regularity* in Objects which escape our Observation, and may not perhaps have their Senses constituted so as to perceive *Beauty*, from the same Foundation which we do, in Objects which our Senses are not fitted to examine or compare.” We shall confine our selves to a Subject where we have some certain Foundations to go upon, and only enquire “ if we can find any Reasons worthy of the Great AUTHOR of *Nature* for making such a Connection between regular Objects, and the Pleasure which accompanys our Perceptions of them;” or, “ what Reasons might possibly influence him to create the *World* as it at present is, as far as we can observe, every where full of *Regularity* and *Uniformity*.” Let it be here observ’d, that as far as we know of any of the great Bodys of the *Universe*, we see Forms and Motions really *Beautiful* to our Senses; and if we were plac’d in any *Planet*, the *apparent Courses* would still be *Regular* and *Uniform*, and consequently *Beautiful* to our Sense. Now this gives us no small Ground to imagine, that if the Senses of their Inhabitants are in the same

Sect. 8. same manner adapted to their Habitations  
 and the Objects occurring to their View,  
 as ours are here, their Senses must be  
 upon the same general Foundation with  
 ours.

BUT to return to the Questions : What  
 occurs to resolve them, may be contain'd in  
 the following Propositions.

1. THE Manner of Knowledge by *universal Theorems*, and of Operation by *universal Causes*, as far as we can attain to this Manner, must be most convenient for *Beings* of limited Understanding and Power, since this prevents Distraction in their Understandings thro the Multiplicity of Propositions, and Toil and Weariness to their Powers of Action: and consequently their *Reason*, without any *Sense* of *Beauty*, must approve of such Methods when they reflect upon their apparent *Advantage*.

2. THOSE Objects of Contemplation in which there is *Uniformity amidst Variety*, are more distinctly and easily comprehended and retain'd, than *irregular Objects*; because the accurate Observation of one or two Parts often leads to the Knowledge of the Whole; Thus we can from a *Pillar* or two with an intermediate *Arch*, and *Cornice*, form a distinct Idea of a whole *regular Building*, if we know of  
 what

what Species it is, and have its Length and Sect. 8.  
 Breadth: From a *Side* and *solid Angle* we ~~~~~  
 have the whole *regular Solid*; the measuring one *Side* gives the whole *Square*; one *Radius* the whole *Circle* pretty nearly; two *Diameters* an *Oval*; one *Ordinate* and *Abscissa* the *Parabola*; and so on in more complex Figures which have any *Regularity*, which can be entirely determin'd and known in every Part from a few *Data*: Whereas it must be a long Attention to a vast Multiplicity of Parts, which can ascertain or fix the Idea of any *irregular Form*, or give any distinct Idea of it, or make us capable of retaining it; as appears in the Forms of *rude Rocks*, and *Pebbles*, and *confus'd Heaps*, even when the Multitude of sensible Parts is not so great as in the *regular Forms*: for such *irregular Objects* distract the *Mind* with *Variety*, since for every sensible Part we must have a quite different Idea.

3. FROM the last two Propositions it follows, " That *Beings* of limited Understanding and Power, if they act rationally for their own *Interest*, must chuse to operate by the *simplest Means*, to invent *general Theorems*, and to study *regular Objects* if they be but equal in Use with *irregular ones*, that they may avoid the endless Toil of producing each Effect by a separate Operation, of searching



Sect. 8. “ ing each different Truth by a different  
 “ Inquiry, and of imprinting the endless  
 “ Variety of dissimilar Ideas in *irregular*  
 “ Objects.”

4. BUT then, beside this Consideration of *Interest*, there does not appear to be any necessary Connection, antecedently to the Constitution of the AUTHOR of *Nature*, between the *regular Forms, Actions, Theorems*, and that sudden sensible *Pleasure* excited in us upon observation of them, even when we do not reflect upon the Advantage mention'd in the former Proposition. And possibly the DEITY could have formed us so as to have receiv'd no Pleasure from such Objects, or connected Pleasure to those of a quite contrary Nature. We have a tolerable Presumption of this in the *Beautys* of various Animals; they give some small Pleasure indeed to every one who views them, but then every one in its own Species seems vastly more delighted with their peculiar *Beautys*, than with the *Beautys* of a different Species, which seldom raise any desire but among Animals of the same Species with the one admir'd: This makes it probable, that the *Pleasure* is not the necessary Result of the *Form* it self, otherwise it would equally affect all Apprehensions in what Species soever. This present Constitution is much more adapted to preserve the *Regularity* of the *Universe*, and  
 is

is probably not the Effect of *Necessity* but Sect. 8. *Choice* in the SUPREME AGENT who constituted our *Senses*.

5. Now from the whole we may conclude, "That supposing the DEITY so kind as to connect *sensible Pleasure* with certain Actions or Contemplations, beside the *rational Advantage* perceivable in them, there is a great *moral Necessity*, from his *Goodness*, that the *internal Sense* of Men should be constituted as it is at present, so as to make *Uniformity amidst Variety* the Occasion of Pleasure." For were it not so, but on the contrary, if *irregular Objects*, *particular Truths*, and *Operations* pleased us, beside the endless Toil this would involve us in, there must arise a perpetual Dissatisfaction in all rational Agents with themselves; since *Reason* and *Interest* would lead us to simple *general Causes*, while a *contrary Sense* of *Beauty* would make us disapprove them: *Universal Theorems* would appear to our Understanding the best Means of increasing our Knowledge of what might be useful; while a *contrary Sense* would set us on the search after *singular Truths*: *Thought* and *Reflection* would recommend Objects with *Uniformity amidst Variety*, and yet this *perverse Instinct* would involve us in Labyrinths of *Confusion* and *Dissimilitude*. And hence

Sect. 8. we see “ how suitable it is to the *sagacious*  
 “ *Bounty* which we suppose in the DEITY,  
 “ to constitute our *internal Senses* in the  
 “ manner in which they are, by which  
 “ Pleasure is join’d to the Contemplation  
 “ of *those Objects*, which a finite *Mind*  
 “ can best imprint and retain the Ideas of  
 “ with the least Distraction; to *those Ac-*  
 “ *tions* which are most efficacious, and  
 “ fruitful in useful Effects; and to *those The-*  
 “ *orems* which most enlarge our *Minds*.”

As to the other Question, “ What Rea-  
 “ son might influence the DEITY, whom  
 “ no Diversities of Operation could distract  
 “ or weary, to chuse to operate by *sim-*  
 “ *plest Means* and *general Laws*, and to  
 “ diffuse *Uniformity*, *Proportion* and  
 “ *Similitude* thro all the Parts of *Nature*  
 “ which we can observe;” perhaps there  
 may be some real Excellence in this Man-  
 ner of Operation, and in these Forms,  
 which we know not: but this we may  
 probably say, that since the *divine Good-*  
*ness*, for the Reasons above mention’d, has  
 constituted our *Sense of Beauty* as it is  
 at present, the same *Goodness* might deter-  
 mine the Great ARCHITECT to adorn  
 this *vast Theatre* in that manner which  
 should be agreeable to the Spectators, and  
 that part which is expos’d to the Observa-  
 tion of Men, so as to be pleasant to them;  
 especially if we suppose that he design’d to  
 discover

discover himself to them as *Wise* and *Good*, Sect. 8. as well as *Powerful*; for thus he has given them greater Evidences, thro the whole *Earth*, of his *Art*, *Wisdom*, *Design*, and *Bounty*, than they can possibly have for the *Reason*, and *Counsel*, and *Good-will* of their fellow-Creatures, with whom they converse with full Persuasion of this in their common Affairs.

As to the Operations of the DEITY by *general Laws*, there is a further Reason from a *Sense* still superior to these already consider'd, even that of VIRTUE, or the *Beauty of Action*, which is the Foundation of our greatest Happiness: For were there no *general Laws* fix'd in the Course of *Nature*, there could be no *Prudence* or *Design* in Men, no *rational Expectation* of Effects from Causes, no *Schemes* of Action projected, nor any *regular Execution*. If then according to the *Frame* of our *Nature*, our greatest Happiness must depend upon our Actions, as it may perhaps be made appear it does, "The *Universe* must  
" be governed, not by *particular Wills*,  
" but by *general Laws*, upon which we  
" can found our Expectations, and project  
" our Schemes of Action."





TREATISE II.

VIZ.

A N

INQUIRY

Concerning the

ORIGINAL of our IDEAS

O F

*Virtue or Moral Good.*

---

*Quod magis ad nos  
Pertinet, & nescire malum est, agitamus : utrumne  
Divitiis homines, an sint Virtute beati :  
Quidve ad Amicitias, Usus, Rectumne, trahat nos  
Et quæ sit natura Boni, summumque quid ejus.*

Hor. Sat. 6. Lib. 2. v. 72.

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TREATISE II.  
 IN  
 AN  
 INQUIRY  
 CONCERNING THE  
 ORIGINAL OF OUR IDEAS  
 OF  
 VIRTUE OR MORAL GOOD.

---

Quod magis ad nos  
 Pertinet, et agere malum est, agendum : virtutem  
 Dignum, honestum, et hoc Virtutis bene :  
 Quod ad speciem, quod, Relativum, virtutem non  
 Est quod sit virtutis bene, immutabile quod est.  
 Hoc, sed et lib. 2. c. 2.

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AN  
INQUIRY  
CONCERNING  
MORAL GOOD and EVIL.

INTRODUCTION.

**T**HE Word MORAL GOODNESS, denotes our Idea of *some Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, and Love toward the Actor, from those who receive no Advantage by the Action.* MORAL EVIL denotes our Idea of a *contrary Quality, which excites Aversion, and Dislike toward the Actor, even from Persons unconcern'd in its natural Tendency.* We must be contented with these imperfect Descriptions, until we discover some general Foundation of this Difference of Actions, as *morally Good or Evil.*



THESE Descriptions seem to contain an universally acknowledg'd Difference of *moral Good* and *Evil*, from *Natural*. All Men who speak of *moral Good* acknowledge that it procures Love toward those we apprehend possess'd of it; whereas *natural Good* does not. In this matter Men must consult their own Breasts. How differently are they affected toward those they suppose possess'd of *Honesty*, *Faith*, *Generosity*, *Kindness*, even when they expect no Benefit from these admir'd Qualities; and those who are possess'd of the *natural Goods*, such as *Houses*, *Lands*, *Gardens*, *Vineyards*, *Health*, *Strength*, *Sagacity*? We shall find that we necessarily love and approve the Possessors of the former; but the Possession of the latter procures no Love at all toward the Possessor, but often contrary Affections of *Envy* and *Hatred*. In the same manner, whatever Quality we apprehend to be *morally Evil*, raises our Hatred toward the Person in whom we observe it, such as *Treachery*, *Cruelty*, *Ingratitude*, even when they are no way hurtful to our selves; whereas we heartily love, esteem, and pity many who are expos'd to *natural Evils*, such as *Pain*, *Poverty*, *Hunger*, *Sickness*, *Death*.

Now

Now the first Question on this Subject is, "Whence arise these different Ideas of "Actions."

BECAUSE we shall afterwards frequently use the Words *Interest*, *Advantage*, *natural Good*, it is necessary here to fix their Ideas. The Pleasure in our sensible Perceptions of any kind, gives us our first Idea of *natural Good*, or *Happiness*; and then all Objects which are apt to excite this Pleasure are call'd *immediately Good*. Those Objects which may procure others immediately pleasant, are call'd *Advantageous*: and we pursue both Kinds from a View of *Interest*, or from *Self-Love*.

OUR *Sense* of Pleasure is antecedent to *Advantage* and *Interest*, and is the Foundation of them. We do not perceive Pleasure in Objects, because it is our *Interest* to do so; but Objects or Actions are *Advantageous*, and are pursu'd or undertaken from *Interest*, because we receive Pleasure from them. Our Perception of Pleasure is necessary, and nothing is *Advantageous* or *naturally Good* to us, but what is apt to raise Pleasure *mediately*, or *immediately*; and such Objects as we know either from Experience of Sense, or Reason, to be *immediately*, or *mediately Advantageous*, or apt to minister Pleasure, we pursue

from *Self-Interest*, when our Intention is only to enjoy this Pleasure, which they have the Power of exciting. Thus *Meats, Drink, Harmony, fine Prospects, Painting, Statues*, are perceiv'd by our Senses to be *immediately Good*; and our Reason shews *Riches and Power* to be *mediately so*, that is, apt to furnish us with Objects of immediate Pleasure: and both Kinds of these *natural Goods* are pursu'd from *Interest*, or *Self-Love*.

Now the greatest part of our later *Moralists* establish it as undeniable, " That all  
 " *moral Qualities* have necessarily some  
 " Relation to the *Law* of a *Superior*,  
 " of sufficient Power to make us *Happy*,  
 " or *Miserable*;" and since all *Laws* operate only by Sanctions of *Rewards*, or *Punishments*, which determine us to Obedience by Motives of *Self-Interest*, they suppose, " that it is thus that *Laws* do constitute some Actions *mediately Good*,  
 " or *Advantageous*, and others the same  
 " way *Disadvantageous*." They say indeed, " That a *benevolent Legislator* constitutes no Actions *Advantageous* to the  
 " Agent by Law, but such as in their own  
 " Nature tend to the *natural Good* of the  
 " *Whole*, or, at least, are not inconsistent  
 " with it; and that therefore we approve  
 " the *Virtue* of others, because it has some  
 " small Tendency to our *Happiness*, either  
 " from

" from its own Nature, or from this ge-  
 " neral Consideration, That Obedience to  
 " a *benevolent* Legislator, is in general  
 " *Advantageous* to the *Whole*, and to us  
 " in particular; and that for the contrary  
 " Reasons alone, we disapprove the *Vice*  
 " of others, that is, the prohibited Action,  
 " as tending to our particular *Detriment* in  
 " some degree." But then they maintain,  
 " That we are determin'd to Obedience to  
 " *Laws*, or deterr'd from Disobedience,  
 " merely by Motives of *Self-Interest*, to  
 " obtain either the *natural Good* arising  
 " from the commanded Action, or the  
 " *Rewards* promised by the Sanction; or  
 " to avoid the *natural evil* Consequences  
 " of Disobedience, or at least the *Penal-*  
 " *tys* of the *Law*."

SOME other Moralists suppose " an im-  
 " mediate *natural Good* in the Actions  
 " call'd *Virtuous*; that is, " That we are  
 " determin'd to perceive some *Beauty* in  
 " the Actions of others, and to love the  
 " Agent, even without reflecting upon any  
 " *Advantage* which can any way redound  
 " to us from the Action; that we have  
 " also a secret Sense of Pleasure accom-  
 " panying such of our own Actions as we  
 " call *Virtuous*, even when we expect no  
 " other *Advantage* from them." But they  
 " alledge at the same time, " That we are  
 " excited to perform these Actions, even  
 " as



“ as we pursue, or purchase *Pictures, Statues, Landskips*, from *Self-Interest*,  
 “ to obtain this Pleasure which accompa-  
 “ nys the very Action, and which we  
 “ necessarily enjoy in doing it.” The De-  
 sign of the following Sections is to enquire  
 into this matter; and perhaps the Reasons  
 to be offer’d may prove,

“ I. THAT some Actions have to Men  
 “ an *immediate Goodness* ;” or “ that by  
 “ a *superior Sense*, which I call a *Moral*  
 “ *one*, we perceive Pleasure in the Con-  
 “ templation of such Actions in others,  
 “ and are determin’d to love the Agent,  
 “ (and much more do we perceive Plea-  
 “ sure in being conscious of having done  
 “ such Actions our selves) without any  
 “ View of further *natural Advantage*  
 “ from them.”

II. It may perhaps also appear, “ That  
 “ what excites us to these Actions which  
 “ we call *Virtuous*, is not an Intention  
 “ to obtain even this *sensible Pleasure* ;  
 “ much less the *future Rewards* from  
 “ Sanctions of Laws, or any other *natu-  
 “ ral Good*, which may be the Consequence  
 “ of the *virtuous* Action ; but an entirely  
 “ different Principle of Action from *Inter-  
 “ rest* or *Self-Love*.”

## S E C T. I.

Of the Moral Sense by which we perceive Virtue and Vice, and approve or disapprove them in others.

I. **T**HAT the Perceptions of *moral Good and Evil*, are perfectly different from those of *natural Good*, or *Advantage*, every one must convince himself, by reflecting upon the different Manner in which he finds himself affected when these Objects occur to him. Had we no *Sense* of *Good* distinct from the *Advantage* or *Interest* arising from the external Senses, and the Perceptions of *Beauty* and *Harmony*; our Admiration and Love toward a *fruitful Field* or *commodious Habitation*, would be much the same with what we have toward a *generous Friend*, or any *noble Character*; for both are, or may be *advantageous* to us: And we should no more admire any Action, or love any Person in a distant *Country*, or *Age*, whose Influence could not extend to us, than we love the *Mountains* of *PERU*, while we are unconcern'd in the *Spanish Trade*. We should have the same Sentiments and Affections toward *inanimate Beings*, which we have toward *rational Agents*; which yet every

Sect. 1. one knows to be false. Upon Comparison, we say, "Why should we admire or love  
 " with Esteem *inanimate Beings*? They  
 " have no Intention of *Good* to us; their  
 " *Nature* makes them fit for our Uses,  
 " which they neither know nor study to  
 " serve. But it is not so with *rational*  
 " *Agents*: they study our *Interest*, and  
 " delight in our *Happiness*, and are *Bene-*  
 " *volent* toward us." We are all then  
 conscious of the Difference between that  
 Esteem, or Perception of *moral Excellence*,  
 which *Benevolence* excites toward the Per-  
 son in whom we observe it, and that Opi-  
 nion of *natural Goodness*, which only rais-  
 es Desire of Possession toward the good  
 Object. Now "what should make this  
 " Difference, if all Approbation, or *Sense*  
 " of *Good* be from Prospect of *Advan-*  
 " *tage*? Do not *inanimate Objects* pro-  
 " mote our *Advantage*, as well as *Benevo-*  
 " *lent Persons* who do Offices of *Kind-*  
 " *ness*, and *Friendship*? Should we not  
 " then have the same endearing Sentiments  
 " of both? or only the same cold Opi-  
 " nion of *Advantage* in both?" The  
 Reason why it is not so, must be this,  
 " That we have a distinct Perception of  
 " *Beauty*, or *Excellence* in the kind Af-  
 " fections of *rational Agents*; whence we  
 " are determin'd to admire and love such  
 " *Characters* and *Persons*."

SUPPOSE we reap the same *Advantage* from two Men, one of which serves us from *Delight* in our Happiness, and *Love* toward us; the other from Views of *Self-Interest*, or by *Constraint*: both are in this Case equally beneficial or *advantageous* to us, and yet we shall have quite different Sentiments of them. We must then certainly have other Perceptions of *moral Actions* than those of *Advantage*: And that Power of receiving these Perceptions may be call'd a MORAL SENSE, since the Definition agrees to it, *viz.* a *Determination of the Mind, to receive any Idea from the Presence of an Object, which occurs to us, independently on our Will.*

THIS perhaps will be equally evident from our Ideas of *Evil* done to us designedly by a *rational Agent*. Our Senses of *natural Good* and *Evil* would make us receive with equal Serenity and Composure, an *Assault*, a *Buffet*, an *Affront* from a *Neighbour*, a *Cheat* from a *Partner*, or *Trustee*, as we would an equal Damage from the Fall of a *Beam*, or *Tile*, or a *Tempest*; and we should have the same Affections and Sentiments of both. *Villany*, *Treachery*, *Cruelty*, would be as meekly resented as a *Blast*, or *Mildew*, or an *overflowing Stream*. But I fancy every one is very differently affected on these Occasions. tho there



*Sect. I.* there may be equal *natural Evil* in both. Nay, Actions no way detrimental may occasion the strongest Anger, and Indignation, if they evidence only impotent Hatred, or Contempt. And, on the other hand, the Intervention of *moral Ideas* may prevent our Hatred of the Agent, or bad moral Apprehension of that Action, which causes to us the greatest *natural Evil*. Thus the Opinion of *Justice* in any Sentence, will prevent all Ideas of *moral Evil* in the Execution, or Hatred toward the *Magistrate*, who is the immediate Cause of our greatest Sufferings.

II. IN our Sentiments of Actions done toward our selves, there is indeed a Mixture of the Ideas of *natural Good*, which requires some Attention to separate. But when we reflect upon the Actions which do not affect our selves, but other Persons, we may observe the *moral Ideas* unmix'd with those of *natural Good*, or *Evil*. For let it be here observ'd, that *those Senses* by which we perceive Pleasure in natural Objects, whence they are constituted *Advantageous*, could never raise in us any Desire of *publick Good*, but only of what was good to our selves in particular. Nor could they ever make us pleas'd with any Action because of its promoting the Happiness of others. And yet as soon as any Action is represented to us as flowing from

Love,


# MORAL GOOD and EVIL. 111

*Love, Humanity, Gratitude, Compassion, Sect. 1.*  
 a Study of the good of others, and a *Delight* in their Happiness, altho it were in the most distant Part of the World, or in some past Age, we feel Joy within us, admire the lovely Action, and praise its Author. And on the contrary, every Action represented as flowing from *Hatred, Delight* in the Misery of others, or *Ingratitude*, raises Abhorrence and Aversion.

It is true indeed, that the Actions we approve in others, are generally imagin'd to tend to the *natural Good* of Mankind, or that of some *Parts* of it. But whence this *secret Chain* between *each Person* and *Mankind*? How is *my Interest* connected with the most distant *Parts* of it? And yet I must admire beneficent Actions toward them, and love the Author. Whence this *Love, Compassion, Indignation* and *Hatred* toward even *feign'd Characters*, in the most distant Ages, and Nations, according as they appear *Kind, Faithful, Compassionate*, or of the *opposite Dispositions*, toward their imaginary Contemporaries? If there is no *moral Sense*, which makes rational Actions appear *Beautiful*, or *Deformed*; if all Approbation be from the *Interest* of the Approver,

\* *What's*

Sect. I.



\* *What's* HECUBA to us, or we to HECUBA?

III. SOME refin'd Explainers of *Self-Love* may tell us, "That we hate, or love *Characters*, according as we apprehend "we should have been supported, or injur'd by them, had we liv'd in their "Days." But how obvious is the Answer, if we only observe, that had we no Sense of *moral Good* in *Humanity*, *Mercy*, *Faithfulness*, why should not *Self-Love* engage us always to the victorious Side, and make us admire and love the successful *Tyrant*, or *Traitor*? Why do not we love SINON, or PYRRHUS, in the *Aeneid*? for had we been GREEKS, these two would have been very *advantageous Characters*. Why are we affected with the Fortunes of PRIAMUS, POLITES, CHOROEBUS or ÆNEAS? It is plain we have some *secret Sense* which determines our Approbation without regard to *Self-Interest*; otherwise we should always favour the fortunate Side without regard to *Virtue*.

SUPPOSE any great Destruction occasion'd by mere *Accident*, without any Design, or Negligence of the Person who casually was the Author of it: This Action

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\* *Tragedy of Hamlet.*

might have been as *disadvantageous* to us Sect. 1.  
as design'd *Cruelty*, or *Malice*; but who  
will say he has the same Idea of both  
Actions, or Sentiments of the Agents?  
“ Whence then this Difference ?”

AND further, Let us make a Supposition, which perhaps is not far from Matter of Fact, to try if we cannot approve even *disadvantageous Actions*, and perceive *moral Good* in them. A few ingenious *Artisans*, persecuted in their own Country, flee to ours for Protection; they instruct us in *Manufactures* which support Millions of Poor, and increase the Wealth of almost every Person in the *State*, and make us formidable to our *Neighbours*. In a *Nation* not far distant from us, some resolute *Burgomasters*, full of Love to their *Country*, and Compassion toward their *Fellow-Citizens*, oppress'd in Body and Soul by a *Tyrant*, and *Inquisition*, with *indefatigable Diligence*, *public Spirit*, and *Courage*, support a tedious perilous War against the *Tyrant*, and form an *industrious Republick*, which rivals us in *Trade*, and almost in *Power*. All the World sees whether the *former* or the *latter* have been more *advantageous* to us: and yet let every Man consult his own Breast, which of the two Characters he has the most agreeable Idea of; whether of the *useful Refugee*, or the *public-spirited Burgomaster*, by whose  
I Love



Sect. I. Love to his own *Country*, we have often suffer'd in our *Interests*; and I am confident he will find some other Foundation of Esteem than *Advantage*, and will see a just Reason, why the Memory of our *Artizans* is so obscure among us, and yet that of our *Rivals* is immortal.

IV. SOME *Moralists*, who will rather twist *Self-Love* into a thousand Shapes, than allow any other Principle of Approbation than *Interest*, may tell us, "That whatever profits one Part without detriment to another, profits *the Whole*, and then some small Share will redound to *each Individual*; that those Actions which tend to the *Good of the Whole*, if universally perform'd, would most effectually secure to *each Individual* his own Happiness; and that consequently we may approve such Actions, from the Opinion of their tending ultimately to our own *Advantage*." We need not trouble these *Gentlemen* to shew by their nice Train of Consequences, and Influences of Actions by way of Precedent, in particular Instances, that we in this Age reap any *Advantage* from ORESTES's killing the treacherous ÆGYSTHUS, or from the Actions of CODRUS or DECIUS. Allow their Reasonings to be perfectly good, they only prove that after long Reflection, and Reasoning, we may find out some ground,  
even

even from Views of *Interest*, to approve Sect. I. the same Actions which every Man admires as soon as he hears of them, and that too under a quite different Conception. Should any of our Travellers find some old *Grecian Treasure*, the *Miser* who hid it, did certainly perform an Action more to the Traveller's *Advantage* than CODRUS, or ORESTES; for he must have but a small Share of Benefit from their Actions, whose Influence is so dispers'd, and lost in various Ages, and Nations: Surely then this *Miser* must appear to the Traveller a prodigious Hero in *Virtue*! For *Self-Interest* will make us only esteem Men according to the Good they do to *our Selves*, and not give us high Ideas of *public Good*, but in proportion to our Share of it. But must a Man have the Reflection of CUMBERLAND, or PUFFENDORF, to admire *Generosity, Faith, Humanity, Gratitude*? Or reason so nicely to apprehend the *Evil* in *Cruelty, Treachery, Ingratitude*? Do not the former excite our *Admiration*, and *Love*, and *Study* of Imitation, wherever we see them, almost at first View, without any such Reflection; and the latter our *Hatred, Contempt*, and *Abhorrence*? Unhappy would it be for *Mankind*, if a *Sense of Virtue* was of as narrow an Extent, as a Capacity for such *Metaphysics*.

Sect. I.

V. THIS *moral Sense*, either of our *own* Actions, or of those of *others*, has this in common with our other Senses, That however our Desire of *Virtue* may be counterballanc'd by *Interest*, our Sentiment or Perception of its *Beauty* cannot; as it certainly might be, if the only Ground of our Approbation were Views of *Advantage*. Let us consider this both as to our *own* Actions and those of *others*.

A COVETOUS *Man* shall dislike any Branch of Trade, how useful soever it may be to the Publick, if there is no Gain for himself in it; here is an Aversion from *Interest*. Propose a sufficient Premium, and he shall be the first who sets about it, with full Satisfaction in his own Conduct. Now is it the same way with our *Sense* of *moral Actions*? Should any one advise us to wrong a *Minor*, or *Orphan*, or to do an ungrateful Action toward a *Benefactor*; we at first View abhor it: Assure us that it will be very *advantageous* to us, propose even a *Reward*; our *Sense* of the Action is not alter'd. It is true, these Motives may make us undertake it; but they have no more Influence upon us to make us approve it, than a Physician's Advice has to make a nauseous Portion pleasant to the Taste, when we perhaps force our-selves to take it for the Recovery of Health. Had we no Notion of

of Actions, beside our Opinion of their Sect. I. *Advantage*, or *Disadvantage*, could we ever chuse an Action as *Advantageous*, which we are conscious is still *Evil*? as it too often happens in human Affairs. Where would be the need of such *high Bribes* to prevail with Men to abandon the Interests of a ruin'd Party, or of *Tortures* to force out the Secrets of their Friends? Is it so hard to convince Mens Understandings, if that be the only Faculty we have to do with, that it is more probably advantageous to secure present Gain, and avoid present Evils, by joining with the prevalent Party, than to wait for the remote Possibility of future Good, upon a Revolution often improbable, and sometimes unexpected? And when Men are overpersuaded by *Advantage*, do they always approve their own Conduct? Nay, how often is their remaining Life odious, and shameful, in their *own Sense* of it, as well as in that of *others*, to whom the base Action was Profitable?

IF any one becomes satisfy'd with his own Conduct in such a Case; upon what Ground is it? how does he please himself, or vindicate his Actions to others? Never by reflecting upon his *private Advantage*, or alledging this to others as a Vindication; but by gradually warping into the *moral Principles* of his *new Party*; for no



Sect. I. Party is without them. And thus Men  
 become pleas'd with their Actions under  
 some Appearance of *moral Good*, distinct  
 from *Advantage*.

It may perhaps be alledg'd, " That in  
 " those Actions of our own which we call  
 " *Good*, there is *this* constant *Advantage*  
 " superior to all others, which is the  
 " Ground of our Approbation, and the Mo-  
 " tive to them from *Self-love*, viz. That  
 " we suppose the DEITY will *reward*  
 " them." This will be more fully consi-  
 der'd \* afterwards: At present it is enough  
 to observe, that many have high Notions  
 of *Honour*, *Faith*, *Generosity*, *Justice*,  
 who have scarce any Opinions about the  
 DEITY, or any Thoughts of *future Re-*  
*wards*; and abhor any thing which is *Trea-*  
*cherous*, *Cruel*, or *Unjust*, without any  
 regard to *future Punishments*. But fur-  
 ther, Tho these *Rewards*, and *Punish-*  
*ments*, may make my own Actions appear  
*advantageous* to me, and make me ap-  
 prove them from *Self-Love*, yet they  
 would never make me approve, and love  
*another* Person for the like Actions, whose  
 Merit would not be imputed to me. Those  
 Actions are *advantageous* indeed to the  
*Agent*; but his *Advantage* is not my *Ad-*  
*vantage*: And *Self-Love* could never in-

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\* See Sect. 2. Art. VII.

fluence me to approve Actions as *advantageous* to others, or to love the Authors of them on that account. Sect. I.

THE second thing to be consider'd, is, "Whether our *Sense* of the *moral Good*, or *Evil*, in the Actions of others, can be over-ballanc'd, or brib'd by Views of *Interest*." I may easily be capable of wishing, that another would do an Action I abhor as *morally Evil*, if it were very *Advantageous* to me: *Interest* in that Case may overballance my Desire of *Virtue* in another. But no *Interest* will make me approve an Action as *Good*, which, without that *Interest* to my self, would have appear'd *morally Evil*. The *Sense* of the *moral Good*, or *Evil*, cannot be overballanc'd by *Interest*. How ridiculous an Attempt wou'd it be, to engage a Man by Rewards, or to threaten him into a good Opinion of an Action, which was contrary to his *moral Notions*? We may procure Dissimulation by such means, and that is all.

VI. A LATE witty Author \* says, That "the Leaders of Mankind do not really admire any Actions, such as those of *REGULUS*, or *DECIUS*, but only observe, that Men of such Dispositions are

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\* See the Fable of the Bees, Page 34, 36. 3d Edition.

Sect. I. " very useful for the Defence of any State;  
 " and therefore by *Panegyricks*, and *Sta-*  
 " *tues*, they encourage such Tempers in  
 " others, as the most *tractable*, and *use-*  
 " *ful*." Here, first, let us consider, If a  
*Traitor*, who would sell his own Country  
 to us, may not often be as *advantageous*  
 to us, as a *Hero* who defends us: And yet  
 we can love the *Treason*, and hate the  
*Traitor*. We can at the same time praise  
 a *gallant Enemy*, who is very *pernicious*  
 to us. Is there nothing in all this but an  
 Opinion of *Advantage*? Again, upon this  
 Scheme what could a *Statue* or *Panegy-*  
*rick* effect?—Men love *Praise*—They  
 will do the Actions which they observe to  
 be *praised*—*Praise*, with Men, who have  
 no other Idea of *Good* but *Self-Interest*, is  
*the Opinion which a Nation or Party have*  
*of a Man as useful to them*—REGU-  
 LUS or CATO, or DECIUS had no *Ad-*  
*vantage* by the Actions which profited their  
 Country, and therefore they themselves  
 could not admire them, however the Per-  
 sons who reaped the *Advantage* might  
 praise such Actions. REGULUS or CATO  
 could not possibly praise or love another  
*Hero* for a *virtuous Action*; for this  
 would not gain them the *Advantage* of  
*Honour*, and their own Actions they  
 must have look'd upon as the hard Terms  
 on which Honour was to be purchas'd,  
 without any thing amiable in them,

in the Contemplation or Reflection upon Sect. 1. which, they could be pleas'd.—Now how unlike is this to what the least Observation would teach a Man concerning such Characters?

BUT says \* he, “ These wondrous cunning Governours made Men believe, by their *Statues* and *Panegyricks*, that there was *publick Spirit*, and that this was in it self *Excellent*; and hence Men are led to admire it in others, and to imitate it in themselves, forgetting the Pursuit of their own *Advantage*.” So easy a matter it seems to him, to quit judging of others by what we feel in our selves!—for a Person who is wholly *selfish*, to imagine others to be *publick-spirited*!—for one who has no Ideas of *Good* but in his own *Advantage*, to be led by the Persuasions of others into a Conception of *Goodness* in what is avowedly detrimental to himself, and profitable to others; nay, so entirely, as not to approve the Action thorowly, but in so far as he was conscious that it proceeded from a *disinterested Study* of the *Good* of others!—Yet this it seems *Statues* and *Panegyricks* can accomplish! †

*Nil intra est oleam, nil extra est in nuce duri!*

\* See the same Author in the same Place.

† Hor. Ep. 1. Lib. 2. v. 31.



## Sect. I.



It is an easy matter for Men to assert any thing in Words; but our own Hearts must decide the Matter, "Whether some  
 " *moral Actions* do not at first View appear  
 " *amiable*, even to those who are uncon-  
 " cern'd in their Influence." It is true, that the Actions which we approve, are useful to Mankind; but not always to the Approver. It would perhaps be useful to the *Whole*, that all Men agreed in performing such Actions; and then every one would have his Share of the *Advantage*: But this only proves, that *Reason* and *calm Reflection* may recommend to us, from *Self-Interest*, those Actions, which at first View our *moral Sense* determines us to admire, without considering this *Interest*. Nay, our *Sense* shall operate even where the *Advantage* to our selves does not hold. We can approve the Justice of a Sentence against our selves: A condemn'd *Traitor* may approve the Vigilance of a Cicerō in discovering Conspiracies, tho it had been for the Traitor's Advantage, that there never had been in the World any Men of such Sagacity. To say that he may still approve such Conduct as tending to the *publick Good*, is a Jest from one whose only Idea of *Good* is *Self-Interest*. Such a Person has no Desire of *publick Good* further than it tends to his own *Advantage*, which it does not at all in the present Case.

VII. IF what is said makes it appear, that we have some other *amiable Idea* of Actions than that of *Advantageous* to our selves, we may conclude, " That this " Perception of *moral Good* is not deriv'd " from *Custom, Education, Example, or " Study.*" These give us no new Ideas; They might make us see *Advantage* to our selves in Actions whose Usefulness did not at first appear, or give us Opinions of some Tendency of Actions to our *Detriment*, by some nice Deductions of Reason, or by a rash Prejudice; when upon the first View of the Action we should have observ'd no such thing: but they never could have made us apprehend Actions as *amiable* or *odious*, abstractly from any Consideration of our own *Advantage*.

VIII. It remains then, " That as the " AUTHOR of *Nature* has determin'd us " to receive, by our *external Senses*, pleasant or disagreeable Ideas of Objects, " according as they are useful or hurtful to " our Bodies; and to receive from *uniform " Objects* the Pleasures of *Beauty* and *Harmony*, to excite us to the Pursuit of " Knowledge, and to reward us for it; " or to be an Argument to us of his *Goodness*, as the *Uniformity* it self proves " his *Existence*, whether we had a *Sense* " of

Sect. 1. “ of *Beauty* in *Uniformity* or not: so he  
 “ has given us a *MORAL SENSE*, to di-  
 “ rect our *Actions*, and to give us still  
 “ *nobler Pleasures*; so that while we are  
 “ only intending the *Good* of others, we  
 “ undesignedly promote our own greatest  
 “ *private Good*.”

WE are not to imagine, that this *moral Sense*, more than the other Senses, supposes any *innate Ideas*, or *Knowledge*, or *practical Proposition*: We mean by it only a *Determination of our Minds* to receive *amiable* or *disagreeable Ideas* of *Actions*, when they shall occur to our *Observation*, antecedently to any *Opinions* of *Advantage* or *Loss* to redound to our selves from them; even as we are pleas'd with a *regular Form* or an *harmonious Composition*, without having any *Knowledge* of *Mathematicks*, or seeing any *Advantage* in that *Form*, or *Composition*, different from the immediate *Pleasure*.

## S E C T. II.

*Concerning the immediate Motive to  
virtuous Actions.*

**T**HE *Motives* of human Actions, or their *immediate Causes*, would be best understood after considering the *Passions* and *Affections*; but here we shall only consider the *Springs* of the Actions which we call *virtuous*, as far as it is necessary to settle the general Foundation of the *Moral Sense*.

I. EVERY Action, which we apprehend as either *morally good* or *evil*, is always supposed to flow from *some Affection* toward *rational Agents*; and whatever we call *Virtue* or *Vice*, is either some such *Affection*, or some *Action* consequent upon it. Or it may perhaps be enough to make an Action, or Omission, appear *vitious*, if it argues the Want of such Affection toward rational Agents, as we expect in Characters counted *morally good*. All the Actions counted *religious* in any Country, are supposed, by those who count them religious, to flow from some Affections toward the DEITY; and whatever we call *social Virtue*, we still suppose to flow from Af-



**Sect. 2.** Affections toward our *Fellow-Creatures*; for in this all seem to agree, "That external Motions, when accompany'd with no Affections toward God or *Man*, or evidencing no Want of the *expected* Affections toward either, can have no moral Good or Evil in them." Ask the most *abstemious Hermit*, if *Temperance* of it self wou'd be *morally good*, supposing it shew'd no Obedience toward the DEITY, made us no fitter for Devotion, or the Service of Mankind, or the Search after Truth, than *Luxury*; and he will easily grant, that it wou'd be no *moral Good*, tho' still it might be *naturally good* or *advantageous* to Health: And mere *Courage*, or Contempt of Danger, if we conceive it to have no regard to the Defence of the Innocent, or repairing of Wrongs, wou'd only entitle its Possessor to *Bedlam*. When such sort of Courage is sometimes admir'd, it is upon some secret Apprehension of a good Intention in the use of it. *Prudence*, if it were only employ'd in promoting *private Interest*, is never imagin'd to be a *Virtue*: and *Justice*, or observing a strict Equality, if it have no regard to the Good of *Mankind*, the Preservation of Rights, and securing Peace, is a Quality properer for its ordinary *Gestamen*, a *Beam* and *Scales*, than for a *rational Agent*. So that these four Qualities, commonly call'd *Cardinal Virtues*, obtain that Name, because they  
are

are Dispositions universally necessary to Sect. 2.  
 promote *publick Good*, and denote *Affec-*  
*tions* toward *rational Agents*; otherwise  
 there would appear no *Virtue* in them.

II. Now if it can be made appear, that  
 none of these Affections which we call *vir-*  
*tuous*, do spring from *Self-love*, or Desire  
 of *private Interest*; since all *Virtue*, is ei-  
 ther some such *Affections*, or *Actions* con-  
 sequent upon them; it must necessarily fol-  
 low, "That *Virtue* is not pursu'd from  
 "the *Interest* or *Self-love* of the *Pursuer*,  
 "or any *Motives* of his own *Advan-*  
 "rage."

THE Affections which are of most Im-  
 portance in *Morals*, are LOVE and HA-  
 TRED: All the rest seem but different Mo-  
 difications of these two *original Affections*.  
 Now in discoursing of *Love* toward ratio-  
 nal Agents, we need not be caution'd not  
 to include that *Love* between the *Sexes*,  
 which, when no other Affections accom-  
 pany it, is only Desire of Pleasure, and is  
 never counted a *Virtue*. *Love* toward ra-  
 tional Agents, is subdivided into *Love* of  
*Complacence* or *Esteem*, and *Love* of Be-  
*nevolence*: And *Hatred* is subdivided into  
*Hatred* of *Displacence* or *Contempt*, and  
*Hatred* of *Malice*. Concerning each of  
 these separately we shall consider, "Whe-  
 "ther

Sect. 2. "ther they can be influenc'd by Motives  
 ~~~~~ " of *Self-Interest*."

LOVE of *Complacence*, *Esteem*, or *Good-liking*, at first view appears to be *disinterested*, and so the *Hatred* of *Displacence* or *Dislike*; and are entirely excited by some *moral Quality*s, *Good* or *Evil*, apprehended to be in the Objects, which *Quality*s the very *Frame* of our *Nature* determines us to *love* or *hate*, to approve or disapprove, according to the *moral Sense* * above explain'd. Propose to a Man all the Rewards in the World, or threaten all the Punishments, to engage him to *love* with *Esteem*, and *Complacence*, a third Person entirely *unknown*, or if known, apprehended to be *cruel*, *treacherous*, *ungrateful*; you may procure external *Obsequiousness*, or good Offices, or *Dissimulation* of Love; but *real Love* of *Esteem* no Price can purchase. And the same is obvious as to *Hatred* of *Contempt*, which no Motive of *Advantage* can prevent. On the contrary, represent a Character as *generous*, *kind*, *faithful*, *humane*, tho in the most distant Parts of the World, and we cannot avoid *loving* it with *Esteem* and *Complacence*. A *Bribe* may possibly make us attempt to ruin such a Man, or some strong Motive of *Advantage* may excite us to

* See Sect. 1.

oppose his Interest; but it can never make us *Sect. 2.*
hate him, while we apprehend him as *morally excellent*. Nay, when we consult
 our own Hearts, we shall find, that we can
 scarce ever persuade our selves to attempt
 any Mischief against such Persons, from any
 motive of *Advantage*, nor execute it, with-
 out the strongest Reluctance, and Remorse,
 until we have blinded our selves into a bad
 Opinion of the Person in a *moral Sense*.


III. As to the *Love of Benevolence*,
 the very Name excludes *Self-Interest*. We
 never call that Man *benevolent*, who is in
 fact useful to others, but at the same time
 only intends his *own Interest*, without any
 desire of, or delight in, the *Good of others*.
 If there be any *Benevolence* at all, it must
 be *disinterested*; for the most useful Action
 imaginable, loses all appearance of *Bene-*
volence, as soon as we discern that it only
 flowed from *Self-Love*, or *Interest*. Thus,
 never were any human Actions more *ad-*
vantagèous, than the Inventions of *Fire*,
 and *Iron*; but if these were casual, or if
 the *Inventor* only intended his *own Inte-*
rest in them, there is nothing which can
 be call'd *Benevolent* in them. Wherever
 then *Benevolence* is suppos'd, there it is
 imagin'd *disinterested*, and design'd for the
Good of others.

BUT it must be here observ'd, That as all
 Men have *Self-Love*, as well as *Benevo-*
 lence,

Sect. 2. *lence*, these two Principles may jointly excite a Man to the same Action; and then they are to be consider'd as two Forces impelling the same Body to Motion; sometimes they conspire, sometimes are indifferent to each other, and sometimes are in some degree opposite. Thus, if a Man have such strong *Benevolence*, as would have produc'd an Action without any Views of *Self-Interest*; that such a Man has also in View *private Advantage*, along with *publick Good*, as the Effect of his Action, does no way diminish the *Benevolence* of the Action. When he would not have produc'd so much *publick Good*, had it not been for Prospect of *Self-Interest*, then the Effect of *Self-Love* is to be deducted, and his *Benevolence* is proportion'd to the remainder of *Good*, which pure *Benevolence* would have produc'd. When a Man's *Benevolence* is hurtful to himself, then *Self-Love* is opposite to *Benevolence*, and the *Benevolence* is proportion'd to the Sum of the *Good* produc'd, and the Resistance of *Self-Love* surmounted by it. In most Cases it is impossible for Men to know how far their Fellows are influenc'd by the one or other of these Principles; but yet the general Truth is sufficiently certain, That this is the Way in which the *Benevolence* of Actions is to be computed.

IF any enquire, "Whence arises this
 " *Love of Esteem*, or *Benevolence*, to
 " good Men, or to Mankind in general,
 " if not from some nice Views of *Self-
 " Interest*? Or, how we can be mov'd to
 " desire the Happiness of *others*, without
 " any View to our *own*?" It may be an-
 " swer'd, "That the *same Cause* which de-
 " termines us to pursue Happiness for our
 " selves, determines us both to *Esteem* and
 " *Benevolence* on their proper Occasions;
 " even the very *Frame* of our *Nature*, or
 " a *generous Instinct*, which shall be after-
 " wards explain'd."

IV. HERE we may observe, That as
Love of Esteem and *Complacence* is al-
 ways join'd with *Benevolence*, where there
 is no strong Opposition of *Interest*; so *Be-
 nevolence* seems to presuppose some small
 degree of *Esteem*, not indeed of *actual*
 good Qualitys; for there may be strong
Benevolence, where there is the *Hatred* of
Contempt for actual Vices; as a Parent may
 have great *Benevolence* to a most abandon'd
 Child, whose Manners he *hates* with the
 greatest *Displacence*: but *Benevolence* sup-
 poses a Being *capable of Virtue*. We
 judge of other rational Agents by *our selves*.
 The *human Nature* is a lovely Form; we
 are all conscious of some *morally good* Qua-
 litys and Inclinations in our selves, how par-
 tial and imperfect soever they may be; we

Sect. 2.  presume the *same* of every thing in human Form, nay almost of every living Creature: so that by this suppos'd remote Capacity of *Virtue*, there may be some small degree of *Esteem* along with our *Benevolence*, even when they incur our greatest Displeasure by their Conduct. *Human Nature* seems scarce capable of *malicious disinterested Hatred*, or a sedate Delight in the Misery of others, when we imagine them no way pernicious to us, or opposite to our *Interests*: And for that Hatred which makes us oppose *those* whose Interests are opposite to *ours*, it is only the Effect of *Self-Love*, and not of *disinterested Malice*. A sudden Passion may give us wrong Representations of our Fellow-Creatures, and for a little time represent them as *absolutely Evil*; and during this Imagination perhaps we may give some Evidences of *disinterested Malice*: but as soon as we reflect upon *human Nature*, and form just Conceptions, this *unnatural* Passion is allay'd, and only *Self-Love* remains, which may make us, from *Self-Interest*, oppose our Adversaries.

EVERY one at present rejoices in the Destruction of our *Pirates*; and yet let us suppose a Band of such Villains cast in upon some desolate Island, and that we were assur'd some Fate would confine them there perpetually, so that they should disturb Mankind no more: now let us calmly reflect that
these

these Persons are capable of Knowledge and Sect. 2.
 Counsel, may be happy, and joyful, or
 may be involv'd in Misery, Sorrow, and
 Pain; that they may return to a State of
Love, Humanity, Kindness, and become
Friends, Citizens, Husbands, Parents,
 with all the sweet Sentiments which ac-
 company these Relations: then let us ask
 our selves, when *Self-Love* no longer
 makes us desire their Destruction, and
 when we cease to look upon them, under
 the Ideas suggested by fresh Resentment of
 Injuries done to us or our Friends, as ut-
 terly incapable of any good *moral Quality*;
 whether we would rather wish them the
 Fate of CADMUS's *Army*, by plunging
 their Swords in each others Breast, or a
 worse Fate by the most exquisite Tortures;
 or rather that they should recover the ordi-
 nary Affections of Men, become *Kind, Com-*
passionate, and Friendly, contrive *Laws,*
Constitutions, Governments, Propertys,
 and form an honest happy Society, with
Marriages, and

Relations Dear, and all the Charities
*Of Father, Son, and Brother — — **

I fancy the latter would be the Wish of every
 Mortal, notwithstanding our present just Ab-
 horrence from *Self-Interest*, or *publick*
Love, and Desire of promoting the Interest
 of our Friends who are expos'd to their Fury.

* Mil. Par. Lost, B. 4. v. 756.

Sect. 2. Now this plainly evidences, that we scarce
 ever have any *sedate Malice* against any
 Person, or delight in his Misery : our *Hatred*
 is only from Opposition of *Interest* ;
 or if we can entertain *sedate Malice*, it
 must be toward a Character apprehended
necessarily and unalterably Evil in a *moral*
Sense ; such as a sudden Passion sometimes
 represents our Enemies to us ; and perhaps
 no *such Being* occurs to us among the
 Works of a good DEITY.

V. Now having offer'd what may per-
 haps prove, That our *Love* either of *Esteem*,
 or *Benevolence*, is not founded on *Self-*
Love, or views of *Interest* ; let us see
 “ if some *other Affections*, in which *Vir-*
 “ *tue* may be plac'd, do arise from *Self-*
 “ *Love* ;” such as *Fear*, or *Reverence*,
 arising from an Apprehension of *Goodness*,
Power, and *Justice*. For no body appre-
 hends any *Virtue* in *base Dread* and *Ser-*
vitute toward a *powerful Evil Being* :
 This is indeed the *meanest Selfishness*. Now
 the same Arguments, which prove *Love* of
Esteem to be *disinterested*, will prove this
honourable Reverence to be so too ; for it
 plainly arises from an apprehension of *ami-*
able Qualitys in the Person, and *Love* to-
 ward him, which raises an *Abhorrence* of
 offending him. Could we reverence a
Being because it were our *Interest* to do
 so, a third Person might bribe us into *Re-*
verence toward a *Being* neither *Good*, nor
Power.

Powerful, which every one sees to be a Sect. 2. Jest. And this we might shew to be common to all other Passions, which have rational Agents for their Objects.

VI. THERE is one Objection against *disinterested Love*, which occurs from considering, "That nothing so effectually procures our *Love* toward rational Agents, as their *Beneficence*, whence we are led to imagine, that our *Love* of Persons, as well as irrational Objects, flows intirely from *Self-Interest*." But let us here examine our selves more narrowly: Do we only love the *Beneficent*, because it is our *Interest* to love them? or do we chuse to love them because our *Love* is the means of procuring their *Bounty*? If it be so, then we could indifferently love any Character, even to obtain the *Bounty* of a third Person; or we could be brib'd by a third Person to love the greatest Villain heartily, as we may be brib'd to external Offices: Now this is plainly impossible. And further, is not our *Love* always the Consequent of *Bounty*, and not the Means of procuring it? External Shew, Obsequiousness, and Dissimulation may precede an Opinion of *Beneficence*; but *real Love* always presupposes it, and shall necessarily arise, even when we expect no more, from Consideration of past Benefits. Or can any one say he only loves the *Beneficent*, as he

Sect. 2. does a *Field* or *Garden*, because of its *Advantage*? His *Love* then must cease toward one who has ruin'd himself in kind Offices to him, when he can do him no more; as we cease to love an inanimate Object which ceases to be useful, unless a Poetical *Prosopopæia* animate it, and raise an imaginary Gratitude, which is indeed pretty common. And then again, our *Love* would be the same towards the worst Characters that 'tis towards the best, if they were *equally bountiful* to us, which is also false. *Beneficence* then must raise our *Love* as it is an amiable *moral Quality*; and hence it is that we love even those who are *beneficent* to others.

It may be further alledg'd, "That
 " *Bounty* toward our selves is much more
 " powerful to excite *Love*, than *equal*
 " *Bounty* toward others." This is true
 for a Reason to be offer'd below *: but it
 does not prove, that in this Case our *Love*
 of Persons is from Views of *Interest*; since
 this Love is not *prior* to the *Bounty*, as
 the means to procure it, but *subsequent*
 upon it, even when we expect no more.
 In the Benefits which we receive our selves,
 we are more fully sensible of their Value,
 and of the Circumstances of the Action
 which are Evidences of a generous Temper
 in the *Donor*; and, by the good Opi-

* See Sect. 5. Art. II.

nion we have of our selves, look upon the *Sect. 2.*
 Kindness better employ'd, than when it is
 bestow'd on others, of whom perhaps we
 have less favourable Sentiments. It is how-
 ever sufficient to remove the Objection,
 that *Bounty* from a *Donor* apprehended as
morally Evil, or extorted by *Force*, or
 conferr'd with some View of *Self-Interest*,
 will not procure *real Love*; nay, it may
 raise *Indignation*, if we suspect Dissimula-
 tion of Love, or a Design to allure us
 into any thing Dishonourable: whereas
 wisely employ'd *Bounty* is always approv'd,
 and gains love to the Author from all who
 hear of it.

IF then no *Love* toward Persons be in-
 fluenc'd by *Self-Love*, or Views of *In-*
terest, and all *Virtue* flows from *Love* to-
 ward Persons, or some other Affection
 equally *disinterested*; it remains, " That
 " there must be some other Motive than
 " *Self-Love*, or *Interest*, which excites
 " us to the Actions we call *Virtu-*
 " *ous*."

VII. THERE may perhaps still remain
 another Suspicion of *Self-Interest* in our
 Prosecution of *Virtue*, taken from this,
 " That the *whole Race* of Mankind seems
 " persuaded of the Existence of an *Al-*
 " *mighty Being*, who will certainly se-
 " cure Happiness either *now*, or *here-*
 " *after*,

Sect. 2. “after, to those who are *Virtuous*, according to their several Notions of *Virtue* in various Places: and upon this Persuasion, *Virtue* may in all Cases be pursu’d from Views * of *Interest*.” Here again we might appeal to all Mankind, Whether there be no *Benevolence* but what flows from a View of *Reward* from the DEITY. Nay do we not see a great deal of it among those who entertain few Thoughts of Devotion at all? Not to say that this *Benevolence* does scarce deserve the Name, when we desire not, nor delight in the *Good* of others, any farther than it serves our own Ends. But if we have no other Idea of *Good*, but *Advantage* to our selves, every *rational Being* must only act for its own *Advantage*; and however we may call a *beneficent Being*, a *good Being*, because it acts for our *Advantage*, yet upon this *Scheme* we can have no reason to imagine that there is any *beneficent Being* in *Nature*, or a *Being* who acts for the *Good* of others. Particularly, if there is no *Sense* of Excellence in *publick Love*, and promoting the Happiness of others, whence should this Persuasion arise, “That the DEITY will make the *Virtuous* happy?” Can we prove that it is for the *Advantage* of the DEITY to do so? This I fancy will be look’d upon as very absurd, unless we

* See above *Sect. 1. Art. V. Par. 4.*

MORAL GOOD and EVIL. 139

suppose some beneficent Dispositions essential to the DEITY, which determine him to consult the *publick Good* of his *Creatures*, and reward such as co-operate with this *kind Intention*: and if there be such Dispositions in the DEITY, where is the impossibility of some small degree of this *publick Love* in *Creatures*? And why must they be suppos'd incapable of acting but from *Self-Love*? In short, without acknowledging some other Principle of Action in rational Agents than *Self-Love*, I see no Foundation to expect *Beneficence*, or *Rewards* from *God*, or *Man*, further than it is the *Interest* of the *Benefactor*; and all Expectation of Benefits from a *Being* whose Interests are independent on us, must be perfectly ridiculous. What should engage the DEITY to reward *Virtue*? *Virtue* is commonly suppos'd, upon this Scheme, to be only a consulting our own *Happiness* in the most artful way, consistently with the *Good of the Whole*; and in *Vice* the same thing is foolishly pursu'd, in a manner which will not so probably succeed, and which is contrary to the *Good of the Whole*. But how is the DEITY concern'd in this *Whole*, if every Agent always acts from *Self-Love*? And what Ground have we from the Idea of a *God* it self to believe the DEITY is good in the *Christian Sense*, that is, *studious of the Good of his Creatures*? Perhaps the *Misery* of *Creatures* may

Sect. 2. may be as capable of giving him Pleasure, as their *Happiness*; And who can find fault, or blame such a *Being* to study their *Misery*; for what else should we expect? A *Manichean Evil God* is a Notion which Men would as readily run into as that of a *Good one*, if there is no Excellence in *disinterested Love*, and no *Being* acts but for its own *Advantage*; unless we prov'd that the happiness of *Creatures* was *advantageous* to the DEITY.

VIII. THE last, and only remaining Objection against what has been said, is this, "That perhaps *Virtue* is pursu'd because "of the *concomitant Pleasure*." To which we may answer, first, by observing, that this plainly supposes a *Sense* of *Virtue* antecedent to Ideas of *Advantage*, upon which this Advantage is founded; and that from the very *Frame* of our *Nature* we are determin'd to perceive Pleasure in the practice of *Virtue*, and to approve it when practis'd by our selves, or others. But further, may we not justly question, whether all *Virtue* is *pleasant*? Or, whether we are not determin'd to some *amiable Actions* in which we find no Pleasure? 'Tis true, all the Passions, and Affections justify themselves; or, we approve our being in such a manner affected on such an Occasion, and condemn a Person who is otherwise affected. So the *Sorrowful*, the *Angry*, the *Fear-*

Jealous, the *Compassionate*, think it reasonable they should be so upon the several Occasions which move these Passions; but we should not therefore say that *Sorrow*, *Anger*, *Jealousy* and *Pity* are pleasant, and that we chuse to be in these Passions because of the concomitant Pleasure. The matter is plainly this: The *Frame* of our *Nature*, on such Occasions as move these Passions, determines us to be thus affected, and to approve our being so: Nay, we dislike any Person who is not thus affected upon such occasions, notwithstanding the uneasiness of these Passions: And then this uneasiness determines us to endeavour an Alteration in the state of the Object; but not otherwise to remove the painful Affection, while the occasion is unalter'd; which shews that these Passions are not from *Self-Love*. The Actions which these Passions move us to, do tend generally in Fact to remove the uneasy Passion by altering the state of the Object: but the removal of our Pain is not directly intended; for then we should run away, shut our Eyes, divert our Thoughts from the miserable Object, to avoid the Pain of Compassion, which we seldom do: nay, we crowd about such Objects, and voluntarily run into Pain, unless Reason, and Reflection upon our inability to relieve the Miserable, countermand our Inclination, or some selfish Affection, as fear of Danger, overballances it.

Now

Sect. 2.

Now there are several *morally amiable* Actions, which flow from these Passions which are so uneasy; such as Attempts of *relieving* the Distress'd, of *defending* the Injur'd, of *repairing* of Wrongs done by ourselves. These Actions are often accompany'd with no Pleasure in the mean time, nor have they any subsequent Pleasure, except as they are successful; unless it be that which may arise from *calm Reflection*, when the Passion is over, upon our having been in a Disposition, which to our *moral Sense* appears *lovely* and *good*: but this Pleasure is never intended in the Heat of Action, nor is it any Motive exciting to it.

BESIDES, In the *pleasant Passions*, we do not *love*, because it is *pleasant* to love; we do not *chuse* this State, because it is an *advantageous*, or *pleasant* State: This Passion necessarily arises from seeing its proper Object, a *morally good Character*. And if we could love, whenever we see it would be our *Interest* to love, Love could be brib'd by a third Person; and we could never love Persons in Distress, for then our Love gives us Pain. The same Observation may be extended to all the *other Affections* from which *Virtue* is suppos'd to flow: And from the whole we may conclude, "That the *virtuous Agent*

is

“ is never apprehended by us as acting on- Sect. 2.
 “ ly from Views of his own Interest, but
 “ as principally influenc’d by some other
 “ Motive.”

IX. HAVING remov’d these falsely suppos’d Springs of those Actions which are counted *Virtuous*, let us next establish the true one, viz. some Determination of our Nature to study the Good of others; or some Instinct, antecedent to all Reason from Interest, which influences us to the Love of others, even as the moral Sense, * above suppos’d, determines us to approve the Actions which flow from this Love in our selves or others. This *disinterested Affection* may appear strange to Men impress’d with Notions of *Self-Love* as the sole Motive of Action, from the Pulpit, the Schools, the Systems, and Conversations regulated by them: but let us consider it in its strongest, and simplest Kinds; and when we see the Possibility of it in these Instances, we may easily discover its *universal Extent*.

AN honest Farmer will tell you, that he studies the *Preservation* and *Happiness* of his Children, and loves them without any design of Good to himself: But say some of our *Philosophers*, “ The Happiness of

* See Sect. 1.

“ their

Sect. 2. “ their Children gives Parents Pleasure, and
 “ their Misery Pain; and therefore to ob-
 “ tain the *former*, and avoid the *latter*,
 “ they study from *Self-Love* the Good of
 “ their Children.” Suppose several Mer-
 chants join’d in Partnership of their whole
 Effects; one of them buittles abroad in ma-
 naging the Stock of the Company; his
 Prosperity occasions Gain to all, and his
 Losses give them Pain from their Share in
 the Loss: is this then the *same* Kind of
 Affection with *that* of Parents to their
 Children? Is there the *same* tender, per-
 sonal Regard? I fancy no Parent will say
 so. In this Case of Merchants there is a
 plain Conjunction of Interest; but whence
 the Conjunction of Interest between the
Parent and *Child*? Do the Child’s *Sensa-
 tions* give Pleasure or Pain to the Parent?
 Is the Parent *hungry, thirsty, sick*, when
 the Child is so? “ No, but *his Love* to
 “ the Child makes him affected with his
 “ Pleasures or Pains.” *This Love* then is
 antecedent to the Conjunction of Interest,
 and the Cause of it, not the Effect: *this
 Love* then must be *disinterested*. “ No,
 “ says another *Sophist*, Children are *Parts*
 “ of our selves, and in loving them we but
 “ love *our selves* in them.” A very good
 Answer! Let us carry it as far as it will
 go. How are they *Parts* of our selves?
 Not as a *Leg* or an *Arm*: We are not con-
 scious of their Sensations. “ But *their*
 “ Bodies

"Bodys were form'd from Parts of *ours*." Sect. 2.
 So is a *Fly*, or a *Maggot* which may breed in any discharg'd Blood or Humour: Very dear *Insects* surely! There must be something else then which makes Children *Parts* of our selves; and what is this but *that Affection* which NATURE determines us to have toward them? *This Love* makes them *Parts* of our selves, and therefore does not flow from their being so before. This is indeed a good Metaphor; and wherever we find a determination among several rational Agents to *mutual Love*, let each *Individual* be look'd upon as a *Part* of a great *Whole* or *System*, and concern himself in the *publick Good* of it. But a *later Author** observes, "That *natural Affection* in Parents is *weak*, till the Children begin to give Evidences of *Knowledge* and *Affections*." Mothers say they feel it strong from the very first: and yet I could wish, for the Destruction of his Hypothesis, that what he alledges were true; as I fancy it is. The observing of *Understanding* and *Affections* in Children, which make them appear to be *moral Agents*, can increase Love toward them without prospect of *Interest*; for I hope this Increase of Love is not from prospect of Advantage from the Knowledge or Affections of Children, for whom Parents are still toiling, and never

* See the Fable of the Bees, Page 68. 3d Ed.

Sect. 2. intend to be refunded their Expences, or recompens'd for their Labour, but in Cases of extreme Necessity. If then the observing a *moral Capacity* can be the occasion of increasing Love without *Self-Interest*, even from the *Frame* of our *Nature*; pray, may not *this* be a Foundation of *weaker* degrees of Love where there is no preceding tie of Parentage, and extend it to *all Mankind*?

X. AND that this is so in fact, will appear by considering some more distant Attachments. If we observe any Neighbours, from whom perhaps we have receiv'd no good Offices, form'd into *Friendships*, *Familys*, *Partnerships*, and with Honesty and Kindness assisting each other; pray ask any Mortal if he would not be better pleas'd with their *Prosperity*, when their Interests are no way inconsistent with his own, than with their *Misery*, and *Ruin*; and you shall find a *Bond of Benevolence* further extended than a *Family* and *Children*, altho the Ties are not so strong. Again, suppose a Person, for Trade, had left his *native Country*, and with all his Kindred had settled his Fortunes abroad, without any View of returning; and only imagine he had receiv'd no Injurys from his Country: ask such a Man, would it give him no Pleasure to hear of the *Prosperity* of his Country? or could he, now that his

his Interests are separated from that of his Sect. 2. Nation, as gladly hear that it was laid waste by *Tyranny*, or a *foreign Power*? I fancy his Answer would shew us a *Benevolence* extended beyond *Neighbourhoods* or *Acquaintances*. Let a Man of a *compos'd* Temper, out of the hurry of his *private* Affairs, read of the *Constitution* of a *foreign* Country, even in the *most distant* parts of the Earth, and observe *Art*, and *Design*, and *Study* of *publick Good* in the *Laws* of this Association; and he shall find his Mind mov'd in their favour; he shall be contriving Rectifications and Amendments in their Constitution, and regret any unlucky part of it which may be pernicious to their Interest; he shall bewail any Disaster which befalls them, and accompany all their Fortunes with the Affections of a Friend. Now this argues a *Benevolence* in some degree extended to all Mankind, where there is no *interfering* Interest, which from *Self-Love* may obstruct it. And had we any Notions of *rational Agents*, capable of moral Affections, in the *most distant* Planets, our *good Wishes* would still attend them, and we should *delight* in their Happiness.

XI. HERE we may transiently remark the Foundation of what we call *national Love*, or LOVE of one's *native Country*. Whatever place we have liv'd in for any

Sect. 2. considerable time, there we have most distinctly remark'd the *various Affections* of human Nature ; we have known many lovely Characters ; we remember the *Associations, Friendships, Familys, natural Affections*, and other humane Sentiments : our *moral Sense* determines us to approve these lovely *Dispositions* where we have most distinctly observ'd them ; and our *Benevolence* concerns us in the Interests of the Persons possess'd of them. When we come to observe the like as distinctly in another Country, we begin to acquire a *national Love* toward it also ; nor has our own Country any other preference in our Idea, unless it be by an *Association* of the pleasant Ideas of our Youth, with the *Buildings, Fields, and Woods* where we receiv'd them. This may let us see, how *Tyranny, and Faction, a Neglect of Justice, a Corruption of Manners, and any thing* which occasions the Misery of the Subjects, destroys this *national Love*, and the dear Idea of a COUNTRY.

WE ought here to observe, That the only Reason of that *apparent want* of natural Affection among *collateral Relations*, is, that these *natural Inclinations*, in many Cases, are overpower'd by *Self-Love*, where there happens any *Opposition* of Interests ; but where this does not happen, we shall find all Mankind under its Influence,
but

but with different degrees of Strength, according to the *nearer* or *more remote* Relations they stand in to each other; and according as the *natural Affection* of *Benevolence* may be join'd with and strengthen'd by *Esteem*, *Gratitude*, *Compassion*, or *other kind Affections*; or on the contrary weaken'd by *Displacence*, *Anger*, or *Envy*. Sect. 2.

L 2 SECT.

S E C T. III.

The Sense of Virtue, and the various Opinions about it, reducible to one general Foundation. The Manner of computing the Morality of Actions.

I. IF we examine all the Actions which are counted *amiable* any where, and enquire into the Grounds upon which they are *approv'd*, we shall find, that in the Opinion of the Person who approves them, they always appear as BENEVOLENT, or flowing from the *Love of others*, and Study of their Happiness, whether the *Approver* be one of the Persons belov'd, or profited, or not; so that all those *kind Affections* which incline us to make others happy, and all Actions suppos'd to flow from *such Affections*, appear *morally Good*, if while they are *benevolent* toward some Persons, they be not *pernicious* to others: Nor shall we find any thing amiable in any Action whatsoever, where there is no *Benevolence* imagin'd; nor in any Disposition, or Capacity, which is not suppos'd applicable to, and design'd for *benevolent Purposes*. Nay, as it was before observ'd *,

* See Sect. 2. Art. III. Par. 1. Art. VI. Par. 2.

The Actions which in fact are exceedingly Sect. 3.
 useful, shall appear void of *moral Beauty*,
 if we know that they proceeded from no
 kind Intentions toward others; and yet an
 unsuccessful Attempt of Kindness, or of
 promoting *publick Good*, shall appear as
 amiable as the most successful, if it flow'd
 from as *strong Benevolence*.

II. HENCE it is, that *those* Affections
 which would lead us to do good to our
 Benefactor, shall appear *amiable*, and the
contrary Affections *odious*, even when our
 Actions cannot possibly be of any advan-
 tage or hurt to him. Thus a *sincere Love*
 and *Gratitude* toward our Benefactor, a
cheerful Readiness to do whatever he shall
 require, how burdensom soever, a *hearty*
Inclination to comply with his Intentions,
 and *Contentment* with the State he has
 plac'd us in, are the strongest Evidences of
Benevolence we can shew to such a Person;
 and therefore they must appear exceedingly
amiable: and under these is included all the
rational Devotion, or *Religion*, toward a
 DEITY apprehended as *Good*, which we
 can possibly perform.

WE may here transiently observe one
 Circumstance in the *Frame* of our *Nature*,
 which is wonderfully adapted to promote
Benevolence, viz. that as a Benefit confer'd,
 necessarily raises Gratitude in the *Benefi-*
 ciary,

Sect. 3. *ciary*, so the Expressions of this Gratitude, even from the meanest of Mankind, are *wonderfully delightful* to the Benefactor. Never were there any Mortals so poor, so inconsiderable, whose grateful Praise would not be some way delightful; and by whom we would not rather chuse to be lov'd, than hated, if their Love no way evidenc'd us to be Partners in their Vices, or concern'd in their Meanness. And thus the *most abject Beneficiary* is capable, and inclin'd to make no small addition to our Happiness by his *Love*, and *Gratitude*, when he is utterly incapable of any other Return, and when we expect none from him: Thus,


————— *A grateful Mind*
By owing owes not, and still pays, at once
Indebted and discharged—————*

As to *external Performances* of Religion, they are no doubt very various in different Nations, and Ages; and *Education* may give Men Opinions, that certain Actions are pleasing, and others displeasing to the DEITY: but then wherever any external Rite of Worship is approv'd, there also it is look'd upon to proceed from *Love* toward the DEITY, or some other Affec-

* Par. Lost, B. 4. l. 55.

tion necessarily join'd with *Love*, as *Re-Sect. 3.*
verence, *Repentance*, or *Sorrow* to have
 offended. So that the general Principle of
Love, is the Foundation of all the *appa-*
rent moral Excellence, even in the most
 fantastick Rites of Worship which were
 ever approv'd. For as to Rites design'd on-
 ly to appease a *furious Being*, no Mortal,
 I fancy, apprehends there is any *Virtue*, or
Excellence in them; but that they are
 chosen only as the dishonourable Means of
 avoiding a greater Evil. Now as there are
 various speculative Opinions about what is
 acceptable to the DEITY, it necessa-
 rily follows, "That, accordingly, *Prac-*
tices, and *Approbation*, must be *various*;
 "tho all the *moral Goodness* of Actions is
 "still presum'd to flow from *Love*."

III. AGAIN, That we may see how *Love*,
 or *Benevolence*, is the Foundation of all
 apprehended *Excellence* in *social Virtues*,
 let us only observe, That amidst the diver-
 sity of Sentiments on this Head among va-
 rious Sects, this is still allow'd to be the
 way of deciding the Controversy about any
 disputed Practice, to enquire whether this
 Conduct, or the contrary, will most effec-
 tually promote the *publick Good*. The
Morality is immediately adjusted, when the
 natural Tendency, or Influence of the
 Action upon the *universal natural Good* of
Mankind is agreed upon. That which pro-
 duces

Sect. 3. *duces more Good than Evil in the Whole,*
 is acknowledg'd *Good*; and what does not,
 is counted *Evil*. In this Case, we no other
 way regard the good of the *Actor*, or that
 of those who are thus enquiring, than as
 they make a Part of the great *System*.

IN our late Debates about *Passive Obedience*, and the Right of *Resistance* in Defence of *Privileges*, the Point disputed among Men of Sense was, whether *universal Submission* would probably be attended with greater *natural Evils*, than *temporary Insurrections*, when *Privileges* are invaded; and not, whether what tended in the Whole to the *publick natural Good*, was also *morally Good*. And if a *divine Command* was alledg'd in favour of the Doctrine of *Passive Obedience*, this would, no doubt, by its eternal Sanctions cast the ballance of *natural Good* to its own side, and determine our Election from *Interest*; and yet *our Sense* of the *moral Good* in *Passive Obedience*, would still be founded upon some Species of *Benevolence*, such as *Gratitude* toward the DEITY, and *Submission* to his Will to whom we are so much oblig'd. But I fancy those, who believe the DEITY to be *Good*, would not rashly alledge such a Command, unless they also asserted, that the thing commanded did tend more to the *universal Good* than the contrary, either by preventing

ing the external Evils of *Civil War*, or Sect. 3. by enuring Men to *Patience*, or some other *Quality* which they apprehended necessary to their everlasting Happiness. And were it not so, *Passive Obedience* might be recommended as an *inglorious Method* of escaping a greater Mischief, but could never have any thing *morally amiable* in it.

BUT let us quit the Disputes of the *Learned*, on whom, it may be alledg'd, *Custom* and *Education* have a powerful Influence; and consider upon what Grounds, in common Life, Actions are *approv'd* or *condemn'd*, *vindicated* or *excus'd*. We are universally asham'd to say an Action is *just*, because it tended to my *Advantage*, or to the *Advantage* of the *Actor*: And we as seldom condemn a *beneficent kind Action*, because it was not *advantageous* to us, or to the *Actor*. *Blame*, and *Censure*, are founded on a Tendency to *publick Evil*, or a Principle of *private Malice* in the *Agent*, or *Neglect* at least of the *Good* of others; on *Inhumanity* of Temper, or at least such *strong Selfishness* as makes the *Agent* careless of the Sufferings of others: and thus we *blame* and *censure* when the Action no way affects our selves. All the moving and persuasive Vindications of Actions, which may, from some *partial* evil Tendency, appear *evil*, are taken from this, that they were necessary to some *greater Good* which counterballanc'd the *Evil*;

Sect. 3. *Evil*: “Severity toward a few, is *Compassion* toward multitudes; *transitory Punishments* are necessary for avoiding more *durable Evils*; did not *some* suffer on such Occasions, there would be *no living* for honest Men;” and such like. And even when an Action cannot be entirely justify’d, yet how greatly is the Guilt extenuated, if we can alledge; “That it was only the Effect of *Inadvertence* without *Malice*, or of *partial good Nature, Friendship, Compassion, natural Affection*, or *Love of a Party*.” All these Considerations shew what is the *universal Foundation* of our Sense of moral Good, or Evil, viz. *Benevolence* toward others on one hand, and *Malice*, or even *Indolence*, and *Unconcernedness* about the *apparent publick Evil* on the other. And let it be here observ’d, that we are so far from imagining all Men to be acted only by *Self-Love*, that we universally expect in others a Regard for the *Publick*; and do not look upon the want of this, as barely the absence of *moral Good*, or *Virtue*, but even as *positively evil*, and *hateful*.

IV. CONTRARYS may illustrate each other; let us therefore observe the *general Foundation* of our Sense of moral Evil more particularly. *Disinterested Malice*, or *Delight* in the Misery of others, is the highest pitch of what we count *vitious*; and every

every Action appears *evil*, which is imagin'd to flow from any degree of *this Affection*. Perhaps a *violent Passion* may hurry Men into it for a few Moments, and our *rash angry Sentiments* of our Enemys, may represent them as having such *odious Dispositions*; but it is very probable from the Reasons offer'd above *, that there is no such degree of wickedness in *human Nature*, as, in *cold blood*, to be pleas'd with the *Misery* of others, when it is conceiv'd to be no way useful to *our Interests*.

THE Story of NERO and PÆTUS may be alledg'd against this, but perhaps unjustly, even allowing the Fact to be true. NERO was conscious that he was hated by those whom the World call'd *good Men*, and that they were dangerous to him; he fancy'd his best Security lay in being terrible, and appearing such on all Occasions, by making others miserable when he pleas'd; to let his Enemys see, that they should have no Security from that Compassion which a NERO would imagine argu'd Weakness. This *unfortunate Gentleman's* Happiness might by some *foolish Courtier* be so related, as to carry a Reproof of the *Tyrant's* unnatural Pursuits, whereby his Passion might be excited to cut off the Person admir'd, and prefer'd before him. Any

* See Sect. 2. Art. IV.

Sect. 3. of these Motives of *apparent Interest* seem more probably to have influenc'd him, than that we should in *him*, and a few *others*, suppose a Principle of *calm Malice* without *Interest*, of which the *rest* of *Mankind* seem entirely incapable.

THE Temper of a *Tyrant* seems probably to be a continu'd state of *Anger*, *Hatred*, and *Fear*. To form our Judgment then of his Motives of Action, and those of Men of like Tempers in lower Stations, let us reflect upon the Apprehensions we form of *Mankind*, when we are under any of those Passions which to the *Tyrant* are *habitual*. When we are under the fresh Impressions of an Injury, we plainly find, that our Minds are wholly fill'd with Apprehensions of the Person who injur'd us, as if he were *absolutely Evil*, and *delighted* in doing Mischief: We overlook the Virtues, which, when calm, we could have observ'd in him; we forget that it is perhaps only *Self-Love*, and not *Malice*, which was his Motive, or it may be some *generous* or *kind Intention* toward others. These, probably, are the Opinions which a *Tyrant* constantly forms concerning *Mankind*; and having very much weaken'd all *kind Affections* in himself, however he may pretend to them, he judges of the Tempers of others by his own. And were *Mankind* really *such* as he apprehends them,
his

his Treatment of them would not be very *Sec. 3.*
 unreasonable. We shall generally find our
 Passions arising suitably to the Apprehen-
 sions we form of others: if these be rashly
 form'd upon some sudden slight Views, it is
 no wonder if we find Dispositions follow-
 ing upon them, very little suited to the
real State of human Nature.

THE ordinary Springs of *Vice* among
 Men, must then be suppos'd to be a *mista-*
ken Self-Love, made too violent, so as
 to overcome *Benevolence*; or *Affections*
 arising from *false* and *rashly form'd Opi-*
nions of *Mankind*, which we run into
 thro the weakness of our *Benevolence*.
 When Men, who had mutually good Opi-
 nions of each other, happen to have *con-*
trary Interests, they are apt to have their
good Opinions of each other *abated*, by
 imagining a *design'd Opposition* from *Ma-*
lice; without this, they can scarcely *hate*
 one another. Two *Candidates* for the
 some Office wish each other *dead*, because
 that is an ordinary way by which Men
 make room for each other; but if there
 remains any Reflection on each other's
 Virtue, as there sometimes may in bene-
 volent Tempers, then their Opposition may
 be without *Hatred*; and if another better
 Post, where there is no Competition, were
 bestow'd on one of them, the other shall
 rejoice at it.



V. THE Actions which flow solely from *Self-Love*, and yet evidence no Want of *Benevolence*, having no hurtful Effects upon others, seem *perfectly indifferent* in a *moral Sense*, and neither raise the *Love* or *Hatred* of the Observer. Our Reason can discover indeed certain Bounds, within which we may not only act from *Self-Love*, consistently with the *Good* of the *Whole*, but every Mortal's acting thus within these Bounds for his own *Good*, is absolutely necessary for the *Good* of the *Whole*, and the Want of such *Self-Love* would be *universally pernicious*; and hence, he who pursues his own *private Good*, with an Intention also to concur with that Constitution, which tends to the *Good* of the *Whole*; and much more he who promotes his *own Good*, with a direct View of making himself more capable of serving God, or doing good to *Mankind*; acts not only *innocently*, but also *honourably*, and *virtuously*: for in both these Cases, a Motive of *Benevolence* concurs with *Self-Love* to excite him to the Action. And thus a *Neglect* of our *own Good*, may be *morally evil*, and argue a Want of *Benevolence* toward the *Whole*. But when *Self-Love* breaks over the Bounds above-mention'd, and leads us into Actions detrimental to *others*, and to the *whole*, or makes us insensible of the *generous kind Affections*;
then

then it appears *vitious*, and is *disapprov'd*. Sect. 3.
 So also, when upon any small Injury, or sudden Resentment, or any weak superstitious Suggestions, our *Benevolence* is so faint, as to let us run into any odious Conceptions of *Mankind*, or any Part of them, without just Ground, as if they were *wholly Evil*, or *Malicious*, or as if they were a worse Sort of Beings than they really are; these Conceptions must lead us into *malevolent Affections*, or at least weaken our *good ones*, and make us *really Vitious*.

VI. HERE we must also observe, that every *moral Agent* justly considers himself as a *Part* of this *rational System*, which may be useful to the *Whole*; so that he may be in part an Object of his own *Benevolence*. Nay further, as was hinted above, he may see, that the Preservation of the *System* requires, that every one should be *innocently solicitous* about himself. Hence he may conclude, that an Action which brings *greater Evil* to the *Agent*, than *Good* to *others*; however it may evidence *strong Benevolence*, or a *virtuous Disposition* in the *Agent*; yet it shews it to be founded upon a mistaken Opinion of the Tendency of an Action to the *publick Good*, which does not in Reality tend to it: so that a wise Man who reason'd justly, and consider'd the *Whole*, would not be led into it, were his *Benevolence* ever so strong;

Sect. 3. nor would he recommend it to the Practice of others; however he might acknowledge, that the Detriment arising to the *Agent* from a *kind Action*, did evidence a strong Disposition to *Virtue*. Nay further, were there any *Good* propos'd to the Pursuit of an *Agent*, and he had a *Competitor* in every respect *only equal* to himself, the *highest Benevolence* possible would not lead a wise Man to prefer another to himself, were there no Ties of Gratitude, or some other external Circumstance to move him to yield to his *Competitor*. A Man surely of the *strongest Benevolence*, may just treat himself as he would do a third Person, who was a *Competitor* of *equal Merit* with the other; and as his preferring one to another, in such a Case, would argue no Weakness of *Benevolence*, so, no more would he evidence it by preferring himself to a Man of only *equal Ability*s.

VII. THE *moral Beauty*, or *Deformity* of Actions, is not alter'd by the *moral Quality*s of the Objects, any further than as the Qualitys of the Objects increase or diminish the *Benevolence* of the Action, or the *publick Good* intended by it: Thus *Benevolence* toward the *worst* Characters, or the Study of their *Good*, may be as *amiable* as any whatsoever; yea often more so than that toward the *Good*, since it argues such a strong Degree of *Benevolence* as can surmount

surmount the greatest Obstacle, the *moral* Sect. 3.
Evil in the Object. Hence the *Love* of
unjust Enemy's, is counted among the
highest Virtues: Yet when our *Benevo-*
lence to the *Evil* encourages them in their
 bad Intentions, or makes them more capa-
 ble of Mischief; this diminishes or destroys
 the *Beauty* of the Action, or even makes
 it *evil*, as it betrays a *Neglect* of the
 Good of *others* more valuable; Beneficence
 toward *whom*, would have tended more to
 the *publick Good*, than that toward our
injurious Favourites: But *Benevolence* to-
 ward *evil* Characters, which neither encour-
 ages them, nor enables them to do Mis-
 chief, nor diverts our *Benevolence* from
 Persons more useful, has as much *moral*
Beauty as any whatsoever.

VIII. IN comparing the *moral Quality's*
 of Actions, in order to regulate our Elec-
 tion among various Actions propos'd,
 or to find which of them has the greatest
moral Excellency, we are led by our *moral*
Sense of *Virtue* thus to judge, that in
equal Degrees of Happiness, expected to
 proceed from the Action, the *Virtue* is in
 proportion to the *Number* of Persons to
 whom the Happiness shall extend: And
 here the *Dignity*, or *moral Importance* of
 Persons, may compensate Numbers; and
 in equal Numbers, the *Virtue* is as the
Quantity of the Happiness, or natural
 M 2 Good;

Sect. 3. Good; or that the *Virtue* is in a compound *Ratio* of the *Quantity* of Good, and *Number* of Enjoyers: And in the same manner, the *moral Evil*, or *Vice*, is as the *Degree* of Misery, and *Number* of Sufferers; so that, *that Action* is best, which accomplishes the *greatest Happiness* for the *greatest Numbers*; and *that, worst*, which, in like manner, occasions *Misery*.

IX. AGAIN, when the *Consequences* of Actions are of a *mix'd* Nature, partly *Advantageous*, partly *Pernicious*, *that Action* is good, whose good Effects preponderate the *evil*, by being useful to many, and pernicious to few; and *that, evil*, which is otherwise. Here also the *moral Importance* of Characters, or *Dignity* of Persons may compensate Numbers; as may also the *Degrees* of Happiness or Misery: for to procure an *inconsiderable* Good to many, but an *immense* Evil to few, may be *Evil*; and an *immense* Good to few, may preponderate a *small* Evil to many.

BUT by the *Consequences* of Actions, we are not only to understand the immediate Effects directly produc'd by them, but also all those Events which otherwise would not have happen'd. Thus many Actions which have no immediate evil Effects; nay, which actually produce good Effects, may be *evil*, if their universal Allowance

lowance would be more detrimental to Man- Sect. 3.
kind than their universal Prohibition; or if there be no fixed Standard, that Men may easily know when such Actions are allow'd, and when prohibited; or when such Actions, however useful in particular Instances, might be Precedents to the greatest Mischief. As for Example, the *Execution* of Justice by *private Persons* on Offenders, in any State not entirely perverted from the Ends of Government; the *violating* the Rights of *worthless Persons*, in favour of those of great *moral Capacities*, and of great *Benevolence*; the *protecting* the *Innocent* by *false Testimony* in a Court of Justice, and such like, may be very useful in singular Instances: but then the Allowance of such Actions would lead into the greatest Mischief, since every one would judge for himself what Cases were proper, and what not, and then there could be no Certainty of *Life*, *Possessions* or *Evidences*: and hence such Practices are universally counted *evil*.

X. FROM the two last Observations, we may see what Actions our *moral Sense* would most recommend to our Election, as the most *perfectly Virtuous*; viz. such as appear to have the most universal unlimited Tendency to the *greatest* and *most extensive Happiness* of all the *rational Agents*, to whom our Influence can extend. All *Benevolence*, even toward a *Part*, is amiable.

Sect. 3. if not inconsistent with the *Good* of the *Whole*: But this is a smaller Degree of *Virtue*, unless our *Beneficence* be restrain'd by want of *Power*, and not want of *Love* to the *Whole*. All strict Attachments to *Partys*, *Sects*, *Factions*, have but an imperfect Species of *Beauty*, unless when the *Good* of the *Whole* requires a stricter Attachment to a *Part*, as in *natural Affection*, or *virtuous Friendships*; or when *some Parts* are so eminently useful to the *Whole*, that even *universal Benevolence* would determine us with special Care and Affection to study their Interests. Thus *universal Benevolence* would incline us to a more strong Concern for the Interests of *great and generous Characters* in a high Station, or make us more earnestly study the Interests of any *generous Society*, whose whole Constitution is contriv'd to promote *universal Good*. Thus a good Fancy in *Architecture*, would lead a Man, who was not able to bear the Expence of a compleatly regular Building, to chuse such a Degree of Ornament as he could keep uniformly through the *Whole*, and not move him to make a vain unfinish'd Attempt in *one Part*, of what he foresaw he could not succeed in as to the *Whole*. And the most perfect Rules of *Architecture* condemn an excessive Profusion of Ornament on *one Part*, above the Proportion of the *Whole*, unless that *Part* be some eminent

eminent Place of the *Edifice*, such as the *Sect. 3.*
chief Front, or *publick Entrance*; the a-
 dorning of which, would beautify the *Whole*
 more than an equal Expence of Ornament
 on any other *Part*.

THIS Increase of the *moral Beauty* of
 Actions, or Dispositions, according to the
Number of Persons to whom the good
 Effects of them extend, may shew us the
 Reason why Actions which flow from the
nearer Attachments of Nature, such as
 that between the *Sexes*, and the *Love* of
 our *Offspring*, are not so *amiable*, nor do
 they appear so *virtuous*, as Actions of
equal Moment of Good towards Persons
 less attach'd to us. The Reason is plainly
 this: These strong Instincts are by Nature
 limited to small Numbers of Mankind, such
 as our *Wives* or *Children*; whereas a Dis-
 position, which would produce a *like Mo-*
ment of Good to others, upon no special
 Attachment, were it accompany'd with
 natural Power to accomplish its Intention,
 would be incredibly more fruitful of great
 and good Effects to the *Whole*.

FROM this primary Idea of *moral Good*
 in Actions, arises the Idea of *Good* in those
 Dispositions, whether *natural* or *acquir'd*,
 which enable us to do good to others, or
 which are presum'd to be design'd, and ac-
 quir'd, or cultivated for that purpose: And
 hence those Abilitys, while nothing appears
 contrary to our Presumption, may increase

Sect. 3. our Love to the Possessor of them; but when they are imagin'd to be intended for *publick Mischief*, they make us hate him the more: Such are a *penetrating Judgment*, a *tenacious Memory*, a *quick Invention*; *Patience of Labour*, *Pain*, *Hunger*, *Watching*; a *Contempt of Wealth*, *Rumour*, *Death*. These may be rather call'd *natural Abilitys*, than *moral Qualitys Good or Evil*. Now, a Veneration for these Qualitys, any further than as they are employ'd for the *publick Good*, is foolish, and flows from our *moral Sense*, grounded upon a false Opinion; for if we plainly see them *maliciously* employ'd, they make the Agent more detestable.

XI. To find a *universal Canon* to compute the *Morality* of any Actions, with all their Circumstances, when we judge of the Actions done by our selves, or by others, we must observe the following *Propositions*, or *Axioms*.

1. THE *moral Importance* of any Character, or the *Quantity* of *publick Good* produc'd by him, is in a *compound Ratio* of his *Benevolence* and *Abilitys*: or (by substituting the initial Letters for the Words, as $M = \text{Moment of Good}$, and $\mu = \text{Moment of Evil}$) $M = B \times A$.

2. WHEN in comparing the *Virtue* of two Actions, the *Abilitys* of the Agents are

are equal, the *Benevolence* is as the *Mo-* Sect. 3.
ment of publick Good, produc'd by them in
 like Circumstances : or $B=M \times I$.

3. WHEN *Benevolence* in two *Agents* is equal, and other Circumstances alike, the *Moment of publick Good* is as the *Abilitys* : or $M=A \times I$.

4. THE *Virtue* then of *Agents*, or their *Benevolence*, is always *directly* as the *Moment of Good* produc'd in like Circumstances, and *inversly* as their *Abilitys* : or $B=\frac{M}{A}$.

5. BUT as the natural Consequences of our Actions are various, some *good* to our selves, and *evil* to the Publick, and others *evil* to our selves, and *good* to the Publick ; or either *useful* both to our selves and others, or *pernicious* to both ; the entire Motive to good Actions is not always *Benevolence alone* ; or Motive to Evil, *Malice alone* ; (nay, this last is seldom any Motive at all) : But in most Actions we must look upon *Self-Love* as another Force, sometimes conspiring with *Benevolence*, and assisting it, when we are excited by Views of *private Interest*, as well as *publick Good* ; and sometimes opposing *Benevolence*, when the good Action is any way *difficult* or *painful* in the Performance, or *de-
 trimental* in its Consequences to the *Agent*.

These

Sect. 3. These *selfish Motives* shall be * afterwards more explain'd; here we may in general denote them by the Word *Interest*: which when it concurs with *Benevolence*, in any Action capable of Increase, or Diminution, must produce a greater Quantity of Good, than *Benevolence* alone in the same *Abilities*; and therefore when the *Moment* in one Action, partly intended for the Good of the *Agent*, is but equal to the *Moment* in the Action of another *Agent* influenc'd only by *Benevolence*, the former is less *virtuous*; and in his Case the *Interest* must be deducted to find the true Effect of the *Benevolence*, or *Virtue*: And in the same manner, when *Interest* is opposite to *Benevolence*, and yet is surmounted by it, this *Interest* must be added to the *Moment*, to increase the *Virtue* of the Action, or the Strength of the *Benevolence*: Or thus, in advantageous *Virtue* $B = \frac{M-I}{A}$. And in laborious, painful, dangerous or expensive *Virtue* $B = \frac{M+I}{A}$. By *Interest*, in this last Case, is understood all the *Advantage* which the *Agent* might have obtained by omitting the Action, which is a *negative Motive* to it; and this, when subtracted, becomes *positive*.

* Vide Sect. 5.

BUT here we must observe, That no *Advantage*, not intended, altho casually, or naturally redounding to us from the Action, does at all affect its *Morality* to make it less *amiable*; nor does any *Difficulty* or *Evil* unforeseen, or not resolv'd upon, tend to make a kind Action more *virtuous*; since in such Cases *Self-Love* neither assists nor opposes *Benevolence*. Nay, *Self-Interest* only then diminishes the *Benevolence*, when without this View of *Interest* the Action would not have been undertaken, or so much *Good* would not have been produc'd by the *Agent*; and it extenuates the *Vice* of an *evil* Action, when without this *Interest* the Action would not have been pleasing to the *Agent*, nor so much *Evil* produc'd by him.

THE fifth Axiom only explains the external Marks by which Men must judge, who do not see into each others Hearts; for it may really happen in many Cases, that Men may have a *Benevolence* sufficient to have surmounted any *Difficulty*, and yet they may meet with none at all: And in that Case, it is certain there is as much *Virtue* in the *Agent*, tho he does not give such Proof of it to his Fellow-Creatures, as if he had surmounted *Difficultys* in his kind Actions: And this too must be the

Sect. 3. the Case with the DEITY, to whom nothing is difficult.

SINCE then *Benevolence*, or *Virtue* in any *Agent*, is as $\frac{M}{A}$, or as $\frac{M+I}{A}$, and no *Being* can act above his *natural Ability*, that must be the Perfection of *Virtue* where $M=A$, or when the *Being* acts to the utmost of its Power for the *publick Good*; and hence the Perfection of *Virtue* in this Case, or $\frac{M}{A}$ is as *Unity*. And this may shew us the only Foundation for the boasting of the *Stoicks*, “ That a Creature suppos’d Innocent, by pursuing *Virtue* with its utmost Power, may in *Virtue* equal the *Gods*.” For in their Case, if $[A]$ or the *Ability* be *Infinite*, unless $[M]$ or the *Good* to be produc’d in the whole, be so too, the *Virtue* is not *absolutely perfect*; and the *Quotient* can never surmount *Unity*.

XII. THE same Axioms may be apply’d to compute the *moral Evil* in Actions; that is, calling the Disposition which leads us to *Evil*, *Hatred*, tho it is oftner only *Self-Love*, with Inadvertence to its Consequences; then,

1st. THE

1st. THE *Moment of Evil* produc'd by any *Agent*, is as the *Product* of his *Hatred* into his *Ability*, or $\mu = H \times A$. And,

2^{dly}. IN *equal Abilitys*, $\mu = H \times I$.

3^{dly}. WHEN *Hatred* is equal, $\mu = A \times I$: And,

4^{thly}. THE *Degree of moral Evil*, or the *Degree of Vice*, which is equal to the *Hatred* or *Neglect* of *publick Good*, is thus expres'd, $H = \frac{\mu}{A}$.

5^{thly}. THE *Motives of Interest* may be co-operating with *Hatred*, or opposing it the same way as with *Benevolence*; and then according as *Self-Interest* may partly excite to the *Action*, and so diminish the *Evil*; or dissuade from it, and so increase it, the *Malice* which surmounts it, or $H = \frac{\mu + I}{A}$, in like manner as in the Case of *moral Good*.

BUT we must observe, that not only *Innocence* is expected from all *Mortals*, but they are presum'd from their *Nature*, in some measure, inclin'd to *publick Good*; so that a bare Absence of this Desire is enough to make an *Agent* be reputed *Evil*: Nor is
a direct

Sect. 3. a direct Intention of *publick Evil* necessary to make an Action *evil*, it is enough that it flows from *Self-Love*, with a plain Neglect of the *Good* of others.

XIII. FROM Axiom the 4th, we may form almost a demonstrative Conclusion, that we have a *Sense* of *Goodness* and *moral Beauty* in Actions, distinct from *Advantage*; for had we no other Foundation of Approbation of Actions, but the *Advantage* which might arise to us from them, if they were done toward our selves, we would make no Account of the *Abilitys* of the *Agent*, but would barely esteem them according to their *Moment*: The *Abilitys* come in only to shew the Degree of *Benevolence*, which supposes *Benevolence* necessarily *amiable*. Who was ever the better pleas'd with a *barren rocky Farm*, or an *inconvenient House*, by being told that the *poor Farm* gave as great Increase as it could; or that the *House* accommodated its Possessor as well as it could? And yet in our Sentiments of Actions, whose *Moment* is very inconsiderable, it shall wonderfully increase the *Beauty* to alledge, "That it was all the *poor Agent* could do for the *Publick*, or his *Friend*."

XIV. THE *moral Beauty* of *Characters* arises from their Actions, or sincere Intentions

tions of the *publick Good*, according to Sect. 3. their Power. We form our Judgment of them according to what appears to be their *fix'd Disposition*, and not according to any *particular Sallys of unkind Passions*: Altho these do abate the *Beauty of good Characters*, as the *Motions of the kind Affections* may diminish the *Deformity of the bad ones*. What then properly constitutes a *virtuous Character*, is not some few accidental *Motions of Compassion, natural Affection, or Gratitude*; but such a *fix'd Humanity*, or *Desire of the publick Good* of all, to whom our Influence can extend, as uniformly excites us to all Acts of *Benevolence*, according to our utmost Prudence and Knowledge of the Interests of others; and a *strong Benevolence* will not fail to make us careful of informing our selves right, concerning the truest Methods of serving the Interests of Mankind. Every Motion indeed of the *kind Affections* appears in some degree *amiable*; but we denominate the *Character* from the *prevailing Principle*.

XV. I KNOW not for what Reason some will not allow that to be *Virtue*, which flows from *Instincts*, or *Passions*; but how do they help themselves? They say, "*Virtue arises from Reason.*" What is *Reason* but that *Sagacity* we have in prosecuting any *End*? The *ultimate End* propos'd

Sect. 3. pos'd by the common *Moralists* is the *Happiness* of the *Agent* himself, and this certainly he is determin'd to pursue from *Instinct*: Now may not another *Instinct* toward the *Publick*, or the *Good* of others, be as proper a Principle of *Virtue*, as the *Instinct* toward *private Happiness*? and is there not the same Occasion for the Exercise of our *Reason* in pursuing the *former*, as the *latter*? This is certain, that whereas we behold the *selfish* Actions of others, with *Indifference* at best, we see something *amiable* in every Action which flows from *kind Affections* or *Passions* towards others; if they be conducted by Prudence, so as any way to attain their End. Our *passionate* Actions, as we shew'd * above, are not generally *Self-interested*; since our Intention is not to free our selves from the *Uneasiness* of the Passion, but to alter the *State* of the Object. If it be said, "That Actions " from *Instinct*, are not so much the Effect " of *Prudence* and *Choice*;" this Objection holds full as strongly against Actions which flow from *Self-Love*: And I see no harm in supposing, that Men are *naturally* dispos'd to *Virtue*; and not left *merely indifferent*, to be engag'd into Actions only as they shall appear to tend to their own *private Good*. Surely, the Supposition of a *benevolent universal Instinct*, would re-

* See Sect. 2. Art. VIII.

commend *human Nature*, and its Au- Sect. 3;
 THOR, more to the *Love* of a *good Man*,
 and leave room enough for the Exercise
 of our *Reason*, in contriving and settling
Rights, Laws, Constitutions; in *invent-*
ing Arts, and *practising* them so as to gra-
 tify, in the most effectual Manner, that ge-
 nerous *Inclination*. And if we must bring in
Self-Love to make *Virtue Rational*, a lit-
 tle Reflection will discover, as it may ap-
 pear afterwards, that this *Benevolence* is
 our *greatest Happiness*; and thence we may
 resolve as much as possible, to cultivate
 this *sweet Disposition*, and to despise every
opposite Interest. Not that we can be *tru-*
ly Virtuous, if we intend only to obtain
 the Pleasure which accompanies *Beneficence*,
 without the *Love* of *others*: Nay this very
 Pleasure is founded on our being conscious
 of *disinterested Love* to *others*, as the *Spring*
 of our *Actions*: But *Self-Interest* may be
 our *Motive*, in choosing to continue in
 this *agreeable State*, tho it cannot be the
sole or *principal Motive* of any *Action*,
 which to our *moral Sense* appears *Virtuous*.

THE applying a *mathematical Calcula-*
tion to *moral Subjects*, may appear perhaps
 at first *extravagant* and *wild*; but some Co-
 rollarys, which are easily and certainly deduc'd below,* may shew the *Conveniency* of

* See Sect. 7. Art. VI, VII.

Sect. 3. this Attempt, if it could be further pursu'd.
 At present, we may only take this one, which seems the most joyful imaginable, even to the lowest Rank of Mankind, *viz.* That no external Circumstances of Fortune, no involuntary Disadvantages, can exclude any Mortal from the *most heroick Virtue*: For how small soever the *Moment* of *publick Good* be, which any one can accomplish, yet if his *Abilitys* be proportionably small, the *Quotient*, which expresses the Degree of *Virtue*, may be as great as any whatsoever. Thus, not only the *Prince*, the *Statesman*, the *General*, are capable of *true Heroism*; tho these are the chief Characters, whose Fame is diffus'd thro various Nations and Ages; but when we find in an *honest Trader*, the *kind Friend*, the *faithful, prudent Adviser*, the *charitable and hospitable Neighbour*, the *tender Husband*, and *affectionate Parent*, the *sedate, yet chearful Companion*, the *generous Assistant* of *Merit*, the *cautious Al-
 layer* of *Contention* and *Debate*, the *Promoter* of *Love* and *good Understanding* among Acquaintances; if we consider, that these were *all* the *good Offices* which his Station in the World gave him an Opportunity of performing to Mankind, we must judge *this Character* really as *amiable*, as those, whose external Splendor dazzles an injudicious World into an Opinion "that they are the *only Heroes in Virtue*."

SECT.



S E C T. IV.

All Mankind agree in this general Foundation of their Approbation of moral Actions. The Grounds of the different Opinions about Morals.

I. **T**O see how far Mankind agree in that, which we have made the *universal Foundation* of this *moral Sense*, viz. BENEVOLENCE, we have observ'd already, that when we are ask'd the Reason of our Approbation of any Action, we perpetually alledge its *Usefulness* to the *Publick*, and not to the *Actor* himself. If we are vindicating a censur'd Action, and maintaining it lawful, we always make this one Article of our Defence, "That it injur'd no body, or did more *Good* than *Harm*." On the other hand, when we blame any Piece of Conduct, we shew it to be *prejudicial* to others, besides the *Actor*; or to evidence, at least, a *Neglect* of their Interest, when it was in our power to serve them, or when *Gratitude*, *natural Affection*, or some other *disinterested Tie* should have rais'd in us a Study of their Interest. We all know how great an Extenuation of

Sect. 4. Crimes this is, to alledge, "That the poor
 ~~~~~ "Man does harm to no body but himself;"  
 and how often this turns Hatred into Pity :  
 and yet if we examine the Matter well, we  
 shall find, that the greatest part of the Acti-  
 ons which are *immediately prejudicial* to  
 our selves, and are often look'd upon as *in-*  
*nocent* toward others, do really tend to the  
*publick Detriment*, by making us inca-  
 pable of performing the good Offices we  
 could otherwise have done, and perhaps  
 would have inclin'd to do : this is the Case  
 of *Intemperance* and *extravagant Luxury*.

II. AND further, we may observe, that  
 no Action of any other Person was ever  
 approv'd by us, but upon some Apprehen-  
 sion, well or ill grounded, of some *really*  
*good moral Quality*. If we observe the  
 Sentiments of Men concerning Actions, we  
 shall find, that it is still some *really amiable*  
 and *benevolent Appearance* which engages  
 their Approbation. We may perhaps com-  
 mit Mistakes, in judging Actions to tend to  
 the publick Good, which do not ; or be so  
 stupidly inadvertent, that while our Atten-  
 tion is fix'd on some *partial good Effects*,  
 we may quite over'look many *evil Conse-*  
*quences* which counter-balance the *Good*.  
 Our *Reason* may be very deficient in its  
 Office, by giving us partial Representations  
 of the tendency of Actions ; but it is still  
 some *apparent Species of Benevolence* which  
 com-

commands our Approbation. And *this* Sect. 4. *Sense*, like our other Senses, tho counter-acted from Motives of *external Advantage*, which are stronger than it, yet does not cease to operate, but has Strength enough to make us *uneasy* and *dissatisfy'd* with our selves; even as the *Sense* of *Tasting* shall make us loath, and dislike the nauseous Portion which we may command our selves, from Interest, to swallow.

It is, therefore, to no purpose to alledge here, "That many Actions are really done, and approv'd, which tend to the *universal Detriment*." For the same way, Actions are often perform'd, and in the mean time approv'd, which in fact tend to the *Hurt* of the *Actor*. But, as we do not from the *latter*, infer the *Actor* to be void of *Self-Love*, or a *Sense* of *Interest*; no more should we infer from the *former*, that such Men are void of a *Sense* of *Morals*, or a desire of *publick Good*. The matter is plainly this. Men are often mistaken in the Tendency of Actions, either to *publick*, or *private Good*: Nay, sometimes *violent Passions*, while they last, will make us approve very bad Actions in a *moral Sense*, or very *pernicious ones* to the *Agent*, as *advantageous*: But this proves only, "That sometimes there may be some more *violent Motive* to Action, than a *Sense* of *moral Good*,



Sect. 4. “ or that Men may be blinded by Passion, even to their own *Interest*.” But to prove that some Men are void of a *moral Sense*, we should find some Instances of *cruel, malicious Actions*, done, and approv’d in others, when there is no *Motive of Interest, real, or apparent*, save gratifying that very *desire* of Mischief to others: We must find a Country where *Murder* in cold blood, *Tortures*, and every thing *malicious*, without any *Advantage*, is, if not approv’d, at least look’d upon with *indifference*, and raises no *Aversion* toward the Actors in the unconcern’d Spectators: We must find Men with whom the *Treacherous, Ungrateful, Cruel*, are in the same account with the *Generous, Friendly, Faithful, and Humane*; and who approve the *latter* no more than the *former*, in all Cases where they are not affected by the Influence of these Dispositions, or when the *natural Good or Evil* befalls other Persons. And it may be question’d, whether the *Universe*, tho large enough, and stor’d with no inconsiderable variety of Characters, will yield us any Instance, not only of a *Nation*, but even of a *Club*, or a *single Person* of such Sentiments, who will think all Actions *indifferent*, but those which touch his *own Concerns*.

III. FROM what has been said, we may easily account for the *vast Diversity* of  
moral

*moral Principles*, in various Nations, and Sect. 4. Ages; which is indeed a good Argument against *innate Ideas*, or *Principles*, but will not evidence Mankind to be void of a *moral Sense* to perceive *Virtue* or *Vice*, when Actions occur to their Observation.

THE Grounds of *this Diversity* are principally these:

1<sup>st</sup>. DIFFERENT Opinions of *Happiness*, or *natural Good*, and of the most effectual Means to advance it. Thus in one Country, where there prevails a *courageous Disposition*, where *Liberty* is counted a *great Good*, and *War* an *inconsiderable Evil*, all Insurrections in defence of Privileges, will have the appearance of *moral Good* to our *Sense*, because of their appearing *benevolent*; and yet the *same Sense* of *moral Good* in *Benevolence*, shall, in another Country, where the Spirits of Men are more *abject* and *timorous*, where *Civil War* appears the *greatest natural Evil*, and *Liberty* no *great Purchase*, make the same Action appear *odious*. So in SPARTA, where, thro Contempt of Wealth, the Security of Possessions was not much regarded, but the thing chiefly desir'd, as *naturally good* to the State, was to abound in a *hardy, shifting Youth*; Theft, if dexterously

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
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Sect. 4. perform'd, was so little odious, that it receiv'd the Countenance of a Law to give it Impunity. But in these, and all other Instances of the like nature, the Approbation is founded on *Benevolence*, because of some real, or apparent Tendency to the *publick Good*. For we are not to imagine, that *this Sense* should give us antecedent to Observation, Ideas of complex Actions, or of their natural Tendencies to *Good* or *Evil*: It only determines us to approve *Benevolence*, whenever it appears in any Action, and to hate *the contrary*. So our *Sense* of *Beauty* does not, without Reflection, Instruction, or Observation, give us Ideas of the *regular Solids, Temples, Cirques, and Theatres*; but determines us to approve and delight in *Uniformity amidst Variety*, wherever we observe it. Let us read the Preambles of any Laws we count unjust, or the Vindications of any disputed Practice by the *Moralists*, and we shall find no doubt, that Men are often mistaken in computing the Excess of *natural Good* or *Evil Consequences* of certain Actions; but the Ground on which any Action is approv'd, is still some Tendency to the *greater natural Good* of others, apprehended by those who approve it.

THE same Reason may take away also the Objections against the *Univversality* of *this Sense*, from some Storys of Travellers.  
con-

concerning *strange Crueltys* practis'd toward Sect. 4.  
 the *Aged*, or *Children*, in certain Coun-  
 tryes. If such Actions be done in sudden  
 angry Passions, they only prove, that o-  
 ther Motives, or Springs of Action, may  
 overpower *Benevolence* in its *strongest Ties*;  
 and if they really be universally allow'd,  
 look'd upon as innocent, and vindicated,  
 it shall certainly be under some appear-  
 ance of *Benevolence*; such as to secure  
 them from Insults of Enemyes, to avoid the  
 Infirmitys of Age, which perhaps appear  
 greater Evils than Death, or to free the  
 vigorous and useful Citizens from the  
 Charge of maintaining them, or the Trou-  
 bles of Attendance upon them. A love of  
 Pleasure and Ease, may, in the immediate  
 Agents, be stronger in some Instances,  
 than *Gratitude* toward Parents, or *natural*  
*Affection* to Children. But that such Na-  
 tions are continu'd, notwithstanding all the  
 Toil in educating the Young, is still a suffi-  
 cient Proof of *natural Affection*: For I  
 fancy we are not to imagine any nice Laws  
 in such Places, compelling Parents to a pro-  
 per Education of some certain number of  
 their Offspring. We know very well that  
 an appearance of *publick Good*, was the  
 Ground of Laws, equally Barbarous, e-  
 nacted by LYCURGUS, and SOLON, of  
 killing the deform'd, or weak, to prevent  
 a burdensom Croud of useless Citizens.





MEN have *Reason* given them, to judge, and compare the Tendency of Actions, that they may not stupidly follow the first Appearance of *publick Good*; but it is still some Appearance of *Good* which they pursue: And it is strange, that *Reason* is universally allow'd to Men, notwithstanding all the stupid, ridiculous Opinions receiv'd in many Places, and yet absurd Practices, founded upon those very Opinions, shall seem an Argument against any *moral Sense*; altho the bad Conduct is not any Irregularity in the *moral Sense*, but in the *Judgment* or *Opinion*. If putting the *Aged* to death, with all the Consequences, really tends to the *publick Good*, and to the *lesser Misery* of the *Aged*, it is no doubt *justifiable*; nay, perhaps the *Aged* chuse it, in hopes of a *future State*. If a *deform'd*, or *weak Race*, could never, by Ingenuity and Art, make themselves useful to Mankind, but should grow an absolutely unsupportable Burden, so as to involve a whole State in Misery, it is *just* to put them to death. This all allow to be *just*, in the Case of an over-loaded Boat in a Storm. And as for *killing* of their Children, when Parents are sufficiently stock'd, it is perhaps practis'd, and allow'd from *Self-love*; but I can scarce think it passes for a good Action any where. If *Wood*, or *Stone*, or *Metal* be a DEITY, have Government,

vernment, and Power, and have been the Sect. 4.  
*Authors of Benefits* to us, it is *morally*  
*amiable*, gratefully to praise and wor-  
 ship them: Or if the *true DEITY* be  
 pleas'd with Worship before *Statues*, or  
 any *other Symbol* of some more *immediate*  
*Presence*, or *Influence*, *Image-Worship* is  
*virtuous*. If he delights in *Sacrifices*, *Pe-*  
*nances*, *Ceremonys*, *Cringings*, they are  
*all laudable*. Our *Sense of Virtue* gene-  
 rally leads us exactly enough according to  
 our *Opinions*; and therefore the *ablu*rd  
*Practices* which prevail in the *World*, are  
 much better *Arguments* that Men have no  
*Reason*, than that they have no *moral*  
*Sense of Beauty* in *Actions*.

IV. THE next *Ground of Diversity* in  
*Sentiments*, is the *Diversity of Systems*,  
 to which Men, from foolish *Opinions*,  
 confine their *Benevolence*. We insinuated  
 above\*, that it is *regular* and *beautiful*  
 to have *stronger Benevolence* toward the  
*morally good* Parts of Mankind, who are  
*useful* to the *Whole*, than toward the *use-*  
*less* or *pernicious*. Now if Men receive a  
*low*, or *base Opinion* of any *Body*, or *Sect*  
 of Men; if they imagine them bent upon  
 the *Destruction* of the more valuable Parts,  
 or but *useless Burdens* of the Earth, *Bene-*  
*volence* itself will lead us to neglect the In-

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\* See Sect. 3. Art. X. Par. 1.

Sect. 4. interests of such, and to suppress them. This is the Reason, why, among Nations who have high Notions of *Virtue*, every Action toward an Enemy may pass for *just*; why ROMANS, and GREEKS, could approve of making those they call'd *Barbarians*, *Slaves*.

WERE we freely conversant with *Robbers*, who shew a *moral Sense* in the equal or *proportionable Division* of their Prey, and in *Faith* to each other, we should find they have their own sublime *moral Ideas* of their Party, as *Generous*, *Courageous*, *Trusty*, nay *Honest* too; and that those we call *Honest* and *Industrious*, are imagin'd by them as *Mean-spirited*, *Selfish*, *Churlish*, or *Luxurious*; on whom that Wealth is ill bestow'd, which therefore they would apply to better Uses, to maintain gallanter Men, who have a Right to a Living as well as their Neighbours, who are their profess'd *Enemys*. Nay, if we observe the Discourse of our *profess'd Debauchees*, our *most dissolute Rakes*, we shall find their Vices clothed, in their Imaginations, with some amiable Dress of *Liberty*, *Generosity*, *just Resentment* against the Contrivers of artful Rules to enslave Men, and rob them of their Pleasures. Perhaps never any Men pursu'd with Peace a long Tract of Vice, without some such deluding

cluding Imagination of *moral Good*\*, while Sect. 4. they may be still inadvertent to the *barbarous* and *inhuman Consequences* of their Actions. The Idea of an *ill-natur'd Villain*, is too frightful ever to become familiar to any Mortal: And hence we shall find, that the *basest Actions* are dress'd in some *tolerable Mask*: What others call *Avarice*, appears to the *Agent* a *prudent Care* of a *Family*, or *Friends*; *Fraud*, *artful Conduct*; *Malice* and *Revenge*, a *just Sense* of *Honour*, and a *Vindication* of our *Right* in *Possessions*, or *Fame*; *Fire* and *Sword*, and *Desolation* among *Enemys*, a *just thorow Defence* of our *Country*; *Persecution*, a *Zeal* for the *Truth*, and for the *eternal Happiness* of *Men*, which *Hereticks* oppose. In all these Instances, Men generally act from a *Sense* of *Virtue* upon *false Opinions*, and *mistaken Benevolence*; upon *wrong* or *partial Views* of *publick Good*, and the means to promote it; or upon very *narrow Systems* form'd by like *foolish Opinions*. It is not a *Delight* in the *Misery* of others, or *Malice*, which occasions the horrid Crimes which fill our *Historys*; but generally an *injudicious unreasonable Enthusiasm* for some kind of *limited Virtue*.

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\* See below, *Sect. 6. Art. II. Par. I.*



## Sect. 4.

~~~~~ *Insani sapiens nomen ferat, æquus iniqui,  
Ultra, quam satis est, VIRTUTEM si
petat ipsam*.*

V. THE last Ground of *Diversity* which occurs, are the *false Opinions* of the *Will* or *Laws* of the DEITY. To obey these we are determin'd from *Gratitude*, and a *Sense* of *Right* imagin'd in the DEITY, to dispose at pleasure the Fortunes of his Creatures. This is so abundantly known to have produc'd *Follies*, *Superstitions*, *Murders*, *Devastations* of Kingdoms, from a *Sense* of *Virtue* and *Duty*, that it is needless to mention particular Instances. Only we may observe, "That all those *Follies*, or "*Barbaritys*, rather confirm than destroy "the Opinion of a *moral Sense*;" since the DEITY is believ'd to have a *Right* to dispose of his Creatures, and *Gratitude* to him, if he be conceiv'd *good*, must move us to Obedience to his Will; if he be not conceiv'd as *good*, *Self-love* may overcome our *moral Sense* of the Action which we undertake to avoid his Fury.

As for the Vices which are commonly observ'd to proceed from *Love* of *Pleasure*, or any *violent Passion*, since generally the *Agent* is soon sensible of their *Evil*; and

* Hor. Ep. 6. Lib. 1. v. 15.

sometimes so, amidst the heat of the Action, Sect. 4. they only prove, "That this *moral Sense* and *Benevolence* may be overcome by the more importunate Sollicitations of *other Desires*."

VI. BEFORE we leave this Subject, it is necessary to remove one of the strongest Objections against what has been said so often, viz. "That *this Sense* is *natural* and independent on *Custom* and *Education*." The Objection is this, "That we shall find *some Actions* always attended with the strongest Abhorrence, even at first View, in some whole Nations, where yet there is nothing contrary to *Benevolence* apparent in the Actions; and that the *same Actions* shall in another Nation be counted *innocent*, or *honourable*: Now we generally allow, that what is from *Nature* in one Nation, would be so in all. Thus Incest, among *Christians*, is abhor'd at first appearance as much as *Murder*; and yet we cannot find any necessary tendency of it to the detriment of Mankind, at least among *Collaterals*. Now this Abhorrence cannot be from *Nature*, since in GREECE the marrying half Sisters was counted *honourable*; and among the *Persian MAGI*, the marrying of Mothers: Say they then, may not all our *Approbation* or
" *Dislike*

Sect. 4. "Dislike of Actions arise the same way from
 ~~~~~ "Custom and Education?"

THE Answer to this may be easily found from what is already said: had we no *moral Sense natural* to us, we shou'd only look upon *Incest* as hurtful to our selves, and shun it, and never hate other *incestuous Persons* more than we do a *broken Merchant*; so that still this Abhorrence supposes a *Sense of moral Good*. And further, it is true, that it is very hard to shew any natural tendency of some sorts of *Incest* to the *publick Detriment*; but wherever it is hated, it is apprehended as offensive to the DEITY, and that it exposes the Persons concern'd to his just Vengeance. Now it is universally acknowledg'd to be the grossest ingratitude and baseness in any Creature to counteract the Will of the DEITY, to whom it is under such Obligations; and this is plainly a *moral evil Quality* apprehended in *Incest*, and reducible to the general Foundation of want of *Benevolence*, or *Malice*. Nay further, where this Opinion, that *Incest* is offensive to the DEITY, prevails, *Incest* must have another direct Contrariety to *Benevolence*; since we must apprehend the *Incestuous*, as exposing an Associate, who should be dear to him by the Ties of *Nature*, to the lowest State of *Misery* and *Baseness*, *Infamy* and *Punishment*.

ment. But in those Countrys where no such Sect. 4.  
 Opinion prevails of the DEITY's abhor-  
 ring *Incest*, or prohibiting it; since it does  
 not appear that any obvious *natural Evils*  
 follow from it, it may be look'd upon as  
*innocent*. And further, as Men who have  
 the *Sense* of *Tasting*, may by *Company* and  
*Education* have Prejudices against Meats  
 they never tasted, as *unsavoury*; so may  
 Men, who have a *moral Sense*, acquire an  
 Opinion by implicit Faith, of the *moral*  
*Evil* of Actions, altho they do not them-  
 selves discern in them any tendency to *na-*  
*tural Evil*; imagining that others do so:  
 but without a *moral Sense*, we could receive  
 no Prejudice against Actions, under any o-  
 ther View than as *naturally disadvantage-*  
*ous* to our selves.

VII. THE *Universality* of this *moral*  
*Sense*, and that it is antecedent to *Instruc-*  
*tion*, may appear from observing the Senti-  
 ments of *Children*, upon hearing the Storys  
 with which they are commonly entertain'd  
 as soon as they understand Language: They  
 always passionately interest themselves on  
 that side where *Kindness* and *Humanity* are  
 found, and detest the *Cruel*, the *Covetous*,  
 the *Selfish*, or the *Treacherous*. How  
 strongly do we see their Passions of *Joy*,  
*Sorrow*, *Love*, and *Indignation*, mov'd by  
 these *moral Representations*, even tho there  
 O has



Sect. 4. has been no pains taken to give them Ideas  
 of a DEITY, of *Laws*, of a *future State*,  
 or of the more intricate Tendency of the  
*universal Good* to that of each *Indi-*  
*vidual*.

S E C T.

## S E C T. V.

*A further Confirmation that we have practical Dispositions to Virtue implanted in our Nature, with a further Explication of our Instinct to Benevolence in its various Degrees; with the additional Motives of Interest, viz. Honour, Shame, and Pity.*

I. **W**E have already endeavour'd to prove, "That there is a *universal Determination to Benevolence in Mankind*, even toward the most distant parts of the Species:" But we are not to imagine that this *Benevolence* is equal, or in the same degree toward *all*; there are some nearer and stronger Degrees of *Benevolence*, when the Objects stand in some nearer relations to our selves, which have obtain'd distinct Names, such as *natural Affection* and *Gratitude*; or when *Benevolence* is increas'd by greater *Love of Esteem*.

ONE Species of *natural Affection*, viz. that in *Parents* towards *Children*, has been consider'd already\*; we may only further observe, That there is the same kind of *Affection* among *collateral Relations*, tho

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\* See above, Sect. 2. Art. IX. Par. 2.

Sect. 5. in a weaker degree, which is universally observable where no Opposition of *Interest* produces contrary Actions, or counterballances the Power of this *natural Affection*. We may also observe, that as to the *Affection* of *Parents*, it cannot be entirely founded on *Merit* or *Acquaintance*; not only because it is antecedent to all *Acquaintance*, which might occasion the *Love* of *Esteem*; but because it operates where *Acquaintance* would produce *Hatred*, even toward *Children* apprehended to be *vicious*. And this *Affection* is further confirm'd to be from *NATURE*, because it is always observ'd to *descend*, and not *ascend* from *Children* to *Parents* mutually. *NATURE*, who seems sometimes frugal in her Operations, has strongly determin'd *Parents* to the Care of their *Children*, because they universally stand in absolute need of Support from them; but has left it to *Reflection*, and a *Sense* of *Gratitude*, to produce Returns of *Love* in *Children*, toward such tender kind *Benefactors*, who very seldom stand in such absolute need of Support from their Posterity, as their *Children* did from them. Now did *Acquaintance* or *Merit* produce *natural Affection*, we surely should find it strongest in *Children*, on whom all the Obligations are laid by a thousand good Offices; which yet is quite contrary to Observation. Nay, this Principle seems not confin'd to *Mankind*,  
but

but extends to other *Animals*, where yet Sect. 5. we scarcely ever suppose any Ideas of Merit; and is observ'd to continue in them no longer than the Necessitys of their Young require; nor could it be of any service to the Young that it should, since when they are grown up, they can receive little Benefit from the Love of their *Dams*: But as it is otherwise with *rational Agents*, so *their Affections* are of longer continuance, even during their whole lives.

II. BUT there is nothing will give us a juster Idea of the *wise Order* in which *human Nature* is form'd for *universal Love*, and *mutual good Offices*, than considering that *strong attraction of Benevolence*, which we call *Gratitude*. Every one knows that *Benevolence* toward our selves makes a much deeper Impression upon us, and raises *Gratitude*, or a *stronger Love* toward the *Benefactor*, than *equal Benevolence* toward a *third Person* \*. Now because of the vast Numbers of Mankind, their distant Habitations, and the incapacity of any one to be remarkably useful to vast Multitudes; that our *Benevolence* might not be quite distracted with a multiplicity of Objects, whose equal Virtues would equally recommend them to our regard, or be made useless towards multitudes, whose Interests, at vast distances, we could not understand, nor be capable of promoting, having no

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\* See above, Sect. 2. Art. VI. Part 2.



Sect. 5. Intercourse of Offices with them; NATURE has more powerfully determin'd us to *admire* and *love* the *moral Qualitys* of others, which affect our selves, and has given us more powerful Impressions of *Good-will* towards those who are *beneficent* to our selves; which we call *Gratitude*; and thus has laid a Foundation for *joyful Associations* in all kinds of *Business*, and *virtuous Friendships*.

By this Constitution also the *Benefactor* is more encourag'd in his *Benevolence*, and better secur'd of an *increase* of *Happiness* by *grateful Returns* \*, than if his *Virtue* were only to be honour'd by the colder general Sentiments of Persons unconcern'd, who could not know his *Necessitys*, nor how to be profitable to him; especially, when they would all be equally determin'd to love innumerable multitudes, whose equal *Virtues* would have the same Pretensions to their Love, were there not an *increase* of *Love*, according as the Object is more *nearly attach'd* to us, or our *Friends*, by Offices which affect *our selves*, or *them*.

THIS *universal Benevolence* toward all Men, we may compare to that Principle of *Gravitation*, which perhaps extends to all Bodys in the *Universe*; but, like the *Love*

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\* See above, Sect. 3. Art. II. Part 2.

of *Benevolence*, *increases* as the Distance is Sect. 5. diminish'd, and is *strongest* when Bodys come to *touch* each other. Now this *increase* of *Attraction* upon nearer Approach, is as necessary to the *Frame* of the *Universe*, as that there should be any *Attraction* at all: For a *general Attraction*, equal in all Distances, would by the Contrariety of such multitudes of equal Forces, put an end to all Regularity of Motion, and perhaps stop it altogether.

THIS *increase* of *Love* towards the *Benevolent*, according to their *nearer Approaches* to our *selves* by their *Benefits*, is observable in the high degree of *Love*, which *Heroes* and *Law-givers* universally obtain in their own Conntrys, above what they find abroad, even among those who are not insensible of their Virtues; and in all the strong Ties of *Friendship*, *Acquaintance*, *Neighbourhood*, *Partnership*; which are exceedingly necessary to the Order of human Society.

III. FROM considering that strong *Determination* in our *Nature* to *Gratitude*, and *Love* toward our *Benefactors*, which was already shewn to be *disinterested*\*; we are easily led to consider another *Determination* of our *Minds* equally *natural* with the for-

\* See above, Sect. 2. Art. VI.

Sect. 5. *mer*, which is to *delight* in the good *Opinion* and *Love* of *others*, even when we expect no other *Advantage* from them, except what flows from *this Constitution*, whereby H O N O U R is made an *immediate Good*. This Desire of *Honour* I would call A M B I T I O N, had not *Custom* join'd some evil Ideas to that Word, making it denote such a *violent desire* of *Honour*, and of *Power* also, as will make us stop at no base Means to obtain them. On the other hand, we are by N A T U R E subjected to a *grievous Sensation* of *Misery*, from the unfavourable Opinions of others concerning us, even when we dread no other *Evil* from them: This we call S H A M E; which in the same manner as *Honour*, is constituted an *immediate Evil*.

Now were there no *moral Sense*, or had we no other Idea of Actions but as *advantageous* or *hurtful*, I see no reason why we should be *delighted* with *Honour*, or subjected to the *uneasiness* of *Shame*; or how it could ever happen, that a Man, who is secure from Punishment for any Action, should ever be *uneasy* at its being known to *all the World*. The *World* may have the worse Opinion of him for it; but what subjects my Ease to the Opinion of the *World*? Why, perhaps, we shall not be so much trusted henceforward in Business, and so suffer Loss. If this be the only reason of *Shame*, and it has no *immediate Evil* or  
Pain

*Pain* in it, distinct from Fear of Loss, then Sect. 5. wherever we expose our selves to Loss, we should be *asham'd*, and endeavour to conceal the Action; and yet it is quite otherwise.

A MERCHANT, for instance, from Interest conceals a *Shipwreck*, or a very bad *Market*, which he has sent his Goods to: But is this the same with the Passion of SHAME? Has he that *Anguish*, that *dejection* of *Mind*, and *Self-condemnation*, which one shall have whose *Treachery* is detected? Nay, how will Men sometimes glory in their Losses, when in a Cause imagin'd *morally good*, tho they really weaken their Credit in the Merchant's Sense; that is, the Opinion of their *Wealth*, or *fitness* for Business? Was any Man ever *asham'd* of impoverishing himself to serve his Country, or his Friend?

IV. THE *Opinions* of our Country are by some made the first Standard of *Virtue*: They alledge, "That by comparing Actions to them, we first distinguish between "*moral Good*, and *Evil*: And then, say "they, AMBITION, or the *Love* of HONOUR, is our *chief Motive*." But what is *Honour*? it is not to be universally known, no matter how: A *covetous Man* is not *honour'd* by being universally known as *covetous*; nor a *weak, selfish, or luxurious Man*,



Sect. 5. *Man*, when he is known to be so: Much less can a *treacherous*, *cruel*, or *ungrateful Man* be said to be *honour'd* for his being known as such. A *Posture-master*, a *Fire-eater*, or *Practiser* of *Leger-de-main*, is not *honour'd* for these publick Shews, unless we consider him as a Person capable of giving the Pleasures of *Admiration* and *Surprize* to multitudes. Honour then is the *Opinion* of others concerning our morally good *Actions*, or *Abilitys* presum'd to be apply'd that way; for *Abilitys* constantly apply'd to other Purposes, procure the greatest Infamy. Now, it is certain, that *Ambition* is founded on *Self-love*; but then our Determination to love *Honour*, presupposes a *Sense* of *moral Virtue*, both in the Persons who confer the Honour, and in him who pursues it. And let it be observ'd, that if we knew an *Agent* had no other Motive of Action but *Ambition*, we should apprehend no Virtue even in his most useful Actions, since they flow'd not from any *Love* to others, or *Desire* of their Happiness. When *Honour* is thus constituted by NATURE pleasant to us, it may be an *additional Motive* to *Virtue*, as we said above \*, the Pleasure arising from *Reflection* on our *Benevolence* was: but the Person whom we imagine *perfectly virtuous*, acts immediately from the *Love* of others; however

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\* See Sect. 3. Art. XV.

these refin'd Interests may be *joint* Mo- Sect. 5.  
*tives* to him to set about such a Course of  
 Actions, or to cultivate every *kind Inclination*,  
 and to despise every *contrary Interest*, as giving a  
 smaller Happiness than *Reflection* on his own  
 Virtue, and *Consciousness* of the Esteem of others.

SHAME is in the same manner constituted an *immediate Evil*, and influences us  
 the same way to abstain from *moral Evil*;  
 not that any Action or Omission would ap-  
 pear *virtuous*, where the *sole Motive* was  
 Fear of *Shame*.

V. BUT to enquire further, how far the  
 Opinions of our Company can raise a Sense  
 of *moral Good* or *Evil*. If any Opinion  
 be universal in any Country, Men of little  
 Reflection will probably embrace it: If an  
 Action be believ'd to be *advantageous* to  
 the *Agent*, we may be led to believe so too,  
 and then *Self-love* may make us undertake  
 it; or may the same way make us shun an  
 Action reputed *pernicious* to the *Agent*. If  
 an Action pass for *advantageous* to the *Publick*,  
 we may believe so too; and what next?  
 If we have no *disinterested Benevolence*,  
 what shall move us to undertake it? "Why,  
 "we love *Honour*; and to obtain this Plea-  
 "sure, we will undertake the Action from  
 " *Self-Interest*." Now, is *Honour* only the  
 Opinion of our Country, that an Action is  
 advan-

Sect. 5. *advantageous* to the *Publick*? No: we see no Honour paid to the *useful Treachery* of an *Enemy* whom we have brib'd to our Side, to *casual undesign'd Services*, or to the most useful Effects of *Compulsion* on *Cowards*; and yet we see Honour paid to *unsuccessful Attempts* to serve the *Publick* from sincere Love to it. Honour then presupposes a *Sense* of something *amiable*, besides *Advantage*, a *Sense* of *Excellence* in a *publick Spirit*; and therefore the *first Sense* of *moral Good* must be antecedent to Honour, for Honour is founded upon it. The Company we keep may lead us without examining, to believe that certain Actions tend to the *publick Good*; but that our Company honours such Actions, and loves the *Agent*, must flow from a *Sense* of some *Excellence* in this *Love* of the *Publick*, and serving its Interests.

“ WE therefore, say they again, pretend to *love* the *Publick*, altho we only desire the Pleasure of *Honour*, and we will applaud all who seem to act in that manner, either that we may reap *Advantage* from their Actions, or that others may believe we *really love* the *Publick*.” But shall any Man ever *really love* the *Publick*, or study the *Good* of others in his heart, if *Self-love* be the only spring of his Actions? No: that is impossible. Or shall we ever *really love*  
Men

Men who appear to *love* the *Publick*, with- Sect. 5.  
out a *moral Sense*? No: we could form  
no Idea of such a Temper; and as for these  
Pretenders to *publick Love*, we should  
hate them as Hypocrites, and our Rivals in  
Fame. Now this is all which could be ef-  
fected by the Opinions of our Country,  
even supposing they had a *moral Sense*,  
provided we had none our selves: They  
never could make us admire *Virtue*, or *vir-  
tuous Characters* in others; but could only  
give us Opinions of *Advantage*, or *Dis-  
advantage* in Actions, according as they  
tended to procure to us the Pleasures of  
*Honour*, or the Pain of *Shame*.

BUT if we suppose that Men have by  
NATURE a *moral Sense* of *Goodness* in  
Actions, and that they are capable of *dis-  
interested Love*; all is easy. The Opinions  
of our Company may make us rashly con-  
clude, that certain Actions tend to the  
universal Detriment, and are *morally Evil*,  
when perhaps they are not so; and then  
*our Sense* may determine us to have an  
aversion to them, and their Authors; or we  
may the same way be led into implicit Preju-  
dices in favour of Actions as *good*; and then  
our desire of *Honour* may co-operate with  
*Benevolence*, to move us to such Actions:  
but had we no *Sense* of *moral Quality*s in  
Actions, nor form'd any Conceptions of  
them, but as *advantageous* or *hurtful*,  
we



~ Sect. 5. we never could have *honour'd* or *lov'd* *Agents* for *publick Love*, or had any regard to their Actions, further than they affected ourselves in particular. We might have form'd the metaphysical Idea of *publick Good*, but we had never desir'd it, any further than it tended to our own *private Interest*, without a Principle of *Benevolence*; nor admir'd and lov'd those who were studious of it, without a *moral Sense*. So far is *Virtue* from being (in the Language of a late \* Author) *the Offspring of Flattery*, *begot upon Pride*, that *Pride*, in the bad meaning of that Word, is *the spurious Brood of Ignorance* by our *moral Sense*, and *Flattery* only *an Engine*, which the *Cunning* may use to turn this *moral Sense* in others, to the *Purposes of Self-love* in the *Flatterer*.

VI. To explain what has been said of the Power of *Honour*: Suppose a STATE or PRINCE, observing the Money which is drawn out of *England* by *Italian Musicians*, did decree *Honours*, *Statues*, *Titles*, for *great Musicians*; this would certainly excite all who had hopes of Success, to the Study of *Musick*; and Men of a *good Ear* would approve of the *good Performers* as useful Subjects, as well as very entertaining:

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\* Author of the Fable of the Bees, Page 37. 3d Ed.

but would this give all Men a *good Ear*, or Sect. 5.  
make them delight in *Harmony*? or could it  
ever make us really love a *Musician*, who  
study'd nothing but his own Gain, in the  
same manner we do a *Patriot*, or a *gene-  
rous Friend*? I doubt not. And yet *Friend-  
ship*, without the Assistance of Statues, or  
Honours, can make Persons appear *exceed-  
ingly amiable*.

LET us take another Instance: Suppose  
*Statues* and *triumphal Arches* were de-  
creed, as well as a *large Sum of Money*, to  
the Discoverer of the *Longitude*, or any  
other useful Invention in *Mathematicks*:  
This would raise a universal Desire of such  
Knowledge from *Self-love*; but would  
Men therefore love a *Mathematician* as they  
do a *virtuous Man*? Would a *Mathema-  
tician* love every Person who had attained  
Perfection in that Knowledge, wherever he  
observ'd it, altho he knew that it was not  
accompany'd with any *Love to Mankind*,  
or *Study of their Good*, but with *Ill-nature*,  
*Pride*, *Covetousness*? In short, let us ho-  
nour other Qualitys by external Shew as  
much as we please, if we do not discern a  
*benevolent Intention* in the Application, or  
presume upon it; we may look upon these  
Qualitys as useful, enriching, or otherwise  
advantageous to any one who is possess'd of  
them; but they shall never meet with those  
endearing Sentiments of *Esteem* and *Love*,  
which

Sect. 5. which our *Nature* determines us to appropriate to *Benevolence* or *Virtue*.

LOVE of *Honour*, and Aversion to *Shame*, may often move us to do Actions for which others profess to honour us, even tho we see no *Good* in them our selves; and *Compliance* with the Inclinations of others, as it evidences Humanity, may procure some Love to the *Agent*, from Spectators who see no *moral Good* in the Action it self: But without some *Sense* of *Good* in the Actions, Men shall never be fond of such Actions in Solitude, nor ever love any one for Perfection in them, or for practising them in Solitude; and much less shall they be dissatisfy'd with themselves when they act otherwise in Solitude. Now this is the case with us, as to *Virtue*; and therefore we must have by NATURE a *moral Sense* of it antecedent to *Honour*.

THIS will shew us with what Judgment a late \* Author compares the Original of our Ideas of *Virtue*, and Approbation of it, to the manner of regulating the Behaviour of aukard Children by Commendation. It shall appear afterward †, that our Approbation of some Gestures, and what we call

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\* See the Fable of the Bees, Page 38. 3d Ed.  
Sect. 6. Art. IV.

† See

*Decency* in Motion, depends upon some Sect. 5.  
*moral Ideas* in People of advanc'd Years: ~~~~~  
 But before Children come to observe this  
 Relation, it is only *good Nature*, an *Incli-*  
*nation* to please, and *Love of Praise*, which  
 makes them endeavour to behave as they  
 are desir'd; and not any Perception of *Ex-*  
*cellence* in this Behaviour. And hence  
 they are not solicitous about Gestures when  
 alone, unless with a View to please when  
 they return to Company; and they never  
 love or approve others for Perfection of this  
 kind, but rather envy or hate them, till  
 they either discern the Connexion between  
*Gestures* and *moral Qualitys*, or reflect on  
 the *good Nature* which is evidenc'd by  
 such a Compliance with the desire of the  
 Company.

VII. THE considering *Honour* in the  
 manner above explain'd, may shew us the  
 reason why Men are often *asham'd* for  
 things which are not *vitious*, and *honour'd*  
 for what is not *virtuous*. For, if any  
 Action only appears *vitious* to any  
 Persons or Company, altho it be not  
 so, they will have a bad Idea of the  
*Agent*; and then he may be *asham'd*, or  
 suffer Uneasiness in being thought *morally*  
*evil*. And the same way, those who look  
 upon an Action as *morally good*, will honour  
 the *Agent*, and he may be pleas'd with the  
 P. Honour,



Sect. 5. *Honour*, altho he does not himself perceive  
 any *moral Good* in what has procur'd it.

AGAIN, we shall be *asham'd* of every Evidence of *moral Incapacity*, or want of *Ability*; and with good ground, when this want is occasion'd by our own Negligence. Nay further, if any Circumstance be look'd upon as *indecent* in any Country, *offensive* to others, and *deform'd*; we shall, out of our Love to the good Opinions of others, be *asham'd* to be found in such Circumstances, even when we are sensible that this Indecency or Offence is not founded on *Nature*, but is merely the Effect of *Custom*. Thus being observ'd in some of the Functions of Nature, which are counted *indecent* and *offensive*, will make us *uneasy*, altho we are sensible that they really do not argue any *Vice* or *Weakness*. But on the contrary, since *moral Abilities* of any kind, upon the general Presumption of a good Application, procure the Esteem of others, we shall value our selves upon them, or grow proud of them, and be *asham'd* of any Discovery of our want of such *Abilities*. This is the reason that *Wealth* and *Power*, the great *Engines* of *Virtue*, when presum'd to be intended for *benevolent* Purposes, either toward our Friends or our Country, procure *Honour* from others, and are apt to beget *Pride* in the Possessor; which, as it is a general Passion which may  
 be

be either *good* or *evil*, according as it Sect. 9. is grounded, we may describe to be the *Joy which arises from the real or imagin'd Possession of Honour, or Claim to it*: And the same are the Effects of *Knowledge, Sagacity, Strength*; and hence it is that Men are apt to boast of them.

BUT whenever it appears that Men have only their *private Advantage* in view, in the application of these *Abilitys*, or *natural Advantages*, the *Honour* ceases, and we study to conceal them, or at least are not fond of displaying them; and much more when there is any Suspicion of an *ill-natur'd Application*. Thus some *Misers* are asham'd of their *Wealth*, and study to conceal it; as the *malicious* or *selfish* do their *Power*: Nay this is very often done where there is no positive evil Intention; because the diminishing their *Abilitys*, increases the *moral Good* of any little kind Actions, which they can find in their hearts to perform.

IN short, we always see Actions which flow from *publick Love*, accompany'd with generous Boldness and Openness; and not only *malicious*, but even *selfish ones*, the matter of Shame and Confusion; and that Men study to conceal them. The Love of *private Pleasure* is the ordinary occasion of *Vice*; and when Men have got any lively Notions of *Virtue*, they generally begin to be asham'd

Sect. 5. of every thing which betrays *Selfishness*, even in Instances where it is innocent. We are apt to imagine, that others observing us in such Pursuits, form mean Opinions of us, as too much set on private Pleasure; and hence we shall find such Enjoyments in most polite Nations, conceal'd from those who do not partake with us. Such are *venereal Pleasures* between *Persons marry'd*, and even *eating* and *drinking* alone, any nicer sorts of Meats or Drinks; whereas a *hospitable Table* is rather matter of boasting; and so are all other kind, generous Offices between *marry'd Persons*, where there is no Suspicion of *Self-love* in the *Agent*; but he is imagin'd as acting from Love to his *Associate*. This, I fancy, first introduc'd Ideas of *Modesty* in polite Nations, and *Custom* has strengthen'd them wonderfully; so that we are now asham'd of many things, upon some confus'd implicit Opinions of *moral Evil*, tho we know not upon what account.

HERE too we may see the reason, why we are not asham'd of any of the Methods of *Grandeur*, or *high-Living*. There is such a Mixture of *moral Ideas*, of *Benevolence*, of *Abilitys* kindly employ'd; so many Dependants supported, so many Friends entertain'd, assisted, protected; such a *Capacity* imagin'd for great and amiable *Actions*, that we are never asham'd, but rather boast

boast of such things : We never affect Obscurity or Concealment, but rather desire that our *State* and *Magnificence* should be known. Were it not for this Conjunction of *moral Ideas*, no Mortal could bear the Drudgery of *State*, or abstain from laughing at those who did. Could any Man be pleas'd with a Company of *Statues* furrrounding his Table, so artfully contriv'd, as to consume his various Courses, and inspir'd by some Servant, like so many Puppets, to give the usual trifling Returns in praise of their Fare ? or with so many *Machines* to perform the Cringes and Whispers of a Levee ?

THE *Shame* we suffer from the Meanness of *Dress*, *Table*, *Equipage*, is entirely owing to the same reason : This Meanness is often imagin'd to argue *Avarice*, *Meanness* of *Spirit*, want of *Capacity*, or *Conduct* in *Life*, of *Industry*, or *moral Abilitys* of one kind or other. To confirm this, let us observe that Men will glory in the Meanness of their Fare, when it was occasion'd by a good Action. How many are there who would be asham'd to be surpriz'd at a Dinner of cold Meat, who will boast of their having fed upon *Dogs* and *Horses* at the Siege of *Derry* ? and they will all tell you that they were not, nor are asham'd of it.

THIS ordinary Connexion in our Imagination between *external Grandeur*, *Regularity*



*Sect. 5.* *W* *gularity in Dress, Equipage, Retinue, Badges of Honour, and some moral Abilities greater than ordinary, is perhaps of more consequence in the World than some recluse Philosophers apprehend, who pique themselves upon despising these external Shews: This may possibly be a great, if not the only Cause of what some count miraculous, viz. That Civil Governors of no greater Capacity than their Neighbours, by some inexpressible Awe, and Authority, quell the very Spirits of the Vulgar, and keep them in subjection by such small Guards, as might easily be conquer'd by those Associations which might be rais'd among the Disaffected or Factionous of any State; who are daring enough among their Equals, and shew a sufficient Contempt of Death for undertaking such an Enterprize.*

WE may also hence discover the reason, why the gratifying our *superior Senses of Beauty and Harmony*, or the Enjoyment of the Pleasures of *Knowledge*, never occasions any Shame or Confusion; tho our Enjoyment were known to all the *World*. The Objects which furnish this Pleasure, are of such a nature, as to afford the same Delights to multitudes; nor is there any thing in the Enjoyment of them by one, which excludes any Mortal from a like Enjoyment: so that altho we pursue these Enjoyments from *Self-love*, yet as our Enjoyment

ment cannot be prejudicial to others, so no Sect. 5.  
 Man is imagin'd any way *inhumanly selfish* from the fullest Enjoyment of them which is possible. The same *Regularity* or *Harmony* which delights me, may at the same time delight multitudes; the same *Theorem* shall be equally fruitful of Pleasure, when it has entertain'd thousands: and therefore none are alarm'd of such Pursuits, since they do not of themselves ever seduce us into any thing *malicious, envious, or unnatural*; nor does any one apprehend another *too selfish*, from pursuing Objects of unexhausted universal Pleasure.

THIS View of *Honour* and *Shame* may also let us see the reason, why most Men are uneasy at being prais'd, when they themselves are present. Every one is delighted with the Esteem of others, and must enjoy great Pleasure when he hears himself commended; but we are unwilling others should observe our Enjoyment of this Pleasure, which is really *selfish*; or that they should imagine us fond of it, or influenc'd by hopes of it in our good Actions; and therefore we chuse Secrecy for the Enjoyment of it, as we do with respect to other Pleasures, in which others do not share with us.

VIII. LET us next consider another Determination of our *Mind*, which strongly proves *Benevolence* to be *natural* to us,

*Sect. 5.* and that is COMPASSION; by which we are dispos'd to study the *Interest* of others, without any Views of *private Advantage*: This needs little Illustration. Every Mortal is made uneasy by any grievous Misery he sees another involv'd in, unless the Person be imagin'd *evil*, in a *moral Sense*: Nay, it is almost impossible for us to be unmov'd, even in that Case. *Advantage* may make us do a cruel Action, or may overcome *Pity*; but it scarce ever extinguishes it. A sudden Passion of *Hatred* or *Anger* may represent a Person as *absolutely evil*, and so extinguish *Pity*; but when the Passion is over, it often returns. Another *disinterested View* may even in cold blood overcome *Pity*; such as *Love* to our *Country*, or *Zeal* for *Religion*. *Persecution* is generally occasion'd by *Love* of *Virtue*, and *Desire* of the *eternal Happiness* of *Mankind*, altho our *Folly* makes us chuse absurd Means; and it is often accompany'd with *Pity* enough to make the *Persecutor* uneasy, in what, for prepollent Reasons, he chuses; unless his Opinion leads him to look upon the *Heretick* as *absolutely* and *entirely evil*.

WE may here observe how wonderfully the Constitution of *human Nature* is adapted to move *Compassion*. Our *Misery* and *Distress* immediately appear in our *Countenance*, if we do not study to prevent it, and propagates

gates some Pain to all Spectators; who Sect. 5.  
from Observation universally understand  
the meaning of those *dismal Airs*. We  
*mechanically* send forth *Shrieks* and *Groans*  
upon any surprizing Apprehension of *Evil*;  
so that no regard to Decency can sometimes  
restrain them: Thus all who are present  
are rous'd to our Assistance, and sometimes  
our *injurious Enemy* is made to relent.


We observ'd above \*, that we are not  
immediately excited by *Compassion* to desire  
the *Removal* of our own Pain; we think  
it just to be so affected upon the Occasion,  
and dislike those who are not so: but we  
are excited directly to desire the *Relief* of  
the Miserable; and if we see this impossi-  
ble, we may by *Reflection* discern it to be  
vain for us to indulge our *Compassion* any  
further; and then from *Self-love* we re-  
tire from the Object which occasions our  
Pain, and study to divert our Thoughts.  
But where there is no such *Reflection*, Peo-  
ple are hurry'd by a *natural, kind Instinct*,  
to see Objects of *Compassion*, and expose  
themselves to this Pain when they can give  
no reason for it; as in the Instance of *pub-  
lick Executions*.

THIS same Principle leads men to *Tra-  
gedys*; only we are to observe, that ano-


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\* See Sect. 2. Art. VIII.



Sect. 5.  ther strong reason of this, is the *moral Beauty* of the *Characters* and *Actions* which we love to behold: for I doubt, whether any Audience would be pleas'd, barely to see fictitious Scenes of Misery, if they were kept strangers to the *moral Qualitys* of the Sufferers, or their *Characters* and *Actions*. As in such a case, there would be no *Beauty* to raise Desire of seeing such Representations, I fancy we would not expose our selves to Pain alone, from Misery, which we knew to be fictitious.

It was the same Cause which crouded the *Roman Theatres* to see *Gladiators*; there the People had frequent Instances of great *Courage*, and *Contempt* of Death, two great *moral Abilitys*, if not *Virtues*; hence *CICERO* looks upon them as great Instructions in *Fortitude*. The *Antagonist Gladiator* bore all the blame of the Cruelty committed, among People of little Reflection; and the *courageous* and *artful* one, really obtain'd a Reputation of *Virtue*, and Favour among the Spectators, and was vindicated by the Necessity of *Self-defence*. In the mean time they were inadvertent to this, that their crouding to such Sights, and favouring the Persons who presented them with such Spectacles of Courage, and with Opportunitrys of following their *natural Instinct* to *Compassion*, was the true occasion  
of


of all the real Distress, or Assaults which Sect. 3.  
they were sorry for. 

WHAT Sentiments can we imagine a Candidate would have rais'd of himself, had he presented his Countrymen only with Scenes of *Misery*; had he drain'd *Hospitals* and *Infirmaries* of all their pityable Inhabitants, or had he bound so many *Slaves*, and without meeting with any Resistance, butcher'd them with his own Hands? I should very much question the Success of his Election, (however *Compassion* might cause his Shews still to be frequented,) if his *Antagonist* chose a Diversion apparently more virtuous, or with a *Mixture* of Scenes of *Virtue*.

How independent this Disposition to *Compassion* is of all *Custom*, *Education*, *Instruction*, will appear from the Prevalence of it in *Women* and *Children*, who are less influenc'd by these. That *Children* do delight in some Actions which in fact are cruel and tormenting to Animals, which they have in their Power, flows not from *Malice*, or want of *Compassion*, but from their *Ignorance* of those signs of Pain which many Creatures make; together with a *Curiosity* to see the various Contortions of their Bodys: for when they are more acquainted with these Creatures, or come by any means to know their Sufferings, their *Com-*  
passion

**Sect. 5.** *passion* often becomes too strong for their *Reason*; as it generally does in beholding *Executions*, where as soon as they observe the evidences of Distress, or Pain in the *Malefactor*, they are apt to condemn this necessary Method of Self-defence in the *State*.

## SECT.



## S E C T. VI.

*Concerning the Importance of this moral Sense to the present Happiness of Mankind, and its Influence on human Affairs.*

I. **I**T may now probably appear, that notwithstanding the Corruption of Manners so justly complain'd of every where, this *moral Sense* has a greater Influence on *Mankind* than is generally imagin'd, altho it is often directed by very partial imperfect Views of *publick Good*, and often overcome by *Self-love*. But we shall offer some further Considerations, to prove, "That it gives us more *Pleasure* and *Pain* than all our *other Facultys*." And to prevent Repetitions, let us observe, that wherever it appears, that any *morally good Quality* gives Pleasure from *Reflection*, or from *Honour*, the contrary *evil one* will give proportionable Pain, from *Remorse* and *Shame*. Now we shall consider the *moral Pleasures*, not only *separately*, but as they are the *most delightful Ingredient* in the ordinary Pleasures of *Life*.

ALL



## Sect. 6.

ALL MANKIND seem perswaded of some *Excellency* in the Possession of *good moral Qualitys*, which is superior to all other Enjoyments; and on the contrary, look upon a State of *moral Evil*, as worse and more wretched than any other whatsoever. We must not form our Judgment in this matter from the Actions of Men; for however they may be influenc'd by *moral Sentiments*, yet it is certain, that *Self-interested Passions* frequently overcome them, and *partial Views* of the Tendency of Actions, make us do what is really *morally evil*, apprehending it to be *good*: But let us examine the Sentiments which Men universally form of the State of others, when they are no way immediately concern'd; for in these Sentiments *human Nature* is *calm* and *undisturb'd*, and shews its *true Face*.

Now would we imagine a *rational Creature* in a sufficiently happy State, when his Mind was without interruption wholly occupy'd with pleasant Sensations of *Smell, Taste, Touch, &c.* if at the same time all other Ideas were excluded? Would we not think the State *low, mean* and *sordid*, if there were no *Society*, no *Love* or *Friendship*, no *good Offices*? What then must that State be wherein there are no Pleasures but those of the *external Senses*, with such long Intervals as *human Nature* at present  
must

must have? do these short Fits of Pleasure Sect. 6.  
make the *Luxurious* happy? How *insipid* and *joyless* are the Reflections on past Pleasure? and how poor a Recompense is the Return of the transient Sensation, for the *nauseous Satiety*, and *Languors* in the Intervals? This *Frame* of our *Nature*, so incapable of long Enjoyments of the *external Senses*, points out to us, "That there  
" must be some other more *durable Pleasure*, without such *tedious Interruptions*,  
" and *nauseous Reflections*."

LET us even join with the Pleasures of the *external Senses*, the Perceptions of *Beauty, Order, Harmony*: There are no doubt more *noble Pleasures*, and seem to enlarge the *Mind*; and yet how *cold* and *joyless* are they, if there be no *moral Pleasures* of *Friendship, Love* and *Beneficence*? Now if the bare Absence of *moral Good*, makes in our Judgment the State of a rational Agent contemptible, the Presence of *contrary Dispositions* is always imagin'd by us to sink him into a degree of Misery, from which no other Pleasures can relieve him. Would we ever wish to be in the same Condition with a *wrathful, malicious, revengeful, or envious Being*, tho we were at the same time to enjoy all the external Sensations of Pleasure, or all the Opportunities of seeing the most *beautiful regular Prospects*, and hearing the most *harmonious Sounds*, or  
obtain-

Sect. 6. obtaining the most *extensive Knowledge*?

These internal Pleasures of *Beauty* and *Harmony*, have a great Power to soothe the Mind into a forgetfulness of *Wrath*, *Malice* or *Revenge*; and they must do so, before we can have any tolerable Delight or Enjoyment: for while *these Affections* possess the Mind, there is nothing but *Torment* and *Misery*.

WHAT *Castle-builder*, who forms to himself imaginary Scenes of Life, in which he thinks he would be happy, ever made *acknowledg'd Treachery*, *Cruelty*, or *Ingratitude*, the Steps by which he mounted to his wish'd for Elevation, or Parts of his Character, when he had attain'd it? We always conduct our selves in such *Reveries*, according to the Dictates of *Honour*, *Faith*, *Generosity*, *Courage*; and the lowest we can sink, is hoping we may be enrich'd by some innocent Accident:

*O si urnam Argenti FORS quâ mihi  
monstret! \** —

But *Labour*, *Hunger*, *Thirst*, *Poverty*, *Pain*, *Danger*, have nothing so detestable in them, that our *Self-love* cannot allow us to be often expos'd to them: Nay, the *Virtues* which these give us occasions of

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\* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 6. v. 10.

displaying, are so amiable and excellent, Sect. 6. that scarce ever is any imaginary Hero in *Romance*, or *Epic*, brought to his highest Pitch of Happiness, without going thro them *all*. Where there is no *Virtue*, there is nothing worth Desire or Contemplation; the *Romance*, or *Epos* must end: Nay, the *Difficulty* \* or *natural Evil* does so much increase the *Virtue* of the good Action, which it accompanys, that we cannot easily sustain these Works after the Distress is over; and if we do continue the Work, it must be by presenting a new Scene of *Benevolence* in a prosperous Fortune. A Scene of *external Prosperity*, or *natural Good*, without any thing *moral*, or *virtuous*, cannot entertain a Person of the dullest Imagination, had he ever so much interested himself in the Fortunes of his Hero; for where *Virtue* ceases, there remains nothing worth wishing to our Favourite, or which we can be delighted to view his Possession of, when we are most studious of his Happiness.

LET us take a particular Instance, to try how much we prefer the Possession of *Virtue* to all other Enjoyments, and how we look upon *Vice* as worse than any other Misery. Who could ever read the History of *REGULUS*, without concerning himself

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\* Sect. 3. Art. XI. Par. 5.



Sect. 6. in the Fortunes of that *gallant* Man, sorrowing at his Sufferings, and wishing him a better Fate? But how a better Fate? should he have comply'd with the Terms of the CARTHAGINIANS, and preserv'd himself from the intended Tortures, tho to the detriment of his Country? or should he have violated his plighted Faith and Promise of returning? Will any Man say, that either of these is the better Fate he wishes his Favourite? Had he acted thus, *that* Virtue would have been gone, which interests every one in his Fortunes. "Let him take his Fate like other common Mortals." What else do we wish then, but that the CARTHAGINIANS had relented of their Cruelty, or that PROVIDENCE by some unexpected Event, had rescu'd him out of their hands? Now may not this teach us, that we are indeed determin'd to judge *Virtue* with Peace and Safety, preferable to *Virtue* with Distress; but that at the same time we look upon the State of the *Virtuous*, the *Publick-spirited*, even in the utmost natural Distress, as preferable to all affluence of other Enjoyments? For this is what we chuse to have our favourite Hero in, notwithstanding all its Pains and natural Evils. We would never have imagin'd him happier, had he acted otherwise; or thought him in a more eligible State, with Liberty and Safety, at the expence of his *Virtue*: we secretly judge the Purchase too dear; and therefore

we never imagine he acted foolishly in securing his *Virtue*, his *Honour*, at the expence of his *Ease*, his *Pleasure*, his *Life*: nor can we think these *latter* Enjoyments worth the keeping, when the *former* are entirely lost. Sect. 6.

II. LET us in the same manner examine our Sentiments of the Happiness of others in common Life. WEALTH and EXTERNAL PLEASURES bear no small bulk in our Imaginations; but does there not always accompany this Opinion of Happiness in *Wealth*, some suppos'd *beneficent Intention* of doing good Offices to Persons dear to us, at least to our *Familys*, or *Kinsmen*? And in our imagin'd Happiness of *external Pleasure*, some Ideas are always included of some *moral* Enjoyments of *Society*, some *Communication* of Pleasure, something of *Love*, of *Friendship*, of *Esteem*, of *Gratitude*. Who ever pretended to a *Taste* of Pleasures without *Society*? or if any seem violent in pursuit of such Pleasures, how *base* and *contemptible* do they appear to all Persons, even to those who could have no expectation of Advantage from their having a more generous Notion of Pleasure? Now were there no *moral Sense*, no Happiness in *Benevolence*, and did we act from no other Principle but *Self-love*; sure there is no Pleasure of the external Senses, which we could not obtain the *solitary* Perceptions

Sect. 6. of, with less trouble and expence than in *Society*. But a *Mixture* of the *moral Pleasures* is what gives the *alluring Relish*; 'tis some Appearance of *Friendship*, of *Love*, of *communicating* Pleasure to others, which preserves the Pleasures of the *Luxurious* from being *nauseous* and *insipid*. And this partial Imagination of some *good moral Qualities*, some *Benevolence*, in Actions which have many *cruel, inhuman, and destructive* Consequences toward others, is what has kept *Vice* more in countenance than any other Consideration\*.

BUT to convince us further, wherein the Happiness of *Wealth* and *external Pleasure* lies; let us but suppose *Malice, Wrath, Revenge*; or only *Solitude*, Absence of *Friendship*, of *Love*, of *Society*, of *Esteem*, join'd with the Possession of them; and all the Happiness vanishes like a Dream. And yet *Love, Friendship, Society, Humanity*, tho' accompany'd with *Poverty* and *Toil*, nay even with smaller degrees of *Pain*, such as do not wholly occupy the Mind, are not only the Object of Love from others, but even of a sort of Emulation; which plainly shews, "That *Virtue* is the chief  
" *Happiness* in the *universal Judgment* of  
" *Mankind*."

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\* See above, Sect. 4. Art. IV. Par. 2.

III, THERE is a further Consideration which must not be pass'd over, concerning the EXTERNAL BEAUTY of Persons, which all allow to have great Power over human Minds. Now it is some apprehended *Morality*, some natural or imagin'd indication of *concomitant Virtue*, which gives it this powerful Charm above all other kinds of *Beauty*. Let us consider the Characters of *Beauty*, which are commonly admir'd in Countenances, and we shall find them to be *Sweetness, Mildness, Majesty, Dignity, Vivacity, Humility, Tendernefs, Good-nature*; that is, that certain *Airs, Proportions, je ne scai quoy's*, are natural Indications of such Virtues, or of Abilities or Dispositions toward them. As we observ'd above \* of *Misery, or Distress* appearing in Countenances; so it is certain, almost all *habitual Dispositions of Mind*, form the Countenance in such a manner, as to give some Indications of them to the Spectator. Our *violent Passions* are obvious at first view in the Countenance; so that sometimes no Art can conceal them: and smaller degrees of them give some less obvious Turns to the Face, which an accurate Eye will observe. Now when the *natural Air* of any Face approaches to that which any Passion would form it unto, we make a

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\* See Sect. 4. Art. VIII. Par. 2.



Sect. 6. conjecture from this concerning the *leading Disposition* of the Person's Mind.

As to those Fancys which prevail in certain Countrys toward *large Lips, little Noses, narrow Eyes*, unless we knew from themselves under what Idea it is that such Forms are admir'd, whether as *naturally beautiful* in Form, or Proportion to the rest of the Face; or as presum'd Indications of some *moral Quality*s, we may more probably conclude that it is the *latter*; since this is so much the Ground of Approbation, or Aversion toward Faces among our selves. And for these Irregularitys of Features which we count *naturally disagreeable* as to Form, we know the Aversion on this account is so weak, that *moral Quality*s shall procure a liking, even to the Face, in Persons who are sensible of the *Irregularity*, or want of that *Regularity* which is common in others. With us, certain Features are imagin'd to denote *Dulness*; as *hollow Eyes, large Lips*; a *Colour* of Hair, *Wantonness*: and may we not conclude the like *Association of Ideas*, perhaps in both Cases without Foundation in *Nature*, to be the Ground of those Approbations which appear unaccountable to us?

IN the same manner, when there is nothing *grossly* disproportion'd in any Face, what is it we dispraise? It is *Pride, Haughtiness,*

*tiness, Sourness, Ill-nature, Discontent, Sect. 6. Folly, Levity, Wantonness*; which some Countenances discover in the manner above hinted at. And *those Airs*, when brought by Custom upon the most *regular Set* of Features, have often made them very disagreeable; as the *contrary Airs* have given the strongest Charms to Countenances, which are far from Perfection in *external Beauty*.

ONE cannot but observe the Judgment of HOMER in his Character of HELEN. Had he ever so much rais'd our Idea of her *external Beauty*, it would have been ridiculous to have engag'd his Countrymen in a War for such a HELEN as VIRGIL has drawn her. He therefore still retains something amiable in a *moral Sense* amidst all her Weakness, and often suggests to his Reader,

— Ἑλένης ὀρμήματα τε σοναχὰς τε \*,

as the Spring of his Countrymens Indignation and Revenge.

THIS Consideration may shew us one reason, among many others, for Mens *different Fancys, or Relishes of Beauty*. The *Mind* of Man, however generally dispos'd to esteem *Benevolence and Virtue*, yet by more particular Attention to some

\* See Homer, *Iliad* 2. v. 356, 390.

Sect. 6. kinds of it than others, may gain a stronger  
 ~~~~~ Admiration of some *moral Dispositions*  
 than others. *Military Men* may admire
Courage more than other Virtues; Persons
 of *smaller Courage* may admire *Sweetness*
 of *Temper*; Men of *Thought* and *Reflec-*
tion, who have more extensive Views, will
 admire the *like Qualities* in others; Men of
keen Passions expect equal Returns of all
 the kind Affections, and are wonderfully
 charm'd by *Compliance*: the *Proud* may
 like those of *higher Spirit*, as more suitable
 to their Dignity; tho' *Pride*, join'd with
Reflection and *good Sense*, will recommend
 to them *Humility* in the Person belov'd.
 Now as the *various Tempers* of Men make
various Tempers of others agreeable to
 them, so they must differ in their *Relishes*
 of *Beauty*, according as it denotes the se-
 veral *Qualities* most agreeable to them-
 selves.

THIS may also shew us, how in
virtuous Love there may be the greatest
 Beauty, without the least Charm to engage
 a Rival. *Love* it self gives a Beauty to the
Lover, in the Eyes of the Person belov'd,
 which no other Mortal is much affected
 with: and this perhaps is the *strongest*
Charm possible, and that which will have
 the greatest Power, where there is not some
 very great Counter-balance from *worldly*
Interest, *Vice*, or *gross Deformity*.

IV. THIS

IV. THIS same Consideration may be extended to the whole AIR and MOTION of any Person. Every thing we count agreeable, some way denotes *Chearfulness*, *Ease*, a *Condescension*, and *Readiness* to oblige, a *Love of Company*, with a *Freedom* and *Boldness* which always accompanys an *honest*, *undesigning Heart*. On the contrary, what is shocking in *Air*, or *Motion*, is *Roughness*, *Ill-nature*, a *Disregard* to others, or a *foolish Shame-facedness*, which evidences a Person to be *unexperient'd* in *Society*, or *Offices of Humanity*.

WITH relation to these *Airs*, *Motions*, *Gestures*, we may observe, that considering the different *Ceremonys*, and *Modes* of shewing respect, which are practis'd in different Nations, we may indeed probably conclude that there is no *natural* Connexion between any of these *Gestures*, or *Motions*, and the *Affections* of *Mind* which they are by *Custom* made to express; but when *Custom* has made any of them pass for Expressions of such *Affections*, by a constant *Association* of Ideas, some shall become agreeable and lovely, and others extremely offensive, altho they were both, in their own Nature, perfectly indifferent.

V. HERE we may remark the manner in which NATURE leads Mankind to the
Conti-


Sect. 6. Continuance of their Race, and by its
 strongest Power engages them to what occa-
 sions the greatest Toil and Anxiety of Life,
 and yet supports them under it with an in-
 expressible delight. We might have been
 excited to the Propagation of our Species,
 by such an uneasy Sensation as would have
 effectually determin'd us to it, without any
 great prospect of Happiness; as we see
Hunger and *Thirst* determine us to preserve
 our Bodies, tho' few look upon eating and
 drinking as any considerable Happiness.
 The *Sexes* might have been engag'd to Con-
 currence, even as we imagine the *Brutes*
 are, by *Desire* only, or by a *Love* of *sen-
 sual Pleasure*. But how dull and insipid
 had Life been, were there no more in MAR-
 RIAGE? Who would have had Resolution
 enough to bear all the Cares of a *Family*,
 and Education of *Children*? or who from
 the general Motive of *Benevolence*, would
 have chosen to subject himself to *natural
 Affection* toward an *Offspring*, when he
 could foresee all the Troubles it might oc-
 casion? This Inclination therefore of the
Sexes is founded on something stronger,
 and more efficacious and joyful, than the
 Sollicitations of *Uneasiness*, or the bare *de-
 sire of sensible Pleasure*.

BEAUTY gives a favourable Presumption
 of good moral Dispositions, and Acquain-
 tance confirms this into a real Love of
 Esteem,

Esteem, or begets it, where there is little *Beauty*: This raises an expectation of the greatest *moral Pleasures* along with the *sensible*, and a thousand tender Sentiments of *Humanity* and *Generosity*; and makes us impatient for a *Society* which we imagine big with unspeakable *moral Pleasures*; where nothing is indifferent, and every trifling Service being an Evidence of *this strong Love of Esteem*, is mutually receiv'd with the Rapture and Gratitude of the greatest Benefit, and of the most substantial Obligation. And where *Prudence* and *Good-nature* influence both sides, this *Society* may answer all their Expectations.

NAY, let us examine those of looser Conduct with relation to the *fair Sex*, and we shall find, that it is not *Love of sensible Pleasure* which is the chief Motive of *Debauchery*, or *false Gallantry*. Were it so, the *meanest Prostitutes* would please as much as any; but we know sufficiently that we are fond of *Good-nature*, *Faith*, *Pleasantry of Temper*, *Wit*, and many other *moral Qualities*, even in a *Mistress*. And this may furnish us with a Reason for what appears pretty unaccountable, *viz.* That *Chastity* it self has a powerful Charm in the Eyes of the *Dissolute*, even when they are attempting to destroy it.

THIS



THIS powerful Determination even to a *limited Benevolence*, and other *moral Sentiments*, is observ'd to give a great bias to our Minds toward a *universal Goodness*, *Tenderness*, *Humanity*, *Generosity*, and *Contempt of private Good* in our whole Conduct; besides the obvious Improvement it occasions in our *external Deportment*, and in our relish of *Beauty*, *Order*, and *Harmony*. As soon as a Heart, before *hard* and *obdurate*, is soften'd in this Flame, we shall observe a *Love of Poetry*, *Musick*, the *Beauty of Nature* in rural Scenes, a *Contempt of other selfish Pleasures of the external Senses*, a *neat Dress*, a *humane Deportment*, a *Delight in and Emulation of every thing which is gallant, generous and friendly*.

IN the same manner we are determin'd to common Friendships and Acquaintances, not by the fullen Apprehensions of our *Necessitys*, or Prospects of *Interest*; but by an incredible variety of little agreeable, engaging Evidences of *Love*, *Good-nature*, and other *morally amiable Qualitys* in those we converse with: And among the rest, none of the least considerable is an inclination to *Chearfulness*, a *Delight to raise Mirth* in others, which procures a secret Approbation and Gratitude toward the Person who puts us in such an *agreeable, innocent*,

cent, good-natur'd, and easy state of Mind, Sect. 6. as we are conscious of while we enjoy pleasant Conversation, enliven'd by moderate Laughter.

VI. UPON this *moral* Sense is founded all the Power of the ORATOR. The various Figures of Speech are the several Manners which a lively Genius, warm'd with Passions suitable to the Occasion, naturally runs into, only a little diversify'd by *Custom*: and they only move the *Hearers*, by giving a lively Representation of the Passions of the *Speaker*; which are communicated to the *Hearers*, as we *observ'd above of one Passion, *viz. Pity*.

Now the Passions which the *Orator* attempts to raise, are all founded on *moral Quality*s. All the bold *Metaphors*, or *Descriptions*, all the artificial Manners of *Expostulation*, *Arguing*, and *addressing* the *Audience*, all the *Appeals* to *Mankind*, are but more lively Methods of giving the *Audience* a stronger impression of the *moral Quality*s of the Person *accus'd*, or *defended*; of the Action *advis'd*, or *dissuaded*: and all the *Antitheses*, or *Witticisms*; all the *Cadences* of sonorous Periods, whatever inferior kind of Beauty they may have separately, are of no consequence to persuade,

* See Sect. 5. Art. VIII. Par. 2.

Sect. 6. if we neglect moving the Passions by some Species of *Morality*. They may perhaps raise a little Admiration of the *Speaker* among those who already favour his Party, but they oftner raise Contempt in his *Adversaries*. But when you display the *Benevolence* of any Action, the good Effect it shall have on the *Publick* in promoting the Welfare of the *Innocent*, and relieving the *unjustly distressed*; if you prove your Allegations, you make every Mortal approve the undertaking it. When any Person is to be recommended, display his *Humanity*, *Generosity*, *Study* of the *publick Good*, and *Capacity* to promote it, his *Contempt* of Dangers, and private Pleasures; and you are sure to procure him *Love* and *Esteem*. If at the same time you shew his *Distress*, or the *Injurys* he has suffer'd, you raise *Pity*, and every tender Affection.

ON the contrary, represent the *Barbarity*, or *Cruelty* of any Action, the *Misery* it shall procure to the *Kind*, the *Faithful*, the *Generous*, or only to the *Innocent*; and you raise an Abhorrence of it in the Breasts of the *Audience*, tho they were not the Persons who would have suffer'd by it. The same way, would you make a Person *infamous*, and *despis'd* and *hated*, represent him as *cruel*, *inhuman*, or *treacherous* toward the most distant rational

tional Agents; or shew him only to be Sect. 6.
selfish, given to *solitary Luxury* without
 regard to any *Friend*, or the *Interest* of
 others; and you have gain'd your Point as
 soon as you prove what you alledge. Nay,
 how far does it go to stop our Admiration
 of any *celebrated Action*, to suggest,
 " That the *Author* of it was no *Fool*,
 " he knew it would turn to his own
 " *Advantage*."

Now, are the *Learned* and *Polite* the
 only Persons who are mov'd by such
 Speeches? Must Men know the Schemes
 of the *Moralists* and *Politicians*, or the
Art of *Rhetorick*, to be capable of being
 persuaded? Must they be nicely conversant
 in all the Methods of promoting *Self-Inter-*
est? Nay, do we not see on the contrary,
 the *rude undisciplin'd Multitude* most af-
 fected? Where had *Oratory* so much
 Power as in *popular States*, and that too
 before the Perfection of the Sciences? *Re-*
flexion, and *Study*, may raise in Men a
 suspicion of Design, and Caution of Assent,
 when they have some knowledge of the
 various Topicks of Argument, and find
 them employ'd upon themselves: but *rude*
Nature is still open to every *moral Im-*
pression, and carry'd furiously along with-
 out Caution, or Suspense. It was not the
Groves of the *Academy*, or the *polish'd*
Stones of the *Portico*, or the *manag'd*
Horses

Sec. 6. *Horses* of GREECE, which listen'd to the Harp of an AMPHION, or an ORPHEUS; but the *Trees*, and *Rocks*, and *Tygers* of the *Forest*: which may shew us, "That
 " there is some *Sense* of *Morality* antecedent to Instruction, or metaphysical Arguments proving the *private Interest* of the Person who is persuaded, to be
 " connected with the *publick Good*."

VII. WE shall find the same *moral Sense* to be the Foundation of the chief Pleasures of POETRY. We hinted, in the former Treatise, at the Foundation of Delight in the *Numbers*, *Measures*, *Metaphors*, *Similitudes**. But as the Contemplation of *moral Objects*, either of *Vice* or *Virtue*, affects us more strongly, and moves our Passions in a quite different and more powerful manner than *natural Beauty*, or (what we commonly call) *Deformity*; so the most moving Beautys bear a Relation to our *moral Sense*, and affect us more vehemently than the Representation of *natural Objects* in the liveliest Descriptions. *Dramatic*, and *Epic* Poetry are entirely address'd to this *Sense*, and raise our Passions by the Fortunes of *Characters*, distinctly represented as *morally good*, or *evil*; as might be seen more fully, were we to consider the Passions separately.

* See Treatise I. Sect. 2. Art. XIII. Sect. 4. Art. III.

Where we are studying to raise any *Desire*, Sect. 6.
 or *Admiration* of an Object really beautiful, we are not content with a bare *Narration*, but endeavour, if we can, to present the *Object* it self, or the most *lively Image* of it. And hence it is that the *Epic Poem*, or *Tragedy*, give a vastly greater Pleasure than the Writings of *Philosophers*, tho both aim at recommending *Virtue*. The representing the Actions themselves, if the Representation be *judicious*, *natural*, and *lively*, will make us admire the *Good*, and detest the *Vicious*, the *Inhuman*, the *Treacherous*, and *Cruel*, by means of our *moral Sense*, without any Reflections of the *Poet* to guide our Sentiments. It is for this Reason that HORACE has justly made Knowledge in *Morals* so necessary to a good *Poet* :

*Scribendi rectè SAPERE est & principium & fons **.

And again :

*Qui didicit Patriæ quid debeat, & quid
 Amicis,
 Quo sit amore Parens, quo Frater aman-
 dus, & Hospes,
 Quod sit Conscripti, quod Judicis offi-
 cium, quæ*

* Hor. de Arte Poet. v. 309.

An INQUIRY concerning
Partes in bellum missi Ducis; ille pro-
fecto
Reddere Personæ scit convenientia cui-
que †.

UPON this same *Sense* is founded the Power of that great *Beauty* in Poetry, the PROSOPOPOEIA, by which every *Affection* is made a *Person*; every *natural Event, Cause, Object*, is animated by *moral Epithets*: for we join the Contemplation of *moral Circumstances* and *Qualities* along with *natural Objects*, to increase the *Beauty* or *Deformity*, and affect the *Hearer* in a more lively manner with the *Affections* describ'd, by representing them as *Persons*. Thus a shady Wood must have its *solemn venerable Genius*, and proper *rural Gods*; every clear Fountain, its *sacred chaste Nymph*; and River, its *bountiful God*, with his *Urn*, and perhaps a *Cornu-copia* diffusing *Plenty* and *Fruitfulness* along his Banks. The *Day-light* is *holy, benign, and powerful* to banish the pernicious *Spirits* of the *Night*. The *Morning* is a *kind, officious Goddess*, tripping over the dewy Mountains, and ushering in *Light* to *Gods* and *Men*. War is an *impetuous, cruel, undistinguishing Monster*, whom no *Virtue*, no *Circum-*

† Hor. de Arte Poet. v. 312.

stance of *Compassion*, can move from his Sect. 6.
 bloody Purposes. The Steel is *unrelent-*
ing; the Arrow and Spear are *impatient*
 to destroy, and carry *Death* on their
 Points. Our modern Engines of War are
 also *frightful Personages*, with their rude
 Throats counterfeiting the Thunder of
 Jove. The *moral Imagery* of *Death* is
 every where known, viz. his *insensibility*
 to *Pity*, his *Inflexibility*, and *universal*
impartial Empire. FORTUNE is inimita-
 bly drawn by HORACE*, with all her
Retinue and *Votaries*, and with her *rigid*
severe Minister, *Necessity*. The Quali-
 tys of *Mind* too become *Persons*: Love
 becomes a VENUS, or a CUPID; Cou-
 rage, or *Conduct*, a MARS, or a PALLAS
protecting and *assisting* the Hero; before
 them march *Terror* and *Dread*, *Flight* and
Pursuit, *Shouts*, and *Amazement*. Nay,
 the *most sacred Poets* are often led into
 this *Imagery*, and represent *Justice* and
Judgment as *supporting* the ALMIGHTY'S
 Throne, and *Mercy* and *Truth* going be-
 fore his Face: They shew us *Peace* as
springing up from the Earth, and *Mercy*
looking down from Heaven.

EVERY one perceives a greater Beauty
 in this manner of Representation, this
 Imagery, this Conjunction of *moral Ideas*,

* See Lib. 1. Od. 35.

Sect. 6. than in the fullest Narration, or the most lively natural Description. When one reads the fourth Book of HOMER, and is prepar'd, from the Council of the Gods, to imagine the bloody Sequel, and amidst the most beautiful Description which ever was imagin'd of shooting an Arrow, meets with its *moral Epithet*,

——— μέλαιναων ἔρμ' ὀδυνῶν *,

——— *The Source of blackest Woes ;*

he will find himself more mov'd by this Circumstance, than by all the Profusion of natural Description which Man could imagine.

HISTORY derives its chief Excellence from the representing the *Manners* and *Characters*; the Contemplation of which in *Nature* being very affecting, they must necessarily give Pleasure when well related. It is well known too, that a Collection of the best Pieces of *Face-painting* is but a poor Entertainment, when compar'd with those Pieces which represent *moral Actions*, *Passions*, and *Characters*.

VIII. WE are often told, “ That there
“ is no need of supposing such a *Sense*
“ of *Morality* given to Men, since Re-

* See Homer, *Iliad* 4. v. 117.

“ *reflection*, and *Instruction* would recom- Sect. 6.
 “ mend the same Actions from Arguments
 “ of *Self-Interest*, and engage us, from
 “ the acknowledg’d Principle of *Self-love*,
 “ to the Practice of them, without this
 “ *unintelligible Determination* to *Bene-*
 “ *volence*, or the *occult Quality* of a *moral*
 “ *Sense*.”

IT is perhaps true, that *Reflection* and *Reason* might lead us to approve the same Actions as *advantageous*. But would not the same *Reflection* and *Reason* likewise generally recommend the same *Meats* to us which our *Taste* represents as pleasant? And shall we thence conclude that we have no *Sense* of *Tasting*? or that such a *Sense* is *useless*? No: The use is plain in both Cases. Notwithstanding the mighty *Reason* we boast of above other Animals, its Processes are too slow, too full of doubt and hesitation, to serve us in every Exigency, either for our own Preservation, without the *external Senses*, or to direct our Actions for the *Good* of the *Whole*, without this *moral Sense*. Nor could we be so strongly determin’d at all times to what were most conducive to either of these Ends, without these *expeditious Monitors*, and *importunate Sollicitors*; nor so nobly rewarded when we act vigorously in pursuit of these Ends, by the calm dull Reflections of *Self-Interest*, as by those delightful Sensations.

THIS *natural Determination* to approve and admire, or hate and dislike Actions, is no doubt an *occult Quality*. But is it any way more mysterious that the Idea of an Action should raise *Esteem*, or *Contempt*, than that the motion, or tearing of Flesh should give *Pleasure*, or *Pain*; or the Act of Volition should move *Flesh* and *Bones*? In the latter Case we have got the Brain, and elastic Fibres, and animal Spirits, and elastic Fluids, like the *Indian's* Elephant, and Tortoise, to bear the Burden of the Difficulty: but go one step further, and you find the whole as difficult as at first, and equally a Mystery with *this Determination* to love and approve, or hate and despise *Actions* and *Agents*, without any Views of *Interest*, as they appear *benovolent* or the contrary.


WHEN they offer it as a Presumption that there can be no such *Sense* antecedent to all prospect of *Interest*, “ That these
 “ Actions for the most part are really *advantageous*, one way or other, to the
 “ Actor, the Approver, or Mankind in
 “ general, by whose Happiness our own
 “ State may be some way made better;”
 may we not ask, supposing the DEITY intended to impress such a *Sense* of something *amiable* in Actions, (which is no impossible Supposition) what sort of Actions would

a good GOD determine us to approve? Sect. 6.
 Must we deny the possibility of such a Determination, if it did not lead us to admire Actions of no *Advantage* to *Mankind*, or to love *Agents* for their being *eminent Triflers*? If then the Actions which a wise and good GOD must determine us to approve, if he give us any such *Sense* at all, must be Actions *useful* to the *Publick*, this *Advantage* can never be a Reason against the *Sense* it self. After the same manner we should deny all *Revelation* which taught us good *Sense*, *Humanity*, *Justice*, and a *rational Worship*, because *Reason* and *Interest* do confirm and recommend such *Principles* and *Services*; and should greedily embrace every *Contradiction*, *Foppery*, and *Pageantry*, as a truly *divine Institution*, without any thing *humane*, or *useful* to *Mankind*.

IX. THE Writers upon opposite Schemes, who deduce all Ideas of *Good* and *Evil* from the *private Advantage* of the *Actor*, or from Relation to a *Law* and its *Sanctions*, either known from *Reason* or *Revelation*, are perpetually recurring to this *moral Sense* which they deny, not only in calling the *Laws* of the DEITY *just* and *good*, and alledging *Justice* and *Right* in the DEITY to govern us; but by using a set of Words which import something different from what they will allow to be their

Sect. 6. only meaning. *Obligation* with them is nothing else but such a *Constitution* either of *Nature*, or *some governing Power*, as makes it advantageous for the *Agent* to act in a certain manner. Let this Definition be substituted wherever we meet with the words, *ought*, *should*, *must*, in a moral Sense, and many of their Sentences would seem very strange; as that the DEITY *must* act rationally, *must* not, or *ought* not to punish the Innocent, *must* make the state of the *Virtuous* better than that of the *Wicked*, *must* observe Promises; substituting the Definition of the Words, *must*, *ought*, *should*, would make these Sentences either ridiculous, or very disputable.

S E C T.



S E C T. VII.

A Deduction of some Complex moral Ideas, viz. of Obligation, and Right, Perfect, Imperfect, and External, Alienable, and Unalienable, from this moral Sense.

I. **T**O conclude this Subject, we may, from what has been said, see the true Original of moral Ideas, viz. “ This “ moral Sense of Excellence in every Appearance, or Evidence of Benevolence ;” and that we have Ideas of *Virtue* and *Vice*, abstractly from any *Law*, *Human* or *Divine*.

IF any one ask, Can we have any Sense of OBLIGATION abstractly from the *Laws* of a *Superior* ? we must answer according to the various Senses of the word *Obligation*. If by *Obligation* we understand a *Determination*, without regard to our own Interest, to approve *Actions*, and to perform them ; which *Determination* shall also make us displeas’d with our selves, and uneasy upon having acted contrary to this Sense ; in this meaning of the word *Obligation*, there is naturally an *Obligation*

Sect. 7. *tion* upon all Men to *Benevolence*; and they are still under its Influence, even when by false or partial Opinions of the natural Tendency of Actions, this *moral Sense* leads them to *Evil*; unless, by long inveterate Habits it be exceedingly weaken'd: for it scarce seems possible wholly to extinguish it. Or, which is to the same purpose, this *internal Sense*, and *Instinct* toward *Benevolence*, will either influence our Actions, or else make us very uneasy and dissatisfy'd; and we shall be conscious that we are in a base unhappy State, even without considering any *Law* whatsoever, or any external Advantages lost, or Disadvantages impending from its Sanctions. And further, there are still such Indications given us of what is in the whole *benevolent*, and what not, as may probably discover to us the true Tendency of every Action, and let us see, some time or other, the evil Tendency of what upon a partial View appear'd *benevolent*: so that no Mortal can secure to himself a perpetual Serenity, Satisfaction, and Self-approbation, but by a *serious Inquiry* into the Tendency of his Actions, and a *perpetual Study* of *universal Good*.

BUT if by *Obligation* we understand a *Motive from Self-Interest* sufficient to determine all those who duly consider it, and pursue their own Advantage wisely,
to

to a certain Course of Actions ; we may Sect. 7.
 have a Sense of such *Obligation* by reflecting on this *Determination* of our Nature to approve *Virtue*, to be pleas'd and happy when we reflect upon our having done *virtuous Actions*, and to be uneasy when we are conscious of having acted otherwise ; and also by considering how much superior we esteem the Happiness of *Virtue* to any other Enjoyment *. We may likewise have a Sense of this sort of *Obligation*, by considering those Reasons which prove a constant Course of *benevolent* and *social Actions* to be the most probable means of promoting the *natural Good* of every *Individual* ; as CUMBERLAND and PUFFENDORF have prov'd : And all this without Relation to a *Law*.

BUT further, if our *moral Sense* be suppos'd exceedingly weaken'd, and the *selfish Passions* grown strong, either thro some general Corruption of Nature, or inveterate Habits ; if our *Understanding* be weak, and we be often in danger of being hurry'd by our *Passions* into precipitate and rash Judgments, that *malicious Actions* shall more promote our Advantage than *Benevolence* ; in such a Case, if it be inquir'd what is necessary to engage Men to *benevolent Actions*, or induce a steady Sense of

* See above, Sect. 6. Art. I, II.

Sect. 7. *Obligation* to act for the *publick Good* ;
 then, no doubt, “ A *Law* with Sanctions,
 “ given by a *superior Being*, of sufficient
 “ Power to make us happy or miserable,
 “ must be necessary to counter-balance
 “ those apparent Motives of *Interest*, to
 “ calm our *Passions*, and give room for
 “ the recovery of our *moral Sense*, or at
 “ least for a just View of our *Interest*.”

II. Now the principal Business of the
moral Philosopher is to shew, from solid
 Reasons, “ That *universal Benevolence*
 “ tends to the Happiness of the *Benevo-*
 “ *lent*, either from the Pleasures of *Re-*
 “ *flection*, *Honour*, *natural Tendency* to
 “ engage the good Offices of Men, upon
 “ whole Aid we must depend for our Hap-
 “ piness in this World ; or from the Sanc-
 “ tions of *divine Laws* discover’d to us
 “ by the Constitution of the ‘*Universe* ;’
 that so no apparent Views of *Interest* may
 counteract this *natural Inclination* : but
 not to attempt proving, “ That Prospects
 “ of our *own Advantage* of any kind, can
 “ raise in us *real Love* to others.” Let the
 Obstacles from *Self-love* be only remov’d,
 and NATURE it self will incline us to *Bene-*
volence. Let the Misery of *excessive Sel-*
fishness, and all its Passions, be but once
 explain’d, that so *Self-love* may cease to
 counteract our *natural Propensity* to *Bene-*
volence, and when this *noble Disposition*
 gets

gets loose from these Bonds of *Ignorance*, Sect. 7. and false Views of *Interest*, it shall be assisted even by *Self-love*, and grow strong enough to make a *noble virtuous Character*. Then he is to enquire by *Reflection* upon human Affairs, what Course of Action does most effectually promote the *universal Good*, what universal Rules or Maxims are to be observ'd, and in what Circumstances the Reason of them alters so as to admit Exceptions; that so our *good Inclinations* may be directed by *Reason*, and a *just Knowledge* of the *Interests* of *Mankind*. But *Virtue* it self, or *good Dispositions* of *Mind*, are not directly taught, or produc'd by *Instruction*; but are the *Effect* of the great AUTHOR of all things, who forms our *Nature* for them.

II. BUT that our first Ideas of *moral Good* depend not on *Laws*, may plainly appear from our constant Inquiries into the *Justice* of *Laws themselves*, and that not only of *human Laws*, but of the *divine*. What else can be the meaning of that universal Opinion, "That the *Laws* of God are *just*, and *holy*, and *good*?" *Human Laws* may be call'd *good*, because of their Conformity to the *Divine*. But to call the *Laws* of the supreme DEITY *good*, or *holy*, or *just*, if all *Goodness*, and *Holiness*, and *Justice* be constituted by *Laws*, or the *Will* of a *Superior* any way
re-

Sect. 7. reveal'd, must be an insignificant Tautology amounting to no more than this, "That *GOD wills what he wills.*" It must then first be suppos'd that there is something in Actions which is apprehended *absolutely good*; and this is *Benevolence*, or a Tendency to the *publick natural Happiness* of *rational Agents*; and that our *moral Sense* perceives this *Excellence*: and then we call the *Laws* of the DEITY *good*, when we imagine that they are contriv'd to promote the *publick Good* in the most effectual and impartial manner. And the DEITY is called *good* in a *moral Sense*, when we apprehend that his *whole Providence* tends to the universal Happiness of his *Creatures*; whence we conclude his *Benevolence*, and *Delight* in their Happiness.

SOME tell us, "That the *Goodness* of the *divine Laws* consists in their *Conformity* to some *essential Rectitude* of his *Nature.*" But they must excuse us from assenting to this, till they make us understand the meaning of this Metaphor, *essential Rectitude*, and till we discern whether any thing more is meant by it than a *perfectly wise, uniform, impartial Benevolence.*

HENCE we may see the Difference between *Constraint*, and *Obligation.* There is

is indeed no Difference between *Constraint*, Sect. 7. and the second Sense of the word *Obligation*, viz. *a Constitution which makes an Action eligible from Self-Interest*, if we only mean *external Interest*, distinct from the delightful Consciousness which arises from the *moral Sense*. The Reader need scarcely be told, that by *Constraint* we do not understand *external Force* moving our Limbs without our Consent, for in that Case we are not *Agents* at all; but that *Constraint* which arises from the threatening and presenting some *Evil*, in order to make us act in a certain manner. And yet there seems a universally acknowledged Difference between even this sort of *Constraint*, and *Obligation*. We never say we are *oblig'd* to do an Action which we count base, but we may be *constrain'd* to it; we never say that the *divine Laws* by their Sanctions *constrain* us, but *oblige* us; nor do we call Obedience to the DEITY *Constraint* unless by a Metaphor, altho many own that they are influenc'd by fear of Punishments. And yet supposing an *almighty evil Being* should require under grievous Penaltys, *Treachery*, *Cruelty*, *Ingratitude*, we would call this *Constraint*. The difference is plainly this; when any Sanctions are join'd to co-operate with our *moral Sense*, in exciting us to Actions which we count *morally good*, we say we are *obliged*; but when Sanctions of Rewards or Threatnings oppose our *mo-*
ral

Sec. 7. *ral Sense*, then we say we are *brib'd* or *constrain'd*: In the former Case we call the *Lawgiver* good, as designing the *publick Happiness*; in the latter we call him *evil*, or *unjust*, for the suppos'd *contrary* Intention. But were all our Ideas of *moral Good* or *Evil* deriv'd solely from Opinions of *private Advantage* or *Loss* in Actions, I see no possible difference which could be made in the meaning of these words.

IV. FROM this Sense too we derive our Ideas of RIGHTS. Whenever it appears to us, that a *Faculty of doing, demanding, or possessing any thing, universally allow'd in certain Circumstances, would in the whole tend to the general Good*, we say that any Person in such Circumstances has a *Right to do, possess, or demand that Thing*. And according as this Tendency to the *publick Good* is *greater or less*, the *Right* is *greater or less*.

THE *Rights* call'd *perfect* are of such necessity to the *publick Good*, that the *universal Violation* of them would make *human Life intolerable*, and it actually makes those miserable, whose *Rights* are thus *violated*: And on the contrary, to fulfil these *Rights* in every Instance, tends to the *publick Good*, either *directly*, or by promoting the innocent Advantage of a *Part*. Hence it plainly follows, " That allow-
" ing

" ing a violent Defence, or Prosecution of Sect. 7.
 " such *Rights*, before Civil Government
 " be constituted, cannot in any particular
 " Case be more detrimental to the *Publick*,
 " than the Violation of them with Impu-
 " nity:" And as to the general Conse-
 quences, The universal Ule of Force in a
State of Nature, in pursuance of *perfect*
Rights, seems exceedingly *advantageous* to
 the *Whole*, by making every one dread any
 Attempts against the *perfect Rights* of o-
 thers. This is the *moral Effect* which at-
 tends *proper Injury*, or a *Violation of the*
perfect Rights of others, viz. A right
 to *War*, and *all Violence* which is neces-
 sary to oblige the *Injurious* to repair the
 Damage, and give Security against such
 Offences for the future. Instances of *per-*
fect Rights are those to our *Lives*; to the
Fruits of our Labours; to demand Per-
 formance of *Contracts* upon valuable Con-
 siderations, from Men capable of perform-
 ing them; to *direct* our own Actions ei-
 ther for *publick*, or *innocent private Good*,
 before we have submitted them to the Di-
 rection of others in any measure: and ma-
 ny others of like nature.

IMPERFECT *Rights* are such as, when
universally violated, would not necessarily
make Men miserable. These *Rights* tend
 to the improvement and increase of *positive*
Good in any Society, but are not *absolute-*


Sect. 7. *ly* necessary to prevent universal Misery.

~ The Violation of them only disappoints Men of the Happiness expected from the Humanity or Gratitude of others; but does not deprive Men of any *Good* which they had before. From this Description it appears, " That a violent Prosecution of such *Rights* would generally " occasion greater *Evil* than the Violation " of them." Besides, the allowing of Force in such Cases, would deprive Men of the greatest Pleasure in Actions of *Kindness*, *Humanity*, *Gratitude*; which would cease to appear amiable, when Men could be constrain'd to perform them. Instances of *imperfect Rights* are those which the *Poor* have to the Charity of the *Wealthy*; which *all Men* have to Offices of no trouble or expence to the Performer; which *Bene-factors* have to returns of Gratitude, and such like. The Violation of *imperfect Rights* only argues a Man to have such weak *Benevolence*, as not to study advancing the *positive Good* of others, when in the least opposite to his own: but the Violation of *perfect Rights* argues the *injurious Person* to be *positively evil* or *cruel*; or at least so *immoderately selfish*, as to be indifferent about the *positive Misery* and *Ruin* of others, when he imagines he can find his *Interest* in it. In violating the *former*, we shew a weak Desire of *publick Happiness*, which every small View of *private Interest* over-ballances;

but in violating the *latter*, we shew our Sect. 7. selves so entirely negligent of the *Misery* of others, that Views of increasing our own *Good* overcome all our Compassion toward their Sufferings. Now as the absence of *Good* is more easily born than the presence of *Misery*, so the Power of our good *Wishes* toward the *positive Good* of others, is weaker than that of *Compassion* toward their *Misery*. He then who violates *imperfect Rights*, shews that his *Self-love* overcomes only the Desire of *positive Good* to others; but he who violates *perfect Rights*, betrays such a *selfish* Desire of advancing his own *positive Good*, as overcomes all the Power of *Compassion* toward the *Misery* of others.

BESIDE these two sorts of *Rights*, there is a third call'd *External*; as when the *doing, possessing, or demanding of any thing is really detrimental to the Publick in any particular Instance, as being contrary to the imperfect Right of another: but yet the universal denying Men this Faculty of doing, possessing, or demanding that Thing, or of using Force in pursuance of it, would do more mischief than all the Evils to be fear'd from the Use of this Faculty.* And hence it appears, "That there can be no Right to use Force in opposition even to *external Rights*, since it tends to the *universal Good* to allow Force in pursuance of them."

Sect. 7.

 CIVIL Society's substitute *Actions* in Law, instead of the Force allow'd in the *State of Nature*.

INSTANCES of *external Rights* are these; that of a *wealthy Miser* to recal his Loan from the most industrious poor Tradesman at any time; that of demanding the Performance of a *Covenant* too burdensom on one side; the Right of a *wealthy Heir* to refuse Payment of any Debts which were contracted by him under Age, without Fraud in the Lender; the Right of taking advantage of a *positive Law*, contrary to what was *Equity* antecedent to that Law; as when a *register'd Deed* takes place of one not register'd, altho prior to it, and known to be so before the second Contract.

Now whereas no *Action*, *Demand*, or *Possession* can at once be either necessary to the *publick Good*, or conducive to it, and at the same time its *contrary* be either necessary or conducive to the same end; it follows, "That there can be no Opposition of *perfect Rights* among themselves, " of *imperfect* among themselves, or between *perfect* and *imperfect Rights*." But it may often tend to the *publick Good*, to allow a *Right* of doing, possessing, or demanding, and of using *Force* in pursuance of it, while perhaps it would have been more humane


humane and kind in any Person to have act- Sect. 7.
 ed otherwise, and not have claim'd his *Right*: but yet a violent Opposition to
these Rights would have been vastly more
pernicious than all the Inhumanity in the
 use of them. And therefore, however *ex-*
ternal Rights cannot be opposite among
 themselves; yet they may be opposite to
imperfect Rights; but *imperfect Rights*,
 tho violated, give no *Right* to *Force*: and
 hence it appears, "That there can never
 be a *Right* to *Force* on both Sides, or a
 " *War* on both Sides *just* at the same time."

V. THERE is another important Difference of *Rights*, according as they are *Alien-*
able, or *Unalienable*. To determine what
Rights are *alienable*, and what not, we
 must take these two Marks:

1st. IF the Alienation be within our natural Power, so that it be possible for us in Fact to transfer our *Right*; and if it be so, then,

2^{dly}. IT must appear that a Power to transfer such *Rights* may serve some valuable Purpose.

By the *first* Mark it appears, "That the
 " *Right* of *private Judgment*, or of our
 " *inward Sentiments*, is *unalienable*;" since
 we cannot command our selves to think what

Sect. 7.  either we our selves, or any other Person pleases : and so are also our *internal Affections*, which necessarily arise according to our Opinions of their Objects. By the *second* Mark it appears, “ That our *Right* of “ *serving* GOD in the manner which we “ think acceptable, is not *alienable* ;” because it can never serve any valuable purpose to make Men serve him in a way which seems to them displeasing to him. The same way, a *direct Right* over our *Lives* or *Limbs*, is not *alienable* to any Person ; so that he might at pleasure put us to death, or maim us. We have indeed a *Right* to hazard our Lives in any good Action which is of importance to *the Publick* ; and it may often serve a most valuable end, to subject the direction of such perilous Actions to the Prudence of others in pursuing a *publick Good* ; as *Souldiers* do to their *General*, or to a *Council of War* : and so far this *Right* is *alienable*. These may serve as Instances to shew the Use of the two Marks of *alienable Rights*, which must both concur to make them so, and will explain the manner of applying them in other Cases.

VI. THAT we may see the Foundation of some of the more *important Rights* of *Mankind*, let us observe, That probably nine Tenths, at least, of the things which are useful to Mankind, are owing to their *Labour* and *Industry* ; and consequently all
Men

Men are oblig'd to observe such a Tenour of Sect. 7.
 Action as shall most effectually promote *Industry*; and to abstain from all Actions which would have the contrary effect. It is well known, that *general Benevolence* alone is not a Motive strong enough to *Industry*, to bear *Labour* and *Toil*, and many other Difficultys which we are averſe to from *Self-love*: For the ſtrengthening therefore our Motives to *Industry*, we have the ſtrongest Attractions of *Blood*, of *Friendſhip*, of *Gratitude*, and the additional Motives of *Honour*, and even of *external Interest*. *Self-love* is really as neceſſary to the *Good* of the *Whole* as *Benevolence*; as that *Attraction* which cauſes the Cohesion of the Parts, is as neceſſary to the *regular State* of the *Whole*, as *Gravitation*: Without theſe additional Motives, *Self-love* would generally oppoſe the Motions of *Benevolence*, and concur with *Malice*, or influence us to the ſame Actions which *Malice* would.

“ Whatever Tenour of Action then would
 “ take away the ſtronger Ties of *Benevo-*
 “ *lence*, or the additional Motives of *Ho-*
 “ *nour* and *Advantage* from our *Minds*,
 “ and ſo hinder us from purſuing *industri-*
 “ *ouſly* that Courſe which really increa-
 “ ſes the *Good* of the *Whole*, is *evil*;
 “ and we are oblig'd to ſhun it.”

FIRST then, the depriving any Perſon of the Fruits of his own innocent Labour, takes

Sect. 7. away all Motives of *Self-love* from *Industry*, and leaves *Benevolence* alone; nay it exposes the *Industrious* as a constant Prey to the *Slothful*, and sets *Self-love* against *Industry*. This is the Ground of our *Right* of *Dominion* and *Property* in the *Fruits* of our *Labours*; without which *Right*, we could scarce hope for any *Industry*, or any thing beyond the Product of uncultivated Nature. *Industry* will be confin'd to our present Necessitys, and cease when they are provided for, at least it will only continue from the weak Motive of *general Benevolence*, if we are not allow'd to store up beyond present Necessity, and to dispose of what is above our Necessitys, either in Barter for other kinds of Necessarys, or for the Service of our Friends or Familys. And hence appears the *Right* which Men have to lay up for the *future*, the Goods which will not be spoil'd by it; of alienating them in *Trade*; of Donation to *Friends*, *Children*, *Relations*: otherwise we deprive *Industry* of all the Motives of *Self-love*, *Friendship*, *Gratitude*, *natural Affection*. The same Foundation there is for the *Right* of Disposition by *Testament*. The *Presumption* of this Disposition is the Ground of the *Right* of Succession to the *Intestate*.

THE *external Right* of the *Miser* to his useless Hoards, is founded also on this, That allowing Persons by Violence, or without
Consent

Consent of the Acquirer, to take the Use Sect. 7. of his Acquisitions, would discourage *Industry*, and take away all the Pleasures of *Generosity*, *Honour*, *Charity*, which cease when Men can be forc'd into these Actions. Besides, there is no determining in many Cases, who is a *Miser*, and who is not.

MARRIAGE must be so constituted as to ascertain the Offspring; otherwise we take away from the *Males* one of the strongest Motives to *publick Good*, viz. *natural Affection*, and discourage *Industry*; as has been shewn above.


THE *Labour* of each Man cannot furnish him with all Necessaries, tho it may furnish him with a needless Plenty of one sort: Hence the *Right of Commerce*, and *alienating* our Goods; and also the *Rights* from *Contracts* and *Promises*, either to the *Goods* acquir'd by others, or to their *Labours*.

VII. THESE Instances may shew how our *moral Sense*, by a little Reflection upon the tendency of Actions, may adjust the *Rights* of *Mankind*. Let us now apply the general Canon laid down above *, for comparing the Degrees of *Virtue* and *Vice* in Actions, in a few Corollaries besides that one already deduc'd †.

* See Sect. 3. Art. XI.

† See Sect. 3. Art. XV. Par. 2.

Sect. 7.



1. THE Disappointment in whole or in part of any Attempt, *Good* or *Evil*, if it be occasion'd only by external Force, or any unforeseen Accident, does not vary the *moral Good*, or *Evil*; for as in *good* Attempts, the *Moment* of *Good*, or [M] is diminish'd, or vanishes in such a case, so does the *Ability*, or [A] likewise: The *Quotient* then may still be the same; and so in *evil* Attempts: So that Actions are not to be judg'd *good* or *evil* by the Events, any farther than they might have been foreseen by the *Agent* in *evil* Attempts; or were actually intended, if they were *good*, in *good* Actions; for then only they argue either *Love* or *Hatred* in the *Agent*.

2. SECULAR *Rewards* annex'd to *Virtue*, and actually influencing the *Agent* further than his *Benevolence* would, diminish the *moral Good*, in as far as they were necessary to move the *Agent* to the Action, or to make him do more *Good* than otherwise he would have done; for by increasing the *Interest*, or [I *positive*] to be subtracted, they diminish the *Benevolence*. But *additional Interests* which were not necessary to have mov'd the *Agent*, such as the *Rewards* of a *good Being* for Actions which he would have undertaken without a *Reward*, do not diminish the *Virtue*. In this however no Mortal is capable of judging
ano.

another. Nor do the Prospects of *grateful* Sect. 7. Returns for Benefits which we would have conferr'd gratuitously, diminish the *Generosity*. This Corollary may be apply'd to the *Rewards* of a *future State*, if any Person conceives them distinct from the Pleasures of *Virtue* itself: If they be not conceiv'd as something distinct from those Pleasures, then the very Desire of them is a strong Evidence of a *virtuous Disposition*.

3. EXTERNAL *Advantage* exciting us to Actions of *evil* Tendency to others, if without this Prospect of *Advantage* we would not have undertaken them, diminishes the *Evil* of the Action; such as the Prospects of *great Rewards*, of avoiding *Tortures*, or even the *uneasy Sollicitations* of violent *selfish Passions*: And this is commonly call'd the *greatness of Temptation*. The reason of this is the same with that in the former Case, since $H = \frac{\mu - I}{A}$. We

may here also remember again, that we are more uneasy upon the presence of *Pain*, than upon the absence of *Good*; and hence *Torture* is a more extenuating Circumstance than *Bribes* engaging us to *Evil*, because [I] is greater.

4. THE surmounting the uneasy Sollicitations of the *selfish Passions*, increases the *Virtue*

Sect. 7. *Virtue* of a *benevolent* Action, and much more worldly Losses, Toil, &c. for now the *Interest* becomes *negative*; the Subtraction of which increaseth the *Quantity*.

5. A MALICIOUS Action is made the more odious by all its foreseen *Disadvantages* to the *Agent*, for the same reason: particularly,

6. THE Knowledge of a *Law* prohibiting an *evil* Action, increaseth the *Evil* by increasing the *negative Interest* to be subtracted; for then the *ill-natur'd* Inclination must be so strong as to surmount all the Motives of *Self-love*, to avoid the Penalties, and all the Motives of *Gratitude* toward the *Law-giver*. This is commonly call'd *sinning against Conscience*.

7. OFFICES of no *Toil* or *Expence*, have little *Virtue* generally, because the *Ability* is very great, and there is no *contrary Interest* surmounted.

8. BUT the refusing of them may be very *vitious*, as it argues an absence of *good Affection*, and has often a great enough Moment of *natural Evil*. And,

9. IN general, the fulfilling the *perfect Rights* of others has little *Virtue* in it; for thereby no *Moment* of *Good* is produc'd more than there was before; and the *Interest*

rest engaging to the Action is very great, Sect. 7.
even the avoiding all the Evils of *War* in a
State of Nature.

10. But the *violating perfect Rights*, or even *external ones*, is always *exceedingly evil*, either in the immediate, or more remote Consequences of the Action; and the *selfish Motives* surmounted by this *vitious Inclination*, are the same with those in the former Case.

11. THE truest Matter of Praise are those Actions or Offices which others claim from us by an *imperfect Right*; and generally, the stronger their *Right* is, there is the less *Virtue* in fulfilling it, but the greater *Vice* in violating it.

LEMMA. The stronger Ties of *Benevolence*, in *equal Abilitys*, must produce a greater *Moment of Good*, in *equally good Characters*, than the weaker Ties: thus, *natural Affection*, *Gratitude*, *Friendship*, have greater Effects than *general Benevolence*. Hence,

12. IN *equal Moments of Good* produc'd by two *Agents*, when one acts from *general Benevolence*, and the other from a *nearer Tie*; there is greater *Virtue* in the *Agent*, who produces *equal Good* from the weaker Attachment, and less *Virtue*, where there
is

Sect. 7. is the stronger Attachment, which yet produces no more.

13. But the Omission of the *good Offices* of the stronger Ties, or Actions *contrary* to them, have greater *Vice* in them, than the like Omissions or Actions contrary to the weaker Ties; since our *Selfishness* or *Malice* must appear the greater, by the strength of the contrary Attachment which it surmounts. Thus in co-operating with *Gratitude*, *natural Affection*, or *Friendship*, we evidence less *Virtue* in any given Moment of *Good* produc'd, than in equally important Actions of *general Benevolence*: But *Ingratitude* to a *Benefactor*, *Negligence* of the *Interests* of a *Friend*, or *Relation*; or Returns of *evil Offices*, are vastly more odious, than *equal Negligence*, or *evil Offices* toward *Strangers*.

14. WHEN we cannot at once follow two different Inclinations of *Benevolence*, we are to prefer gratifying the stronger Inclination according to the wise Order of NATURE, who has constituted these Attachments: thus, we are rather to be *Grateful* than *Liberal*, rather serve a *Friend*, or *Kinsman*, than a *Stranger* of only *equal Virtue*, when we cannot do both.

VIII. LET us not imagine, that from the above Idea of *Right* it will follow, that

that the *wise* and *benevolent* have a per- Sect. 7.
fect Right to dispose of the Labours or
 Goods of the *weak* or *foolish*, because per-
 haps they would better employ them for the
publick Good than the unskilful Possessors
 can; for tho in some particular Cases this
 might happen to do good, as when a *good-na-*
tur'd OCTAVIUS assum'd the Government
 of a *distracted Commonwealth*; yet what
 would be the Consequence of allowing this
 universally, while there is no acknowledg'd
 Standard, or Judge of *superior Wisdom* or
Benevolence, which every one would be
 too apt to claim? And as each Man is
 more nearly engag'd for his own *Good* by
Self-love, than another is by mere *Bene-*
volence, he will scarcely be brought to be-
 lieve, that another understands his *Interest*,
 or pursues it, better than he could himself.
 And what Happiness can remain to the *Go-*
vern'd, while there is any Suspicion of ei-
 ther the *Benevolence* or *Wisdom* of the
Governor? Especially when there are too
 great Presumptions, that Governors may
 be sway'd by *Self-love* against the *publick*
Good. From this Consideration, as well as
 the *natural Love* of *Liberty*, and *Inclina-*
tion both to act and judge for our selves,
 we justly conclude, " That except when
 " Men, for their *own Interest*, or out of
 " *publick Love*, have by *consent* subjected
 " their Actions, or their Goods within cer-
 " tain Limits to the Pleasure of others; no
 " Mortal

Sect. 7. "Mortal can have a *Right* from his *superior Wisdom*, or *Goodness*, or any other *Quality*, to give Laws to others without their *Consent*, *express* or *tacit*; or to dispose of the *Fruits* of their Labours, or of any other *Right* whatsoever."

BUT then with relation to the DEITY, suppos'd *omniscient* and *benevolent*, and secure from *Indigence*, the ordinary Cause of Injuriys towards others; it must be *amiable* in such a *Being*, to assume the Government of *weak*, *inconstant* *Creatures*, often misled by *Selfishness*; and to give them Laws. To these Laws every Mortal should submit from *publick Love*, as being contriv'd for the *Good* of the *Whole*, and for the *greatest private Good* consistent with it; and we should be better guided by them than by our own utmost Circumspection. Hence we imagine, "That a *good* and *wise* GOD must have a *perfect Right* to govern the *Universe*; and that all Mortals are oblig'd to *universal Obedience*."

THE *Justice* of the DEITY is only a Conception of his *universal impartial Benevolence*, as it shall influence him, if he gives any Laws, to attemper them to the *universal Good*, and inforce them with the most effectual Sanctions of *Rewards* and *Punishments*.


SOME

IX. SOME imagine that the *Property* Sect. 7.
 the *Creator* has in all his Works, must be
 the *true* Foundation of his *Right* to go-
 vern. Among Men indeed, we find it ne-
 cessary for the *publick Good*, that none
 should arbitrarily dispose of the Goods ac-
 quir'd by the Labour of another, which
 we call his *Property*; and hence we ima-
 gine that *Creation* is the *only* Foundation
 of God's *Dominion*. But if the Reason
 of establishing the *Rights* of *Property* does
 not hold against a *perfectly wise* and *be-
 nevolent Being*, I see no Reason why *Pro-
 perty* should be necessary to his *Dominion*;
 but the Reason does not hold: For an
infinitely wise and *good Being* could never
 (by his assuming Authority) counteract the
universal Good. The tie of *Gratitude* is
 stronger indeed than bare *Benevolence*; and
 therefore supposing two *equally wise* and
good Beings, the one our *Creator*, and the
 other not, we would think ourselves more
 oblig'd to obey our *Creator*. But supposing
 our *Creator Malicious*, and a *good Being*
 condescending to rescue us, or govern us
 better, with sufficient Power to accomplish
 his kind Intentions; his *Right* to govern
 would be perfectly good. But this is ra-
 ther matter of curious Speculation than
 Use; since both Titles of *Benevolence* and
Property concur in the *one only true*
 DEITY, as far as we can know, join'd with
infinite Wisdom and *Power*.

T

X. IF

Sect. 7.



X. IF it be here enquir'd, " Could not
 " the DEITY have given us a *different* or
 " *contrary determination of Mind, viz. to*
 " *approve* Actions upon another Foundation
 " than *Benevolence*? It is certain, there is
 nothing in this surpassing the natural Power
 of the DEITY. But as in the first Trea-
 tise * we resolv'd the Constitution of our
 present *Sense of Beauty* into the *divine*
Goodness, so with much more obvious Rea-
 son may we ascribe the present Constitu-
 tion of our *moral Sense* to his *Goodness*.
 For if the DEITY be really *benevolent*, or
delights in the Happiness of others, he
 could not *rationaly* act otherwise, or give
 us a *moral Sense* upon another Foundation,
 without counteracting his own *benevolent*
Intentions. For, upon the Supposition of
 a *contrary Sense*, every *rational Being*
 must have been solicitous in some degree
 about his own external Happiness: Re-
 flection on the Circumstances of Mankind
 in this World would have suggested, that a
universal Benevolence and *social Temper*,
 or a Course of such external Actions, would
 most effectually promote the *external Good*
 of every one, according to the Reasonings
 of CUMBERLAND and PUFFENDORF;
 while at the same time this *perverted*
Sense of Morality would have made us un-

* Sect. 8. Art. 2. Par. 5.

easy in such a Course, and inclin'd us to the Sect. 7. quite contrary, viz. *Barbarity, Cruelty, and Fraud*; and *universal War*, according to Mr. HOBBS, would really have been our *natural State*; so that in every Action we must have been distracted by two contrary Principles, and perpetually miserable, and dissatisfy'd when we follow'd the Directions of either.

XI. IT has been often taken for granted in *these Papers*, "That the DEITY is morally good;" tho the Reasoning is not at all built upon this Supposition. If we would know the Reason of the great Agreement of Mankind in this Opinion, we shall perhaps find no demonstrative Arguments *a priori*, from the Idea of an *Independent Being*, to prove his *Goodness*: but there is abundant Probability deduc'd from the whole *Frame of Nature*, which seems, as far as we know, plainly contriv'd for the *Good* of the *Whole*; and the casual Evils seem the necessary Concomitants of some Mechanism design'd for vastly prepollent *Good*. Yea, this very *moral Sense*, implanted in *rational Agents*, to delight in, and admire whatever Actions flow from a Study of the *Good* of *others*, is one of the strongest Evidences of *Goodness* in the AUTHOR of *Nature*. But these Reflections are no way so universal as the Opinion, nor are they often inculcated by any one.

What

Sect. 7. What then more probably leads *Mankind* into that Opinion, is this: The obvious *Frame* of the *World* gives us Ideas of *boundless Wisdom* and *Power* in its *AUTHOR*; such a *Being* we cannot conceive *indigent*, and must conclude *happy*, and in the *best State* possible, since he can still gratify himself: The *best State* of *rational Agents*, and their *greatest* and most *worthy Happiness*, we are necessarily led to imagine must consist in *universal efficacious Benevolence*; and hence we conclude the *DEITY* *benevolent* in the most *universal impartial manner*. Nor can we well imagine what else deserves the Name of *Perfection* but *Benevolence*, and those *Capacities* or *Abilities* which are necessary to make it *effectual*; such as *Wisdom*, and *Power*: at least we can have no other valuable Conception of it.

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